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“Live together like brothers and do business like
strangers.”
(Arabic proverb)
Virtuality has changed the way commerce is conducted, even how economies work, since
“the Internet has influenced the economy in every respect” (Choi and Yi, 2009, p. 39).
Where ancient market places were built on personal relationships and in-person trans-
actions, the consumer culture of the 20th century was rather characterized by mass
markets and anonymity. E-Commerce on the Internet now comprises both aspects: On
the one hand, many online market places yield anonymity among the transaction part-
ners, sometimes even ambiguity about the nature of the other party. On the other hand,
however, recent forms of e-commerce are explicitly based on the notion of personal con-
nections and relations. Starting from services like eBay early on, peer-to-peer platforms
today allow to market and share spare real estate, commodities, skills, or time. In
the “global village,” knowledge about identity, history, and accountability potentially
decreases economic risk and thus increases potential counterparts’ mutual trustworthi-
ness, which is a prerequisite for exchange. Operators of peer-to-peer platforms have
recognized this and urge their users to create personal profiles and maintain their online
presence, let alone the appearance in online social networks. This puts transactions in
e-commerce increasingly into a social context. And it leads to new questions for market
engineers, designers and operators of e-commerce platforms, but also with regard to
economic decision situations involving social facets in a wider sense.
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In particular, the aspects social context and risk become more explicit in online envi-
ronments, since people lack the necessary sensing capabilities when there is no physical
presence and direct contact. But the factors social context and risk are neither new
nor limited to e-commerce. They do, however, appear in a new light in the context of
peer-to-peer economies, in some cases even driving business success. The convergence of
“private” and “professional” sphere in many e-commerce applications raises new ques-
tions. On the one hand, economic decision making may be distorted when the mere
economic outcome is intermingled with personal and relational objectives. The gen-
eral presence of peers may, on the other hand, be part of an online- and peer-to-peer
provider’s value proposition, be it the thrill of competing, the “warm-glow” of helping
others, or the anticipation of complacent interaction.
This work thus addresses risky decision making in stylized market situations, which are
characterized by the presence of a peer. In two major experimental studies, the peer’s role
is investigated by systematically varying i) the nature of the peer (human or computer),
and ii) the relationship to the peer (friend or stranger). The interplay of social context
and individual risk preferences should be of interest in view of economic and information
systems related matters. By taking a theoretical and practical perspective, this work
may inform market design as well as operators and users in the e-commerce business.
1.1. The “Peer-to-Peer Economy”
The advent of the personal computer and the World Wide Web have caused a shift in
the structure of who is able to offer products and services to a global pool of potential
customers. E-business and e-commerce have almost become the default form of economic
exchange and are ubiquitous in today’s society. “As computers and the Internet pervade
almost every corner of life, the impact of IT on economic behavior is definitive” (Riedl
et al., 2011, p. 2). Whereas it was long reserved to large corporations with sufficient
resources for development, marketing, and logistics, private persons can now make use
of different kinds of information systems and online channels in order to develop and
offer their products and services to a global clientele, as well as to purchase and consume
from it.
These private entrepreneurs not only satisfy the demand of an anonymous consumer
market, but sell to and interact with other private persons. This has led to the de-
velopment of specialized small size businesses and has also enabled the emergence of a
peer-to-peer economy, in which the Internet is utilized for means of exchange. Starting
off with traditional market places like eBay, there has been an increasing use of plat-
forms that allow private users to share their spare goods, skills, and resources with other
2
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private users at a charge, or even for free. In this peer-to-peer or sharing economy people
rent out their cars and apartments, share rides, tools, and so forth.1
Web- and mobile services have laid the ground for the development of a novel form of
market. These “new” tools enable the connection and coordination of widely spread
people, their resources and demands at sufficiently low cost and effort (cf. Anderson,
2007). The mediation of supply and demand in peer-to-peer markets has shifted away
from bulletin boards, newspaper advertisements, and manually operated card files, and
does now exist almost exclusively in the form of online platforms.
In this context, the intermediary, i.e. the operator of such an online platform, and the
concept of trust play an important role. Naturally, corporations strive to build a rep-
utation of high quality, good service, and reliability. The mere fact, however, that a
company has been in the market for a considerable time can here be interpreted as a
signal of sufficient quality, since otherwise the company would have long been out of the
market due to competition and the customer’s choice. But this consideration does typi-
cally not hold for private product or service providers in a peer-to-peer economy, where
the creation of a user profile might only take as few as a couple of clicks. Additionally,
and even more than traditional forms of exchange, Internet transactions heavily rely on
a sufficient level of trustworthiness and trust2, since the conditions are very different to
real world transactions, where people meet in person, shake hands, and are personally
accessible and accountable (Pavlou and Gefen, 2004). The “designers” or “engineers”
of a platform (online or offline) for economic exchange—which basically constitutes the
definition of a market—may thus want to create ways for their users to mutually judge
their trustworthiness. Also may it be the task of a market designer or engineer to set
up and explore the rules, terms, and facets of social interaction, aiming at improving
the market, may that be in terms of revenue, profit, efficiency, time spent by the users,
or whatsoever desired criteria.
1Typically, the case is made that a car sits idle for 23 out of 24 hours a day, and a power drill is
used only for 6 to 13 minutes during its entire lifetime; cf. www.shareable.net/blog/ how-to-share-your-
car-with-a-stranger, www.earthshare.org/ 2012/05/sharing.html, both accessed on 13.05.2013. For this
“sharing reinvented through technology,” Botsman and Rogers (2010) have coined the term collaborative
consumption.
2In her 2013 TED talk, Onora O’Neill noted on the unconditional aim to increase trust:
“Well frankly, I think that’s a stupid aim. It’s not what I would aim at. I would aim
to have more trust in the trustworthy, but not in the untrustworthy. In fact, I aim posi-
tively to try not to trust the untrustworthy. [...] More trust is not an intelligent aim in
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In both regards, assessment of quality and accountability, business in a peer-to-peer
economy thus faces the challenge of overcoming obstacles of lacking trust and to cre-
ate ways for users to mutually evaluate their trustworthiness. Therefore, among means
like reputation systems or personalized recommendations, social online identity and so-
cial presence become increasingly important. Particularly, online platform operators in
two-sided markets often make use of the social identities and spheres of their users in
order to stimulate benevolent behavior and stress reliability. Companies like Airbnb,
Inc. and carpooling.com GmbH, for instance, animate providers and consumers on their
platforms—whereat people usually act in both roles—to integrate their facebook account
(cf. “facebook connect”) or to maintain a distinguishable profile. In that regard, the
main German ride sharing company states: “faces create trust: please complete your
profile.”3
This, in turn, puts e-commerce transactions progressively into a social context. The
transaction partner (or competitor) is not necessarily anonymous anymore, but may
appear with a face, a name, a history and reputation, a circle of friends, maybe even
with acquaintances in common (cf. facebook’s “12 of your friends like this”). This shifts
the focus towards new questions. Bidders, buyers, traders, and sellers might ask whether
their transaction partners (or competitors) are other humans at all, since fake accounts,
sniping bots, and automated trading agents have long become prevalent in e-commerce
and online trading. And if so, it occurs possible that the other person’s attributes and
the relation to the decision maker may interfere with the underlying economic reasoning.
What, for instance, do the sayings “friendship doesn’t extend to money matters,” or,
somewhat more subtle, “Live together like brothers and do business like strangers” imply
in this context?
Now, for applications in electronic markets involving other persons, i.e. where social
preferences potentially take effect, trust plays an important role (see above). Mayer
et al. (1995, p. 712) defined trust as “the willingness of a party to be vulnerable to the
actions of another party based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular
action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor or control that other
party.” This is often supplemented by the explanation that the trustor faces uncertainty
about the trustee’s ability and intention. Risk and trust are thus strongly linked to each
other. Johnson-George and Swap (1982, p. 1306) even stated that the “willingness to
take risks may be one of the few characteristics common to all trust situations.” Since
it may be particularly difficult to “monitor or control” the other party when interacting
online, the users’ risk attitudes may, besides the aforementioned social concerns, be seen
3www.mitfahrgelegenheit.de/news/viewNews/464, accessed on 13.05.2013
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as one major factor, relevant to the design and operation of online environments and
mechanisms.
The recent peer-to-peer economies are rooted online. Technical, design, and privacy
related issues are thus vital. From an information systems perspective, this means that
the interplay between social presence and economic decisions and outcomes is of high
relevance. In fact, the intersection of social facets and risky decisions is key in a series
of applications. Social trading, peer-to-peer lending, crowd funding, crowd investing,
(online) gambling, and serious gaming are such.
But also in classical economic settings, applications of this type can be found. Both
in the private and in the professional context, decision making is inherently linked to
the social ties among friends, colleagues, and acquaintances. In contrast to the tradi-
tional microeconomic perspective, individuals evidently do not exclusively value their
own prospective gains or losses, but may derive utility also from the fortune of beloved
ones or from the misfortune of an opponent or rival (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006; Over-
beck et al., 2010). The associated notions here may be sympathy and spitefulness, or
benevolence, altruism, and malevolence. In the context of the firm, managers decide
about the execution of risky projects, deliberately deciding on the level of risk taken.
They might be evaluated not only on their individual (project-) results, but also on how
these results compare to those of their colleagues. They might compete for bonuses,
the future allocation of budget, the next promotion, or—most probably—simply for sta-
tus. Fairness, envy, and gloating are potential motives in this regard (cf. Bault et al.,
2008). Different heads of departments, for instance, might take their rivals’ actions into
account. Knowing one’s competitor in person may fuel the desire to “win,” which in
turn may distort the quality of the underlying economic decisions. Generally speaking,
a principal with certain requirements towards his risk portfolio might want to install
adequate mechanisms to avoid undesired dynamics and an escalation of risk propensity
or aversion among the decision makers.
In order to capture the players’ motivations and create incentives accordingly, the con-
cept of Homo Economicus has long been serving as a main pillar of theoretical and empir-
ical research in social science and, in particular, in economics.4 The Homo Economicus
concept regards humans as fully rational, entirely unchanging and self-interested utility
maximizers. Most scholars uniformly agree that these assumptions are very simplistic
and highly unrealistic. Kenneth Binmore, an important contributor to the foundations of
4Ockenfels (2013). ... über die Grenzen der experimentellen Ökonomie, realitätsferne Verhal-
tensforscher und seine neue Rolle als “Ingenieur”, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, blogs.faz.net/
fazit/2012/11/08/ oekonomen-im-gespraech-axel-ockenfels- ueber-die-grenzen-der-experimentellen-




game theory and experimental economics, stated: “Homo economicus is dead, but whose
Homo behavioralis will replace him?”5 The concept is albeit taught in ECON-101 classes
around the world. Economists up to the first half of the 20th century regarded their field
as a social science, stressing psychological factors in order to understand economic—still
human—behavior (Thaler, 2000). It was a “mathematical revolution,” which led to a
more extensive use of models and formulas, and assumed rationally optimizing agents:
“The IQ of Homo Economicus became bounded only by the IQ of the smartest economic
theorist” (cf. Thaler, 2000, p. 134). Lately, it is argued that the concept of Homo Eco-
nomicus is not entirely rejected in most recent approaches. However, the assumption of
perfect selfishness is scrapped and substituted by the assumption of other-regarding, so
called social preferences.6,7 A very intuitive form of social preferences is referred to as
“distributional preferences.” Models based on such distributional preferences have found
much attention in the literature (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006). These models still use a
formal approach. The decision maker is, however, not assumed to be fully selfish, but to
consider the allowances of other persons or the relevant peer group in some way. Bolton
and Ockenfels (2012, p. 669) stated that “it is now widely acknowledged, including in
economics, that some human decision makers care not only about their own material
payoff, but also about the distribution of payoffs in the reference group, about how the
distribution was generated, and about reciprocity.”
Furthermore, the consideration of emotions may contribute to better understand the
participants’ behavior and its interaction with the institutional design. Emotions, with
no doubt, are complex. In order to albeit address the participants’ emotions in the
analysis, researchers may use psychophysiological measurements. Adam et al. (2011,
p. 3), in this context, used the term physioeconomics to describe a technique that
“builds on this well-established methodology of experimental economics, but additionally
incorporates physiological measurements of participants as proxies for their individual
emotional processing.” In particular, the methods of NeuroIS enable researchers to get
an idea of the visceral processes underlying the users’ emotions and potentially decision-
making (Dimoka et al., 2012; Vom Brocke et al., 2013). Correlates of the activity of
the autonomous nervous system (ANS) like heart rate and skin conductance, taken as a
starting point, are comparably easy to access in the laboratory, and are “typically much
less expensive than the low-cost neuroscience tools (e.g., EEG)” (Riedl et al., 2010, p.
256). The amplitude of a skin conductance response to a certain event, for instance,
5Quote by Kenneth Binmore, University College London; from the back cover of Microeconomics:
Behavior, Institutions, and Evolution by Samuel Bowles, 2003, Princeton University Press.
6Pennekamp (2012). Abschied von der Weltformel, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
blogs.faz.net/fazit/2012/11/07/abschied-von-der-weltformel-633, accessed on 14.05.2013.
7Pennekamp (2012). Der Homo oeconomicus lebt, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
www.faz.net/aktuell/wirtschaft/wirtschaftswissen/wirtschaftswissenschaften-der-homo-oeconomicus-
lebt-11938235.html, accessed on 14.05.2013.
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has been identified as a measure of emotional arousal (Lang et al., 1993; Bradley et al.,
2008). In particular for experiments involving multiple participants, or even large groups,
and real time interaction, methods like functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI),
where only one subject at a time can be treated under very constrained conditions, may
be not applicable. The methods of NeuroIS, in contrast to that, allow researchers to
address questions like whether arousal impacts certain patterns of economic behavior
and vice versa, and also how inter- and intra-personal differences of arousal (even in
groups with interaction) affect decision making. Making use of this information may
help to better understand what makes people behave irrational, competitive, benignly,
or particularly beneficial or detrimental at certain decisions. Platform operators, in this
regard, might be interested in how to explicitly induce or mitigate arousal during the
process of interacting with their service.
Many behavioral economists employ the insights about social preferences and increas-
ingly also about the role of emotions in order to think of and to create markets that
work. Setting up a market becomes an increasingly complex task with the information
at hand. Since theoretical models are oftentimes unable to capture this complexity in
a reasonable way, the process requires methodological approaches, very much alike the
engineering sciences. Bolton and Ockenfels (2012, p. 666) defined economic engineering
as “the science of designing real-world institutions and mechanisms that align individual
incentives and behavior with the underlying goals.” Behavioral economic engineering,
in addition to that, “aims to discover how actual (social) behavior interacts with the
institutional design” (Bolton and Ockenfels, 2012, p. 669).
Like any engineering approach, behavioral economic engineering partly relies on trial
and error, since not every dynamic in human interaction is foreseeable. For the case
of electronic markets, Weinhardt et al. (2003) stated that economists increasingly made
use of the tools and methods of the engineering sciences and defined the term market
engineering as
“[...] the systematic and theoretically grounded approach for the analysis,
design, adoption, quality control, and further development of electronic mar-
kets as well as the respective legal frame conditions, based on an integrated
view on micro structure, infrastructure, and business structure.”
In particular, the authors named simulations and economic experiments as techniques,
potentially helping at the design of markets, where “established theories, due to high
complexity, come up against borders” (Weinhardt et al., 2003, p. 636). This has not
always been the case. As up to the early 2000’s, economists like Nobel laureate Alvin
Roth and his colleague Axel Ockenfels, who regarded themselves as economic engineers,
were considered outsiders. Roth (2002, p. 1341) stated that, in addition to analyzing
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markets, “economists have lately been called upon [...] to design them.” The success of
their approach presumably stems from the fact that it does not solely rely on mathemati-
cally aesthetic models, but incorporates real-life aspects.8 Factual human behavior, such
as motivated by the desire for fairness or revenge can be rationalized by such models,
whereas these factors were hitherto mostly disregarded.
To sum it up: Most electronic markets now increasingly comprise social aspects, e.g.,
the relation between the actors, identities, etc. Trust and risk are vital for almost any
economic decision in this context, be it the uncertainty about exogenous events, or
the fact that one relies on others’—ex ante uncertain—capability and benignity. It is
thus straightforward to address both concepts within an integrated approach. However,
both areas of research, social factors and risk preferences, have mostly been studied
separately and, as Bolton and Ockenfels (2010, p. 628) stated, “surprisingly, [...], few
contributions investigate risk taking in a social context.” The economic literature on
this joint topic is rather sparse. Only in the last decade, research on distributional
preferences is increasingly accompanied by the question of how these preferences can be
expanded to decisions in the presence of risk. Most contributions do so by means of
laboratory experiments and behavioral models.
The aim of this work is to gain a deeper understanding on the relevant principles and
to derive theoretical and practical implications for economic decision scenarios from a
market engineering perspective. The focus thereat is on the aspects relevant to the
design and operation of online platforms, since the Internet has become a major pillar of
global commerce and even altered the way economies work. In this regard, this work is
structured into two main building blocks. The first one is concerned with the question
how different types of peers (human or computerized) in online markets affect decision
making. The second block then explores the role of different relationships among human
peers in greater detail. Common to both blocks is the intersection of social- and risk
related aspects. The research questions on that account, as well as the structure of this
work are outlined in the following sections.
1.3. Research Questions
Overall, this work is concerned with human decision making in different economic con-
texts, which are characterized by the presence of i) a social context and ii) risk. Both
aspects are relevant from a mere economic perspective. Their junction, however, is only
sparsely covered by the existing literature (cf. Yechiam et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels,
8Pennekamp (2013). Ökonomische Ingenieurskunst, Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung,
blogs.faz.net/fazit/2013/04/11/okonomische-ingenieurskunst-1398, accessed on 14.05.2013.
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2010; Trautmann and Vieider, 2011). Whereas almost all prior studies in experimen-
tal economics created an abstract social context, i.e. matching subjects to anonymous,
unknown other experiment participants, this approach is challenged and extended in
the scope of this work. In order to match people of different types of relationships, lab
experiments appear inapplicable, since subject pool as well as invitation process (using
e-mail notifications) do not allow to effectively control for that aspect. Therefore, the
respective experiment (cf. Chapter 5) is conducted in the field, i.e. on well frequented
campus sites such as dining commons and cafeterias. In the scope of this work, the
assessment of personal risk preferences is essential. In order to capture the participants’
individual risk preferences in such experiments “in the wild,” a light-weight risk aversion
questionnaire is needed. By developing and evaluating a simplified version of the stan-
dard procedure for risk preference elicitation in the lab (Holt and Laury, 2002), Chapter
3 lays the ground for the subsequent work. The associated question here is how well this
short version of the test is able to capture and depict personal risk preferences, where
the original test serves as benchmark. Research Question 1 thus states:
Research Question 1: Can a short version of the Holt and Laury (2002)
risk aversion task serve as a substitute? How well do the results correlate
and which factors are determinant?
Now, a very intuitive way to conflate social preferences and risk taking are auctions.
This format is specifically interesting because Internet auctions are widely used as a
particular form of electronic markets and are “one of the greatest success stories of
web-based services” (Ariely and Simonson, 2003, p. 113). At that, the nature of the
other participants one faces in online environments may differ, and sometimes may not
even be clear. Chapter 4 thus presents an experimental study analyzing the economic,
behavioral, and emotional aspects of human decision making under risk in a laboratory
auction experiment. Auctions are suitable for this purpose since—in first-price sealed-
bid auction formats—the other bidders’ actions are unknown at the time of bidding.
High bids increase the probability of winning the auction and thus the auctioneered
commodity. They do however potentially reduce the profit (value of the commodity less
the bid) in case the auction is won. Low bids yield high profits. It is then, however,
likely that another bidder has submitted a higher bid. This trade-off between potential
gain and probability of winning constitutes the risky decision and may be expected to
depend on one’s risk preferences. But auctions also serve as a suitable environment for
the investigation of interpersonal effects. The nature of auctions, the fact that only
one player can win, is known to foster competition among the players, which may in
turn affect bidding behavior. In order to isolate the effect of social facets in the light of
the risks involved in auctions, the nature of the other bidders (human or computerized)
is varied in a systematical way. Economically, bidding behavior may be regarded as
9
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the most direct expression of a bidder’s risk attitude and social preferences. Research
Question 2 thus states:
Research Question 2: Is there a difference in bidding behavior in first-price
sealed-bid auctions where the other auction participants are either human or
computerized?
Along with competition, the nature of the auction may lead to competitive arousal (Ku
et al., 2005; Malhotra, 2010) and auction fever (Ku et al., 2005; Adam et al., 2011),
resulting in excessive bidding. The phenomenon is long known: “Already in ancient
Rome, legal scholars debated whether auctions were void if the winner was infected by
bidder’s heat (calor licitantis)” (Malmendier and Lee, 2011, p. 749). For that reason,
it is of interest how the market participants’ arousal varies, how arousal and auction
environment interact, and how this eventually may help to understand bidding behavior.
Research Question 3 thus states:
Research Question 3: Is there a difference in arousal in first-price
sealed-bid auctions where the other auction participants are either human
or computerized—and how do auction environment, arousal and bidding be-
havior interact?
The next building block of this work considers the interaction among humans in greater
detail. Building on the results of the literature review and the auction study, an exper-
iment is designed in order to address a yet mostly neglected type of decision: prospect
selection with a coincident decision about payoff alignment among the peers. A novel ex-
periment yielding such a scenario is proposed. Again, the intersection of other-regarding
and risk preferences is addressed. Using the type of the relationship between the decision
makers involved, an important aspect is addressed in the analysis. Two decision makers
at a time face a risky situation, where the decision makers of the pairs have different
types of relationships towards each other (friends or strangers). The overarching re-
search question in this regard addresses the role of the relationship and is formulated as
follows:
Research Question 4: Is there a difference in economic behavior among
friends and strangers, regarding risk preference and the desire to align or
de-align payoffs ex ante in prospect selection?
Since the proposed experiment represents a novel approach, the empirical analysis is ac-
companied by a game-theoretical analysis. This analysis considers the first- and second-
mover’s perspective and the resulting equilibria. The analysis is based on a simple
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behavioral model, which incorporates the motives of envy and gloating. The model pa-
rameters are estimated using a maximum likelihood estimation on the empirical data.
It is then benchmarked against other models of social preferences from the literature.
Research Question 5 thus states:
Research Question 5: Can a model with the emotional motives of envy
and gloating explain the observed data? How well does it in comparison to
other existing models?
Taken together, this work addresses economic decisions from different perspectives,
whereat it is oriented towards the central idea of conflating risk preferences and so-
cial preferences. The subject is regarded from an IS perspective, particularly having in
mind the design and operation of peer-to-peer markets. A major working hypothesis
throughout this work is that the impact of the reference peer is dependent on the type
of, as well as the relationship between the decision maker and the peer, which proves to
be valid, as shown in Chapters 4 and 5.
1.4. Structure of the Thesis
This work and the research agenda therein are structured in blocks that build upon
another. Chapter 1 introduces and motivates the topic and extrapolates a set of research
questions.
In Chapter 2, the foundations of social preferences and risk preferences are illustrated
and the intersection of both aspects is examined. This part is divided into the main
subsections Social Preferences, Risk Preferences, and the synthesis Social Preferences
and Risk. After introducing the basic terms and concepts of social preferences and risk
preferences, the recently emerged body of literature on the interplay of both aspects is
reviewed. Existing theories, empirical evidence, and conceptual approaches regarding
social preferences under risk are considered. In order to differentiate and organize the
respective decision scenarios used in the literature, a classification framework is pre-
sented.
Chapter 3 proposes and evaluates a short version of the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aver-
sion task and discusses methodological issues on economic experiments “in the field,”
which are not to be confused with field experiments. This light-weight version of the
test is needed for measuring risk preferences in a later-on experiment (Chapter 5), which
is conducted at well frequented campus sites but, apart from the location, rather com-
parable to a standard laboratory experiment.
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Chapter 4 presents the design, results, and implications of a study in the context of
online auctions, which considers the impact of the type of the other bidders (humans or
computer agents), and the bidders’ behavior and emotions.9
Chapter 5 then focuses on the interaction among humans. Particularly, the impact
of different types of relationships between the decision makers (friends or strangers) is
considered. As mentioned, the experiment is conducted outside the lab. This is done to
get access to different types of relationships in a natural manner. The decision situation
and the empirical findings are then analyzed from a theoretical perspective by means of
a game-theoretical model.10
Concluding this work, Chapter 6 summarizes, provides concluding remarks, and elabo-
rates on limitations, possible extensions, and future research.
9Chapter 4 is based on joint research with Marc Adam and Ryan Riordan (Teubner et al., 2013):
a previous version was circulated under the working title “Bidding against the Machine: Emotions in
Electronic Markets.”
10Chapter 5 is based on joint research with Marc Adam and Christof Weinhardt (Teubner et al.,
2012). A previous version was circulated under the working title “Risky Choices Among Friends and




“No man is an island, entire of itself; every man
is a piece of the continent, a part of the main.”
(John Donne)
This chapter provides the foundations of the the broader fields of social preferences and
risk preferences. In the third part, the conflation of both aspects is discussed. For that
purpose, a classification framework is proposed, along which theory, experiments, and
results from the literature are reviewed.
2.1. Social Preferences
This section illustrates the concept of social—or other-regarding—preferences. First,
the general foundations are introduced, a brief historical outline is given and the main
terms and definitions are presented. Second, the notion of reciprocity is explored in some
more detail. Third, the role of emotions, particularly interpersonal emotions in economic
decision making, is described briefly and a basic framework is proposed. Then, different
formal models of social preferences are considered and some well-established experimen-
tal methods for the assessment of social preferences are presented. The models presented
in this chapter are also used as a benchmark for explaining the experimental observa-





“People care about the outcomes of others.” Loewenstein et al. (1989, p. 426) argued
that the social context is important for beings that live in companionship with others
or in a community, rather than in isolation. Thus, preferences and decisions are (to
some extent) derived by evaluating social aspects. Preferences of social beings are thus
necessarily social preferences, which was common sense from time immemorial: “Man
is by nature a social animal” (Aristotle), or as John Donne framed it: “No Man is an
Island.”
Economic Approaches & Social Comparison Theory
Social preferences were studied systematically starting from the second half of the 20th
century by Leon Festinger (Festinger, 1954), and, in a narrower economic sense, among
others, by Hochman, Rodgers, and Becker (Hochman and Rodgers, 1969, 1974, 1977;
Becker, 1974), who began to interpret functions of social welfare from an individual,
rather interpersonally motivated perspective. Until then, economic redistribution was
thought of as a sovereign act, imposing a necessary loss on the richer parts of society in
order to maximize total welfare. Hochman and Rodgers (1969, p. 542) were concerned:
“We believe that this line of reasoning is misleading. It implies that redis-
tribution yields no benefits to the parties who finance it, so that from this
viewpoint it imposes a simple deadweight loss. [...] If accepted, redistribu-
tion carried out by government institutions can only be explained as legalized
Robin Hood activity, and redistribution through private institutions would
seem to imply individual irrationality.”
That is, they rejected the view that “less for oneself and more for some others” is neces-
sarily considered pernicious for oneself, and only a broader social welfare perspective can
justify this act of redistribution (“legalized Robin Hood activity”). Instead they pro-
posed a variety of self-interested reasons why non-recipients could support redistribution,
including expectations about being reliable on transfers in the future oneself, expecting
(higher) profits from supported sections of the population, or the coverage of a private
need (Hochman and Rodgers, 1977). They stated, however, that “the basis of nonrecip-
ient support for redistribution programs may extend beyond simple self-interest,” but
do not become more explicit than saying that “nonrecipients may be concerned, for a
variety of reasons, with the well-being of the poor” (Hochman and Rodgers, 1977, p.
74). While the motivational and psychological constructs behind such considerations
remained mostly untouched, the ground was laid for the economic conceptual design of
fairness, inequality aversion, altruism, efficiency preferences, and the like.
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Until then, economists usually spoke of households as the atomic building blocks of an
economic system. This understanding was gradually extended and shifted towards an
individual, i.e. personal, and with that, behavioral perspective. This made it reasonable
to think about aspects again, which had, in favor of a cleaner utilitarian approach, been
deliberately excluded from the analysis. Becker (1974, p. 2, p. 32) wrote:
“As greater rigor permeated the theory of consumer demand, variables like
distinction, a good name or benevolence were pushed further and further out
of sight. Each individual or family generally is assumed to have an utility
function that depends directly on the good and services it consumes. This
is not to say that interactions between individuals have been completely
ignored. Pigou, Fisher and Panteleoni at the turn of the century included
attributes of others in utility functions (but did nothing with them) [...]
The central concept of the analysis is “social income”, the sum of a person’s
own income (his earnings, etc) and the monetary value to him of the relevant
characteristics of others, which I call his social environment.”
The acknowledgment of this dimension of personality indicates that social psychology
is inseparably connected with questions of distributional preferences. Becker explicitly
named charitable behavior, envy, and hatred as possible motives. With this at hand, and
the thought from above that the direct benefit (or damage) from the material conditions
of others should be formally acknowledged in people’s utility functions, the birth of
(economic) social preferences most certainly falls somewhere into that era.
Festinger (1954) sketched an influential Theory of Social Comparison Processes, mainly
building on a set of hypotheses. These were, among others, that humans exhibit a
natural tendency to evaluate their opinions and abilities, they use social comparison if
no objective measures are available, and that the tendency for comparison with others is
stronger if the reference peer is more similar to themselves. Moreover, humans are said
to constantly strive to improve their abilities, with no natural upper boundary. Whereas
it is hard to change one’s abilities on short call for obvious reasons, this does not hold
for opinions. Where Festinger (1954) took a perspective of social psychology, the subject
has also and increasingly so raised the interest of economists, accompanied by a higher
degree of formalization (Loewenstein et al., 1989).
2.1.2. Distributional, Type, and Intention Based Preferences
Economic decisions are typically not made in a sterile environment. Being part of
a socio-economic environment, decision makers inevitably compare their decisions with
those of others: friends, co-workers—possibly collaborators—or competitors, maybe even
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strangers. Again, it should be clarified that the terms “social preferences” and “other-
regarding preferences” are oftentimes used synonymously in the literature. The concept
of social preferences is oftentimes thought of as limited to the incorporation of the eco-
nomic payoffs of other people into one’s utility function. This view, although accurate in
many cases, is too narrow. The concept of social preferences, which is closely linked to
the fields of psychology, psychological game theory and experimental economics, yields
a broader perspective. Depending on the perspective, this may comprise strategic and
rational considerations, other-regarding evaluations, intension, beliefs, beliefs about in-
tentions or beliefs, reciprocal interaction, relationship types, and emotions.
The concept of social preferences, as including others’ outcomes into the utility function,
was used by experimental economists early on. These economists, however, mostly tried
to rule out any such factors in experimental investigations. With regard to interper-
sonal utility criteria Smith (1976, p. 278) stated that “this kind of interdependence is
effectively controlled by the experimental condition of ‘incomplete’ information,” where
incomplete information in this context means that subjects only learned about their own
reward.
If one now assumes that another person’s payoff in a particular situation is relevant
to a decision maker for whatever reasons, it is straightforward to include this payoff
into his utility function and thus base a model of rational decision making also on this
value. When it comes to strategic interaction between two or more decision makers
with mutually relevant payoffs, game theoretic approaches may also be extended to such
other-regarding aspects by using utility values instead of raw payoffs. Section 2.1.7
provides an example in this regard.
Classical game theory may be seen as the study of strategic decision making. Rationality
of the decision makers is one fundamental assumption. But, as Colman (2003, p. 139)
stated, “instrumental rationality, conventionally interpreted, fails to explain intuitively
obvious features of human interaction.” Psychological game theory takes into account,
that not only the sheer outcomes are relevant to the actors, but also the beliefs and
intentions linked to those payoffs. 100 dollars for the other person may be seen as
beneficial, neutral or harmful, depending on what the other person has done—or just
on what one believes about the other person’s plans, intentions, or prior actions.
Furthermore, people differ with regard to personality characteristics. Often, the interac-
tion and the course of events is as important for behavior than personality. Reciprocal
behavior is very common: “[...] the same people who are altruistic to other altruistic
people are also motivated to hurt those who hurt them” (Rabin, 1993, p. 1281).
Distributional preferences are defined as a subset of the more general concept of social
preferences. At that, decision makers with distributional preferences consider the (eco-
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nomic) payoffs of others besides their own payoff. Anything else, e.g., intentions, path
dependence, etc. is not considered, simply the combination of “what I get” and “what
you get” is evaluated. This narrow definition is favorable since it allows formalization
in a practical way. Several formal approaches are considered in Section 2.1.5. In the
last decades, many of such models have been proposed, sometimes giving the impres-
sion that the mathematical formulation, instead of the actual problem (which still is a
research question of the social sciences), is central. At the outset of this, in the early
and mid 20th century, economists used to excuse for the use of mathematical equations
in their papers. “Social preferences” were a topic of anthropologists and psychologists:
“It may be hard for younger economists to image, but nearly until midcentury it was
not unusual for theorist using mathematical techniques to begin a substantial apology,
explaining that this approach need not assume that humans are automatons deprived
of free will” (Baumol, 2000, p. 23).
Fehr and Schmidt (2006) provided a summary of the development and the status quo of
social preferences in economic research. They pointed out that a vast set of experiments
and studies provided evidence for the existence of social preferences and that “the real
question is no longer whether many people have other-regarding preferences, but under
which conditions these preferences have important economic and social effects and what
the best way to describe and model these preferences is” (Fehr and Schmidt, 2006, p.
618). The authors regard social preferences mainly as a contrapose to selfish behavior,
i.e., subjects showing fair or altruistic behavior are denoted socially motivated, others
are selfish. This, of course, omits the negatively connoted side of socially motivated, e.g.,
envious, spiteful, or sadistic behavior. Fehr and Schmidt (2006) distinguished between
three types of social preferences from a formal perspective: distributional, intention
based, and type based preferences.
Distributional Preferences are present when a subject cares about how the material
resources, e.g. the payoffs, are allocated among him or herself and the other (relevant)
subjects of the reference group. It might be important that everyone has the same, or
that oneself has the largest share, but anything that cannot be expressed by means of
payoff allocation is not in the scope of this type of preferences.
Intention Based Preferences, in contrast, include the fairness, or more general, the
benevolence or malevolence, of the other’s behavior. Since feelings about another sub-
ject’s actions or intentions cannot be easily measured or formalized, this type of prefer-
ences cannot be modeled by means of standard game theory. The very same action might
be regarded differently, depending on the underlying intention of the actor. Intention
Based Preferences therefore require the tools of psychological game theory (Geanakoplos,
17
Chapter 2. Foundations
1989), conceptualizing belief-dependent motives like reciprocity, guilt aversion, regret,
or shame.
Type Based Preferences, on the other hand, let subjects behave differently towards
different types of counterparts, e.g., kindly towards “good,” and hostilely towards “bad”
persons. In this case, not the intention of the other person’s action, which may be
ambiguous, but the attributable property of the person self is the relevant factor for the
game mechanics.
2.1.3. Reciprocity
As early as Stone Age, humans made use of the advantages of reciprocal good exchange.
Trusting other individuals by transferring more or less valuable goods in order to receive
an adequate service or good in return subsequently influenced the very organization of
economy and the formation of first market forms, as well as social behavior. The rule of
reciprocity, in this context, stated that “people should help those who help them” (Fogg
and Nass, 1997; Milinski, 1987). In the economic literature, trust and reciprocity are
often regarded as the fundamental driving forces for the evolution of cooperative behavior
(Falk and Fischbacher, 2006; McCabe et al., 2003). This is in contrast to classical self-
interest-theory and many models of social preferences (cf. Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000;
Charness and Rabin, 2002; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).
Table 2.1.: Classification of different channels of reciprocal behavior in groups of n ≥ 4.
to
from A B C D
A — × (Self-Commitment)
B Direct — Forward Forward
C Reward Matthew — Community
D Reward Matthew Community —
A novel approach for classifying the different ways of reciprocal behavior in groups is
presented here. Assume a group of n = 4 people1. These people are denoted player A,
B, C, and D. Furthermore, assume that initially, A transfers some money to B or does
B a favor in a broader sense. There now occur multiple ways for reciprocal behavior in
the group, which can be summarized as follows:
1All statements hold for any number n ≥ 4 likewise, but there occurs no additional class of action,
and thus no reason to do so.
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• Direct Reciprocity: B directly returns the favor or the contribution to A.
• Rewarding Behavior: Another player than B rewards A for her benevolent behav-
ior.
• The Matthew Effect: He that has plenty of goods shall have more. Player B receives
contributions also from other players. The initial transfer from A to B might be
interpreted as a signal of B’s credibility.
• Forwarding Behavior: The movie Pay It Forward2 illustrated this notion: A young
boy is granted a favor, and out of this, starts a ponzi-scheme-like movement, in
which everyone pays forward (not back) a good deed to three new—random or
known—people. B is granted a benefit and forwards this very same or any different
benefit to others.
• Community Spirit: Simply observing a (successful) transaction between players A
and B leads a third uninvolved player (C) to become active herself and engage a
transaction with another, hitherto uninvolved player (D). This behavior can be
observed in strongly committed communities and movements. The couchsurfing
community (cf. www.couchsurfing.org) can be seen as an example of this commu-
nity bond or loyalty.
• Self-Commitment: For the sake of completeness of this framework, another form of
induced action may be considered, which typically would not be called reciprocal
behavior. When initially, A grants a favor to B, and subsequently A also grants
favors to an uninvolved party C or D, this behavior could be seen as motivated by
self-commitment of A. A might not want to treat C or D less favorable than B and
hence feels committed to help out C or D as well. The motivation for the second
action might also stem from a positive utility derived from the first action.
The compilation is summarized in Table 2.1, where the × symbol indicates the initial
transfer or favor from A to B.
2.1.4. Emotional Motives
“Economists refer to the desirability of an outcome as its utility, and decision
making is depicted as a matter of maximizing utility. This does not, however,
imply that consequentialist decision makers are devoid of emotion or immune
to its influence” (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008, p. 138).
2cf. http://www.imdb.com/title/tt0223897/, accessed May 2013.
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Emotions were classically not a subject in economics. Elster (1998, p. 47) wrote that the
fields of economics and psychology “seem to exist in near-complete isolation from each
other.” This has changed in recent years. Behavioral economics has increasingly tried to
address the role of immediate and anticipatory emotions (cf. Loewenstein and Lerner,
2003) in order to understand human behavior and its effect on markets. By now, there
exists a variety of different definitions and terms for emotional motives for decision
making in an interpersonal context: spite, envy, similarity seeking, competitiveness,
altruism, to name just a few. In order to clarify these terms for the further use in the
scope of this work, this section provides a brief classification of the most common terms
and relates them to the different economic scenarios. There exists a quantity of different
frameworks, some of which shall be briefly presented here.
An early study aiming at decomposing the concerns for own and others’ outcomes into
basic motives was conducted by Scott (1972). The author distinguished between the
three motives avarice, altruism, and egalitarianism. MacCrimmon and Messick (1976)
proposed a framework of Social Value Orientation (SVO) considering six basic motives,
namely self-interest, self-sacrifice, altruism, aggression, cooperation, and competition.
Liebrand (1984) used a graphical representation for the SVO framework, which was
widely used in following studies. This framework has recently been further extended
by Murphy and Ackermann (2012). In particular, the SVO framework contraposes the
payoffs for a decision maker and a reference person in a two-dimensional space as depicted
in Figure 2.1. The decision maker has to make a (series of) binary choice(s) between
different resource distributions of the form (payoff to self, payoff to other). Each of the
locations on the circle characterizes a different type of social preference. A choice for the
pro-social distribution is oftentimes also regarded as expression of an efficiency concern,
since here the joint outcome is maximized and thus the social optimum is achieved (85,
85). In the logic of this framework, the individualistic distribution (100, 50) would be
chosen by selfish decision makers, whereas competitive subjects would chose (85, 15) in
order to maximize the difference between their own and the other’s payoff. Despite a
rather non-uniform and varying terminology, the SVO framework was widely used in
different contexts aiming at expressing the same ideas.
In order to explain an experimental observation, there is a need to identify motives and
emotions driving the behavior. Hence, the underlying emotional concepts of decision
making in an interpersonal context shall briefly be conceptualized. Rick and Loewen-
stein (2008) distinguished between expected and immediate emotions, where immediate
emotions are experienced as the response to an (external) event (e.g. good or bad news, a
payoff, a noise, an odor, even as little as a mere thought, etc.). At the moment of decision
making, a subject expects future immediate emotions and takes the set of such expected
emotions and the respective probabilities into account when maximizing expected utility.
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Figure 2.1.: A graphical representation of the SVO framework, based on Murphy and
Ackermann (2012).
Models of experienced affect categorize emotions among the two dimensions of arousal
(or involvement, or activation) and valence (cf. Russell, 1980; Watson and Tellegen,
1985; Larsen and Diener, 1992). There exist several standard measures, mostly using
self-report questionnaires, for emotions and emotional motives in the literature.
With the increasing availability of neuroscience methods and tools, research has also
begun to explore the neural basis of emotions and social decision making. Rilling and
Sanfey (2011) presented a review on a variety of studies concerning the role of the
prefrontal cortex in social decision scenarios.
Envy and Gloating. Envy is a complex but pervasive emotion (Parrott, 1991; Smith
et al., 1999). Feeling envy means, that something important is missing, and this lack
becomes apparent through social comparison (Smith et al., 1996). “Equity theory in
psychology [...] and studies in the field of organizational behaviour all suggest that
envy can play an important role in economic behaviour” (Mui, 1995, p. 311). Baumol
(1982, p. 640), in the context of the distribution of a fixed bundle of outputs, wrote on
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envy: “A distribution, i, of n commodities is said to involve envy by individual 2 of the
share obtained by individual 1 if 2 would rather have Y1i, the bundle of commodities
received by 1 under this distribution, than Y2i, the bundle the distribution assigns to
2,” i.e. that envy is only absent when no individual prefers the bundle of any other
individual over her own. This is not very probably to ever happen in reality. In the lit-
erature, there exist different measures for envy, e.g. the 8-item self-report questionnaire
by Smith et al. (1999), asking to indicate agreement or disagreement with statements
like “I feel envy every day.” or “Frankly, the success of my neighbors makes me resent
them.” In economic research, the role of envy has been considered formally for ultima-
tum games (Kirchsteiger, 1994), for allocation problems (Feldman and Kirman, 1974),
for alternating-offer bargaining (Kohler, 2013; Bolton, 1991), for strategic behavior in
innovation (Mui, 1995), and for the evaluation of risky prospects and outcomes (Gry-
golec et al., 2012; Bault et al., 2008; Coricelli and Rustichini, 2010). As a constituent
part of their model of inequality aversion, Fehr and Schmidt (1999) constructed a utility
function, which explicitly puts a negative weight on a negative difference to someone
else’s payoff, which can be interpreted as an aversion towards feeling envy. Envy may be
seen as a very powerful emotions, also in terms of behavioral consequences. Regarding,
material arms races among peers, as a form of such, it has found its way into proverbial
usage: “Keeping up with the Joneses” refers to the comparison to one’s neighbor (with
the common family name “Jones”) as a benchmark for social status or the accumulation
of material goods.
Gloating, on the other hand, has found much less attraction in the economic literature.3
Common web dictionaries4 define gloating as a malicious glee, or as “contemplat[ing]
or dwell[ing] on one’s own success or another’s misfortune with malignant pleasure.”
One reason for this lower prominence may be the higher ambiguity about the term.
It is oftentimes used synonymously with schadenfreude, spite, or spitefulness. Morgan
et al. (2003, p. 1), for instance, considered the effect of the spite motive in auctions, at
which they explored “the consequences of a model for bidder behavior that incorporates,
in addition to a utility for one’s own surplus, a disutility for the surplus of a rival—
interpretable as spiteful behavior.” In fact, envy and schadenfreude are closely related.
Smith et al. (1996, p. 167) argued that “Schadenfreude will result from a misfortune
befalling an envied person because, for one thing, the misfortune can directly benefit the
envying person” and also that “by eliminating the very basis for envy, the misfortune
should supply a pleasant relief from the pain of envy.” The notions are disentangled in
this section.
3In fact, in contrast to over 89,000 hits on the search term “envy + economics,” there were only
2,790 for “gloating + economics” on google scholar in May 2013.
4cf. www.thefreedictionary.com, www.merriam-webster.com, en.wiktionary.org/wiki/gloat.
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Altruism and Sympathy. Andreoni (1990, p. 473) stated that “when people make
donations to privately provided public goods, they may not only gain utility from in-
creasing its total supply, but they may also gain utility from the act of giving.” This
warm glow from the act of giving is often referred to as a rational for altruistic behav-
ior. Another approach to explain altruistic behavior, often pursued by socio-biologists
is called “kin selection.” It basically states that humans act altruistically towards others
who share genes with them, since this helps (part of) their own genes to survive. “There-
fore,” Becker wrote, “altruism toward siblings, children, grandchildren, or anyone else
with common genes could have high survival value, which would explain why altruism
toward kin is one of the enduring traits of human and animal nature.” (Becker, 1976, p.
818).
In order to experimentally measure altruistic attitude, Rushton et al. (1981) proposed
a 20-item questionnaire. In this questionnaire, subjects are asked how often they faced
situations, in which they altruistically helped others. These questions were formulated
like “I have given directions to a stranger”, “I have donated blood,” or “I have offered to
help a handicapped or elderly stranger across a street.” Subjects indicated the frequency,
choosing from never, once, more than once, often, and very often. Johnson et al. (1989)
took a similar approach, extending this scale to 56 items.
Similarity Seeking. Similarity seeking (or inequality aversion) describes preferences,
which discount utility for any difference in the payoffs between the decision maker and the
reference person. In a way, these preferences thus comprise envy and the notion of having
more than the other is also bad (maybe due to shame, or guilt, maybe because it violates
a group harmony preference). Loewenstein et al. (1989) let their subjects evaluate
different payoff allocations and found evidence for such preferences. Fehr and Schmidt
(1999) proposed an influential model implementing this notion, which is described in
more detail later on. With regard to the results of Loewenstein and his colleagues,
the latter authors wrote “that subjects exhibit a strong and robust aversion against
disadvantageous inequality: for a given own income xi, subjects rank outcomes, in which
a comparison person earns more than xi substantially lower than an outcome with equal
material payoffs. Many subjects also exhibit an aversion to advantageous inequality
although this effect seems to be significantly weaker than the aversion to disadvantageous
inequality” (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999, p. 821).
Emotional Motives Framework
The framework presented in this work approaches the subject from a slightly different
perspective. Whereas previous frameworks considered the shift away from the reference
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Figure 2.2.: Categorization of self-regarding, other-regarding, and relative emotions.
point of a given payoff allocation, the allocation itself and the associated emotional mo-
tives are regarded here. It is important to highlight, that the term emotional motive shall
explicitly not denote the emotion triggered by a particular allocation or outcome, but
rather the underlying psychological concept that may trigger the desire for a particular
allocation in the first place. These terms are usually hard to separate, however.
A categorization of possible emotional motives due to 1) one’s own payoff x, 2) another’s
payoff y and 3) the difference (or ratio) between x and y is formulated. Figure 2.2
attributes possible emotional motives to the sections of the diagrams—where the x-
axis denotes the economic payoffs and the y-axis denotes utility or general valence,
respectively. Note that this attempt to classify and label emotional motives can of
course neither be exhaustive nor consummate. The first coordinate system depicts all
possible combinations of own payoff (x) and emotional valence. A typical graph would
have a positive slope and show positive values for positive payoffs, and negative values
for negative payoffs. It could be considered a standard utility function (cf. Kahneman
and Tversky, 1979).
If people derive a positive utility from payoffs, this is denoted joy or pleasure. A negative
payoff is usually associated with negative, or disutility, termed frustration or anger
here. Some people might just be different minded and derive utility from negative
payoffs (masochism or gallows humor). Then again, others may experience disutility
from positive payoffs (misery, depression).
The second coordinate system depicts all possible combinations of the other’s payoff (y)
and one’s own emotional valence. A benevolent person’s chart would run from the lower
left to the upper right. A positive valuation for the other’s fortune is denoted benevolence
or sympathy, a negative valuation for the other’s misfortune pity or compassion. Other
people might not be as benevolent, but feel schadenfreude or gleefulness for someone
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else’s misfortune, or, negatively, spite and disfavor for someone else’s achievement. Note
that this does not consider the comparison between oneself and the reference person,
but only the absolute view onto the other’s payoff.
The third coordinate system depicts all possible combinations of the difference of own
and other’s payoff (x − y) and emotional valence. For positive values of x − y, one
receives a higher payoff than the other, for negative values, one receives less. It could be
assumed that most people’s utility is positive for a positive difference (pride, gloating)
and negative for a negative difference (envy, jealousy). However, depending on the
context, it is conceivable that someone is inequality averse or similarity seeking to such
a degree, that even an own surplus is regarded as deleterious. Possible explanations for
this could be shame or embarrassment. Moreover, someone could regard a situation,
in which he has less than the other as beneficial, out of heroism or selflessness, like a
grandfather may be proud of his grandchild outperforming him in chess.
As stated before, the set of terms presented in this overview is by no means exhaustive—
other traits may be included in a meaningful way. Griffin-Pierson (1990) presented a
questionnaire in order to measure subjects’ competitiveness, on both an individual and
goal-directed level. Competitiveness, in contrast to the motives described here, does not
constitute an emotional motive in itself, but could, in the context of this framework,
rather be interpreted as the slope of an assumed function ux(x − y), running through
the third coordinate system (from the lower left to the upper right) in Figure 2.2.
2.1.5. Models of Social Preferences
“A number of social preference models have been developed in an effort
to explain and organize the evidence from economic experiments. It has
been found that people share with others in dictator games, reject offers
in ultimatum games, cooperate in public good games, etc., all of which is
in direct conflict with traditional microeconomic utility theory” (Daruvala,
2010, p. 199).
There have been quite a lot propositions for different types of social preference models
in the literature. Each of these models incorporates and stresses different motives, e.g.
inequality aversion, a preference for efficiency (total welfare), or the maximization of
the worst off player (maximin). While some models typically perform well at explaining
certain types of decisions, they fail to do so for others. Daruvala (2010), in this sense,
urged: “Would the right social preference model please stand up!” Wilson (2010, p. 78)




• “social preference functions [...] balance a person’s desire to have more money
with their desire to reciprocate those who have treated them fairly or unfairly, or
to achieve equality” (Camerer, 2003, p. 11).
• “formal models of social preferences [...] assume people are self-interested, but are
also concerned about the payoffs of others” (Charness and Rabin, 2002, p. 817).
• “people exhibit social preferences, which means they are not solely motivated by
material self-interest but also care positively or negatively for the material payoffs
of relevant reference agents” (Fehr and Fischbacher, 2002, p. C1).
This section introduces the most prevalent tractable models of social preferences with
regard to distributional preferences. Such tractable models can be used to fit empirical
data, and they may actually explain behavioral patterns. Typically, such models formu-
late a utility function ux(·) for a player x, whose perspective is taken. Then by design,
player x’s utility does not only depend on her own payoff πx, but also, in some way, on
the payoffs of one or more other players, the reference person(s), peer(s), or peer group.
Oftentimes, the general n player case is simplified to a generic 2-player scenario with
players x and y. The formal utility of player x is hence denoted as ux(πx, πy).
Fehr and Schmidt (1999, FS) formulated the presumably most successful utility concept
in terms of usage, citation5, and circulation in the subsequent literature in their article
A theory of fairness, competition, and cooperation. Here, in addition to the value of the
own payoff, negative weights are assigned to the differences between own and the other
person’s payoff. This approach thus implements the concept of inequality aversion. The
function is given by
ux(πx, πy) = πx − α max{πy − πx, 0} − β max{πx − πy, 0}, (2.1)
where 0 ≤ β ≤ α and β ≤ 1. An increase of the other player’s payoff is only useful for x,
if y has less than x: ∂ux/∂πy ≥ 0 if and only if πx ≥ πy. Also note that having less than
the other player is considered more harmful than having more (β ≤ α). Thus, the Fehr
and Schmidt (1999) approach implements a concept of differentiated inequality aversion.
Having more is different than having less. However, the question remains, why having
more than a peer is necessarily considered a bad thing, causing disutility. It can easily
be thought of situations, where people strive to receive more than their peers, regardless
of how much it is (e.g., in competition, or among rivals). This thought will be followed
in more detail in Chapter 5.
5Over 5,700 citations on google scholar in July 2013.
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Bolton and Ockenfels (2000, BO) take a similar perspective in their influential ERC-
paper (A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition). Here, however, the utility
model is not ultimately defined. Instead, the authors presented the principle of such
a functional form and several requirements, in order to be implemented by a specific
function. Stating x’s utility to be given by the “motivation function”
ux(πx, σx), (2.2)
where, loosely speaking, σx represents the relative share of x’s payoffs compared to
the entire reference group6, the actual characteristic is provided by the formal require-
ments on ux: weakly increasing and concave in πx and strictly concave in σx, yielding
a maximum at σx = 1/N , where N denotes the number of players. Fehr and Schmidt
(2006, p. 641) noted that the utility, or motivational concepts of “Fehr-Schmidt and
Bolton-Ockenfels often yield qualitatively similar results for two-player games, while
some interesting differences arise with more than two players.” One of the main differ-
ences between the models of Fehr and Schmidt (1999) and Bolton and Ockenfels (2000)
lies in the fact that, in the latter, the player compares her share to the average share
of each member of the group, i.e. only the total payoff and the number of players is
relevant. In the former model, a player compares her payoff to each of the other players’
payoffs. Thus, in the case of more than 2 players, a transfer of money between two other
players will alter one’s utility in the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model. It will, however,
not do so in the Bolton and Ockenfels (2000) model.
Charness and Rabin (2002, CR) considered a utility function of the form
ux(πx, πy) = (1− γ)πx + γ(δmin{πx, πy}+ (1− δ)(πx + πy)), (2.3)
where 0 ≤ γ, δ ≤ 1. The utility of player x is driven by self-interest, as well as by
a measure for social welfare. The measure for social welfare itself consists of a term
that determines how much player x cares about the player with the minimum payoff
(including herself), known as maximin preferences, and how much she cares about the
total of outcomes (social welfare concerns). The parameter δ weights these terms. The
parameter γ defines to what extent the player is concerned about her own payoff and
how important the mentioned social aspects are to her.




(1− θ−1πx<πy − θ+1πx≥πy)πxα + (θ−1πx<πy + θ+1πx≥πy)πyα
)1/α
, (2.4)




i∈P πi 6= 0, and σx = 1/N otherwise (P representing the set
of all N players.)
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where 0 < α < 1, 0 ≤ θ− ≤ θ+ < 1 and θ− + θ+ ≤ 1. They refer to the function as a
modified CES (constant elasticity of substitution) utility function. The weights on πx
and πy depend on which player receives the higher payoff.
Tan and Bolle (2006, TB) considered a utility function using a quadratic term in the
payoff difference. It takes the form




with no further restrictions on the parameters a and b, respectively. The parameter a
represents the concern for the other player’s outcome in an altruistic or spiteful way. If
b > 0, the third term refers to a quadratic inequality aversion, whereas b < 0 indicates
a quadratic desire for inequality, regardless of which player is better or worse off.





(παx + θπαy ), if α ∈ (−∞, 1] \ {0}
πxπ
θ
y, if α = 0
(2.6)
where α ∈ (−∞, 1]. Again, the structure of this function is generic: It allows for altruism
as well as resentment, depending on the sign of θ. An overview is provided in Table 2.2.
Engelmann and Strobel (2004) presented a general view on different utility models,
applying them to the data of one-shot distribution experiments, conducted in the class-
room. They considered the role of efficiency concerns, maximin preferences, and inequal-
ity aversion. The different allocations to choose among were set up in a way that would
lead different theories to different predictions. They found that efficiency concerns and
maximin preferences did well at rationalizing their empirical data. Since the Fehr and
Schmidt (1999) model is in line with maximin preferences, they concluded, it did better
in rationalizing the data than the ERC model by Bolton and Ockenfels (2000). Bolton
and Ockenfels (2006) responded that in other experiments—using a vote about the al-
location in their case—the willingness to pay for efficiency was low, whereas there was
considerable demand for equity. To conclude this section, Bolton and Ockenfels (2006,
p. 1910)’s closing remark puts it splendidly:
“In closing, we would say that the test for social preference theory is not so
much whether the model is true, but rather whether the model can usefully
organize important behavioral patterns and economic phenomena (in the
sense of Alvin E. Roth, 1996)7.”
7Roth, Alvin E. 1996. “Individual Rationality as a Useful Approximation: Comments on Tversky’s
‘Rational Theory and Constructive Choice’.” In The Rational Foundations of Economic Behavior:
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Table 2.2.: Selected models of other-regarding preferences, πx: own payoff, πy: other
person’s payoff.
model utility function ux(πx, πy) = parameters
FS 1999 πx − αmax{πy − πx, 0} − βmax{πx − πy, 0} 0 ≤ β ≤ α, β ≤ 1
BO 2000 ux(πx, σx) σx ∼ πx/
∑
i∈P πi
CR 2002 (1− γ)πx + γ(δmin{πx, πy}+ (1− δ)(πx + πy)) 0 ≤ γ,
δ ≤ 1
CS 2005 ((1− θ−1πx<πy − θ+1πx≥πy)πxα
+(θ−1πx<πy + θ+1πx≥πy)πyα)1/α
0 < α < 1,
0 ≤ θ+ < 1,
0 ≤ θ− ≤ θ+,
θ− + θ+ ≤ 1
TB 2006 πx + aπy − b2(πx − πy)





(παx + θπαy ), if α ∈ (−∞, 1] \ {0}
πxπ
θ
y, if α = 0
α ∈ (−∞, 1]
2.1.6. Experimental Measurement of Social Preferences
In order to illustrate how existence and effect of social preferences can be measured
experimentally, the most common standard games are presented in this section. Two of
those games, namely the Ultimatum Game and the Dictator Game, shall be presented
in more detail, since they are particularly simple and illustrative.
The Ultimatum Game (UG) was initially presented by Güth et al. (1982). The UG is a
2-player game with two stages. In stage 1, Player A (the proposer) makes an offer about
the split of a fixed amount of money M (e.g., M = e 10) to Player B (the responder),
e.g., e 8 for A, e 2 for B. Then in stage 2, Player B decides whether to accept or to
reject the offer. If B accepts, both players receive the amounts as proposed by A. If B
rejects, both players receive nothing.
From a classical economic perspective, A should offer the minimum possible amount,
which would be accepted by B, since any ε > 0 is still better than nothing. This,
however, is not what is found empirically and what would also not be quite consistent
Proceedings of the IEA Conference held in Turin, Italy, ed. Kenneth Arrow, Enrico Colombatto, Mark
Perlman, and Christian Schmidt, 198–202. London: Palgrave Macmillan.
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with one’s intuition. Player B has some control and power in this game—which is
to eliminate all payoffs—and this power should typically be paid off. Also do people
apparently care about fairness. A and B are equal for the time being. Then why should
one receive more than the other, if the roles are assigned purely randomly? For this
reason, unfair offers are punished, which in turn is anticipated by the proposer. But this
argument also works the other way around. If the roles are not assigned randomly, but
the proposer earns his or her position by, for instance, a high performance in a real effort
task, he or she feels “entitled” to keep a larger share of the pie, which is also accepted
by the responder (e.g., Frey and Bohnet, 1995).
The UG has been played many times and has been varied in almost every possible way
since 1982. Hence, the empirical evidence is large and not entirely consistent. There
are, however, some overarching trends: Modal and median offers typically lie around
40 to 50 percent of the stake size M . The average offer is typically between 30 to
40 percent of M . Hardly any offers fall into the regions below 10 percent or above
50 percent (hyper-fair) of M . Offers below 30 percent are increasingly rejected; that
is to say about half of the time for offers below 20 percent (cf. Camerer, 2003, pp.
48–59). The most important methodological design variables are repetition, stake-size,
anonymity, and experimenter blindness. For a detailed description of the UG results,
also including demographic factors such as gender, race, age, academic major, beauty,
and structural variables such as identity, communication, competition, outside options,
information, number of players, etc., as well as culture, see Camerer (2003).
The UG is often referred to as an illustrative example of fairness preferences. Player B
has the ability to punish unfair offers, which leads A to carefully contemplate how much
to offer. The game is often mistaken for revealing fairness preferences on the part of
Player A, which is not necessarily true. As outlined above, offering an amount around
50 percent of the stake may be the best strategy for a purely selfish decision maker A,
when assuming fairness preferences for B.
A physical version of the Ultimatum Game was conducted by Kaiser et al. (2012), using
bonobos and chimpanzees as experimental subjects. The first ape was able to propose
a split of 10 grapes by physically moving the grapes with a paper strip. The second ape
then was able to pull a bar, which made the grapes (as divided before) accessible for
both apes. Kaiser et al. (2012) observed that bonobos and chimpanzees were entirely
insensitive to unfairness. The proposer always took as many grapes as possible—and
the responder basically always accepted. Even when the proposer took all grapes for
himself, the responding ape accepted this zero-offer in about 40 percent of the time.8
8In other experiments, however, monkeys appear to have distributional preferences and reject what
they regard as unfair offers or allocations made by the experimenter (Van Wolkenten et al., 2007). When
fed with pieces of cucumber as reward for a simple task (handing over a stone to the experimenter),
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The Dictator Game (DG) was initially presented by Kahneman et al. (1986). The DG
is a 2-player game with only one stage and only one active player. The active player
(the so called dictator) decides about the division of a fixed amount of money M (e.g.,
M = e 10) between herself and the other (passive) player. The passive player does not
have any strategic power whatsoever and merely receives the money allocated to her.
Forsythe et al. (1994) stated that, in view of the results of Ultimatum Games, fairness
cannot fully explain these results, since the amounts offered in the DG are significantly
smaller and a much higher share of the participants offers nothing at all. Similar to the
UG, DGs have been executed and varied many times. Engel (2011) presented a meta
study on Dictator Games and identified overarching positive effects on contribution for
conditions, in which the recipient is deserving or has earned the money. Moreover,
old age and the presence of multiple recipients has a positive effect, whereas students
and children tend to give less. Also repetition and concealment have negative effects
on contribution. He found an overall contribution rate of 28.35 percent, where 36.11
percent of all subjects gave nothing, and 16.74 percent gave half of the pie.
Besides Ultimatum and Dictator Game, commonly used standard experiments are the
Trust Game, the Gift Exchange Game, and the Public Good Game, or versions of these
types. Levitt and List (2007) provided a compact description and overview on these
games, which is presented in Table A.1 in the Appendix.
2.1.7. Application Example of Social Preferences
In order to illustrate the thought of social preferences and also the formalization, consider
the example of the following game: Two players X and Y are endowed with 100 monetary
units (MU) each. They now have to simultaneously decide on whether to keep this
endowment for themselves (keep) or to transfer it to the other player (transfer). The
amount transferred is multiplied by an efficiency factor r > 1 and credited to the other
player. Let this factor be r = 1.4 for this example. This game represents a prisoners’
dilemma (PD). From the game theoretic perspective, the classical PD occurs in many
situations such as public goods, syndicates, arms races, climate debates, or mutual gift
exchange as outlined here, etc. Each of the players has a dominant strategy, which means
that—given the other player’s action—it is always best to pursue this strategy. In this
case, the dominant strategy is to keep the money. Both players then end up with their
everything is fine until another monkey—the peer—which was rewarded cucumber before as well for the
exact same task, receives the more valued grapes instead. The first monkey, which observed the peer
and its reward, then refuses the chunks of cucumber and demonstrates its discontent with this unequal
treatment. Assuming that cucumber is still valued higher than no food at all, this expression is made
even at a cost (http://www.ted.com/talks/frans_de_waal_do_animals_have_morals.html).
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initial endowment. This holds for both players symmetrically. The resulting equilibrium
is pareto-inferior, meaning that there would be another situation, in which both players
would be better off, namely, if they transferred their endowment. They would then both
end up with 140 MU. This situation, however, is not stable: then again, both players
have an incentive to deviate, i.e. to keep their endowments, and thereby achieve a higher
payoff individually. But this thought is followed by the other player, too. So eventually,




































































(b) Utility matrix for the prisoners’ dilemma with
social preferences.
Figure 2.3.: Game structure of a prisoners’ dilemma with and without the consideration
of social preferences.
Social preferences come into play when it is acknowledged that not only the own (mon-
etary) payoff might be relevant to a player, but also the payoff of the respective other.
On that score, it is necessary to consolidate both own and other’s payoff into a single
value of utility. Let this function be ux(πx, πy) = πx+axyπy, where πx and πy denote the
payoffs of players X and Y. How the other’s payoff is evaluated will usually depend on
the relationship between A and B, their intentions, the history of actions, personalities,
etc. Roughly following the proposition made by Rabin (1993), this aspect is captured
by the factor axy. Assume that a player derives a positive utility from the other player’s
payoff, if (and only if) this other player decided to transfer her money. The emotion
associated could be sympathy for the goodwill of the other player (axy > 0). Analo-
gously, a player derives a negative utility from the other player’s payoff, if this other
player decides to keep her endowment. This can be interpreted as a disfavor, grudge or
spitefulness in response to the other’s non-benign action (axy < 0). In particular, let
the factors by which the other’s payoff is weighted be axy = 0.8 for the positive, and
axy = −0.8 for the negative relationship, respectively. Now, the payoff structure of the
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game is transferred into a utility structure, so that the other player’s payoff is taken into
account, conditioned by the other player’s action.
The new matrix is shown in Figure 2.3(b). There are now two Nash equilibria, which
are (keep, keep) and (transfer, transfer). Given what the other player does, it is now
always best to act likewise.9 This example shows in a very simplified manner that the
concept of social preferences is able to capture and rationalize actual behavior.
2.2. Risk Preferences
This section illustrates the concept of risk preferences. First, the general foundations
are introduced, a brief historical outline is given and the main terms and definitions
are presented. At that, first the concepts of risk, expected utility, Prospect Theory,
and some characteristics of risk preferences are explained. Second, different methods of
experimental risk preference elicitation are presented, with an emphasis on the Holt and
Laury (2002) test.
2.2.1. Foundations
“Most decisions, including decisions of economic importance, entail an ele-
ment of risk, because the consequences of alternative courses of action are
rarely known with certainty. Thus decision making under risk is a central
topic in economics” (Rick and Loewenstein, 2008, p. 140).
A risky decision is characterized by the existence of at least one decision alternative, of
which the outcome is not determined beforehand. In contrast to ambiguous situations,
however, the probabilities of different scenarios are known—or can at least be assumed
(cf. Laux et al., 2012). Such a risky choice alternative is usually denoted as lottery,
or prospect. In the context of economics, the results of such prospects are typically
expressed in monetary units, the payoffs. A decision maker faced with a choice between
a prospect and a certain outcome (or several prospects) can—for instance—derive the
9This concept is often referred to as reciprocity. Teubner et al. (2013) showed within the context
of an online gift exchange game (which constitutes a repeated prisoners’ dilemma), that people tend to
reciprocate, in particular when it is made possible on a 1:1 basis rather than on a group level. A positive
action towards oneself or the group is rewarded, whereas negative actions are punished. In reality, not
every PD necessarily ends in the inferior situation, as predicted by standard economic theory. Promotive
circumstances such as repeated play, adequate framing, communication, outside options, the possibility
to punish or reward, or, as was shown here, the provision for social preferences enables deeper insights
into the mechanics of interpersonal strategic decision making and provides an explanation for how the
dilemma situation can be resolved.
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decision by evaluating the expected values of the different prospects and comparing them
to the certain payoffs. Consider the following, simple choice problem: A decision has to
be made between one of the two options A and B, which are defined as
• Option A: e 0,
• Option B: winning e 100 with a probability of 50%, losing e 100 with a probability
of 50%.
In case the risky option B is chosen, the 50% chances are implemented by a flip of
a fair coin. The safe option A entails an (expected) value of EVA = 0 (EUR), since
this is the actual certain payoff. The second, risky option B entails an expected value
of EVB = 50% × 100 + 50% × (−100) = 0 (EUR), too. A risk averse decider will
(rationally) choose option A, in order to avoid the risk of losing money. A risk seeking
decider, however, will (rationally) choose option B, hoping for the favorable outcome to
be realized. A risk neutral decision maker is indifferent between both alternatives.
Utility, Expected Utility, and Prospect Theory
It can be assumed that actual people do evaluate risky alternatives not only by comparing
expected values, i.e. completely regardless of any notion of risk. This can be illustrated
by a simple example, which is commonly known as the St. Petersburg paradox, named
after a presentation given by Daniel Bernoulli in St. Petersburg in 1738 (Bernoulli,
1738).10 Consider the following single player lottery game: A fair coin is tossed again
and again until it shows tails. The pot starts at e 1 and is doubled in every round (1, 2,
4, 8, 16, ...). The player wins whatever is in the pot when the game ends. So the profit
is e 1, if the first coin toss is tails, of which the probability is p1 = 12 . The profit is e 2,
if the first toss is heads and the second toss is tails (p2 = (12)
2 = 14), and so on. The












The expected profit is infinitely high. A rational player would hence be willing to pay
any ever so high price to participate in that lottery. This outcome, however, is neither
10The problem actually was described earlier by Daniel Bernoulli’s cousin Nicolas Bernoulli in a
letter to Pierre Raymond de Montmort in 1713 (cf. Bernoulli, 1738).
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in line with common intuition, nor does it match any empirical observation—therefore it
is called a paradox. As a criterion for the decision, Bernoulli suggested to use the utility
of the payoff, instead of the payoff itself. Bernoulli actually came back to a thought
expressed by Gabriel Cramer11 in a letter to Bernoulli’s cousin Nicolas in 1728, who
stated:
“The paradox consists in the infinite sum which calculation yields as the
equivalent which A must pay to B. This seems absurd since no reasonable
man would be willing to pay 20 ducats as equivalent. You ask for an ex-
planation of this discrepancy between the mathematical calculation and the
vulgar evaluation. I believe that it results from the fact that, in their theory,
mathematicians evaluate money in proportion to its quantity while, in prac-
tice, people with common sense evaluate money in proportion to the utility
they can obtain from it.”
Hence, a decision maker would select the option entailing the highest expected utility.
In that sense, already Bernoulli assumed rational behavior. This Expected Utility The-
ory (EUT) was further developed and axiomatically formalized by von Neumann and
Morgenstern (1944). Given a decision maker has a utility function of certain properties
and acts rational, it would be possible to predict the actual (and optimal) behavior.
Note that von Neumann and Morgenstern did not claim that any decision maker would
aim at maximizing their utility function consciously, only the general existence of such
a function.
Before presenting the basic axioms, the concept of a lottery must be generalized. A
lottery in the sense of von Neumann and Morgenstern is a vector of n outcomes vi
(i ∈ {1, ..., n}), all of which can be assigned a certain probability of incidence pi. This
vector includes all possible alternatives, i.e. the probabilities sum up to ∑ni=1 pi = 1.
The outcome of lottery can itself be another lottery. The expected value of a lottery
L is thus given by EV (L) = ∑ni=1 pivi. The main von-Neumann-Morgenstern axioms
concern the preference relation among lotteries, where either lottery M is preferred to
lottery L (L ≺ M), lottery L is preferred to lottery M (L  M), or the decision maker
is indifferent between L and M (L ∼ M). The four main axioms are presented in the
following (cf. also Laux et al., 2012, pp. 121ff).
Completeness L ≺ M,L  M, or L ∼ M . For any two lotteries L and M , exactly
one of the relations “is better”, “is worse”, or is “equal” holds, i.e. the choice alternatives
can be ordered completely.
11Gabriel Cramer, born in Geneva, Switzerland, mathematician, 1704–1752.
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Figure 2.4.: Figures from the Kahneman and Tversky (1979) Prospect Theory paper,
illustrating the utility functions for gains and losses, probability weighting,
and the isolation effect in multi-stage prospects.
Transitivity L ≺ M, and M ≺ N ⇒ L ≺ N , i.e., if M is preferred over L, and N is
preferred over M , then N is necessarily also preferred over L.
Continuity L ≺ M ≺ N ⇒ ∃p ∈ [0, 1] with M ∼ pL + (1 − p)N , i.e., any lottery, in
terms of preference, can be replicated by a linear combination of a better and a worse
lottery.
Independence L ≺ M ⇒ ∀N, p ∈ (0, 1], pL + (1 − p)N ≺ pM + (1 − p)N , i.e., the
preference relation holds independently of the existence of another (irrelevant) outcome.
In the 1970’s, psychologists and economists used the concept of (tractable) utility func-
tions to explain real human behavior (in a positivistic way), rather than to derive theo-
retically optimal decisions (normative approach). Daniel Kahneman and Amos Tversky
developed a comprehensive theory of decisions involving risk (Kahneman and Tversky,
1979). Their seminal Prospect Theory paper (and later on Cumulative Prospect Theory
(CPT), Tversky and Kahneman, 1992) extended the classical Expected Utility Theory
by the concepts of reference points, probability weighting, path isolation for multi-stage
prospects, and a more differentiated view on gains and losses. The authors showed that
one of the major heuristics people apply in decisions under risk is to evaluate payoffs as
gains or losses, relative to a reference point (cf. Figure 2.4, diagram on the left hand
side). Endowing someone with e 1000 and then asking to choose among the prospects
A1 (e 1,000, 0.50) and B1 (e 500) will result in different choices than endowing someone
with e 2000 and then asking to choose among the prospects A2 (e -1,000, 0.50) and
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B2 (e -500). Most subjects, as Kahneman and Tversky showed, chose B1 in the first
problem, and A2 in the second, exhibiting “risk aversion for positive prospects and risk
seeking for negative ones.” In summary, the authors proposed that the subjective value
function for most individuals is “(i) defined on deviations from the reference point; (ii)
generally concave for gains and commonly convex for losses; (iii) steeper for losses than
for gains” (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
Also it was shown that people tend to handle probabilities in a systematically skewed
way. This probability weighting, formalized by a weighting function π(p), rationalizes be-
havior involving probabilities close to 0 or 1, where small probabilities are systematically
overestimated (π(p) > p for small values of p) and high probabilities are systematically
underestimated (cf. Figure 2.4, diagram in the center). In addition, the authors de-
scribe a subcertainty effect, stating that people tend to assign less than 100 percent of
probability in total when evaluating combinations of prospects (π(p) + π(1− p) < 1).
Finally, path isolation shall be outlined here in some more detail. Consider, for this
purpose, a two-stage game as given by Kahneman and Tversky (1979). In the first
stage, there is a 75 percent chance that the game ends and there is no payoff. Only if
the second stage is reached (25 percent), the decision maker has the choice between the
two prospects (e 4,000, 0.80) and (e 3,000), whereat the choice must be made before the
game starts. Clearly, in this game, one actually has the choice between the two prospects
(e 4,000, 0.80 · 0.25 = .20) and (e 3,000, 1.00 · 0.25 = 0.25). The authors showed that
people tend to ignore the first stage of the game and treat the decision problem as if
they already reached the second stage.
Utility Functions and Risk Preferences
In order to derive a utility value from a payoff value, a functional relation is constructed.
Bernoulli suggested a logarithmic function for discounting excessively high payoffs. As
the small example from above shows, a decision maker’s individual risk preference is
implicitly determined by the curvature of the underlying utility function. Concave func-
tions yield risk aversion, convex functions yield risk seeking behavior. Linear functions
represent risk neutrality. Clearly, it is conceivable that a decision maker’s utility func-
tion is convex in some parts, whereas it is concave in other parts. The risk preference
then depends on the stakes involved in the decision situation. Typically, humans are
more risk averse for higher stakes (Who would sacrifice a certain gain of e 1,000,000 for
a 10 percent chance on e 10,000,000?). On the other hand, small stakes often support
risk seeking behavior: A certain payoff of e 1 might just not be seen as useful because
the equivalent spending power is limited, while e 10, however, would indeed be more
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useful. As a result, the 90 percent risk of losing the certain e 1 is accepted here more
often (Holt and Laury, 2002).
The curvature of a function u(x) at x is mathematically defined by the second derivative
u′′(x). For u′′(x) > 0, the decision maker is risk seeking at x, for u′′(x) < 0 the
decision maker is risk averse. Thus, the second derivative comes handy to characterize
risk attitude, it has, however, a major drawback. The positive linear transformation
v(x) = a·u(x)+b will transform the second derivative, yielding v′′(x) = a·u′′(x) 6= u′′(x).
This is particularly problematic, since the positive linear transformation of a utility
function does not alter the preference order as specified by the axioms in Section 2.2.1.
Thus, the second derivative as a measure of risk preference does not meet the implications
of this characteristic, since it yields different values. In order to ensure comparability,
the second derivative can be normalized. Doing so, Pratt (1964) and Arrow (1971)




For positive values of ARA(x), the decision maker is risk averse, negative values indicate
risk propensity. The ARA(x) is a measure of the absolute amount of wealth a decision
maker is willing to expose to risk as a function of her reference point (e.g., current
wealth or credit account). Decreasing absolute risk aversion implies that this amount
increases as wealth itself increases. Constant absolute risk aversion remains unchanged as
wealth increases or decreases. If the measure of risk aversion is supposed to consider the
potential changes in wealth (e.g., the lottery payoffs) relatively to the reference point (the
pre-existing credit account), the Arrow-Pratt measure of relative risk aversion (RRA)
can be used. It is defined as
RRA(x) = −u
′′(x)
u′(x) · x. (2.11)
In order to illustrate the difference between these two measures, consider the following
case. There are two decision makers A and B with the exact same utility function
u(x) =
√
x (x ≥ 0). Thus, both A and B are risk averse, since the root function is
concave at any x > 0. The measures of ARA(x) and RRA(x) can easily be derived.
The first and second derivative of u(x) are u′(x) = 0.5 · x−0.5 and u′′(x) = −0.25 · x−1.5,
respectively. This results in ARA(x) = 12x , and RRA(x) = 0.5(= const.). Note that
RRA(x) does not depend on x, i.e., it is constant. This implies Constant Relative Risk
Aversion (CRRA), which means that the decision maker shows the same degree of risk
aversion, if the ratio of money at risk at wealth is constant. Also note that ARA(x)







































Figure 2.5.: Stylized utility function with decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion.
prospect if the reference level of wealth increases. Now, let A possess a credit balance
of e 10, while B possesses a credit balance of e 100,000, see Figure 2.5 for a stylized
illustration. Looking at the measure of Absolute Risk Aversion, A obtains a value of
ARAA(10) = 0.05, whereas B obtains a value of ARAB(100, 000) = 0.00001, which is
much closer to 0, i.e., closer to risk neutrality. Therefore, in terms of absolute risk
aversion, A is more risk averse than B towards the same prospect. A concrete decision
situation illustrates this. Both decision makers face the choice of either receiving e 40
with certainty (safe option S) or playing a 50:50 gamble for e 100 or e 0 (risky option
R). Recall that both players are risk averse. In the case of identical expected values,
both players would always prefer the safe option. The risky option, however, yields a
higher expected value than the safe option (EVR = 50 > 40 = EVS). From an outside
perspective, decision maker A faces a much “riskier” choice than B since the absolute
amount of e 40 or e 100 is much higher compared to the respective endowments, or in
other words, the relative share at risk is larger. The utility function (of both decision
makers) does account for this, since it yields decreasing absolute risk aversion. Decision
maker A compares a certain payment of e 40 with the 50:50 gamble for e 100, and
because the initial endowment is e 10, the respective utility values are u(40 + 10) =
7.071, u(0 + 10) = 3.162, and u(100 + 10) = 10.488. The expected utility value of the
lottery amounts to 12u(10) +
1
2u(110) = 6.825, which is smaller than the utility of the
certain payoff. Decision maker A will hence choose the safe payoff. Decision maker
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B conducts an analogous calculation and obtains the values u(100, 040) = 316.291,
u(100, 000) = 316.228, and u(100, 100) = 316.386. The expected utility of the lottery
thus is 316.307, which is (slightly) higher than the utility of the certain payoff. He will
thus choose the lottery.
Utility functions with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA), such as
u(x) = 1− exp(−αx), (2.12)
yield a constant value for ARA(x) = α with respect to x. Any, ever so rich decision
maker with this utility function will evaluate a given prospect identically. The concept
of Constant Relative Risk Aversion implies decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion and thus
implements the thought that the reference point does matter to some extent. The
decision problem from the example above would have to be a choice between a certain
payoff of e 400,000 and a 50 percent chance on e 1,000,000 for B, in order to put him
into the exact same position as A. Utility functions with Constant Relative Risk Aversion
rationalize that millionaires bet e 100 chips on single numbers on roulette tables in the
casino, whereas ordinary people do not—although the game and the chances are the
same for both. Utility functions with Constant Absolute Risk Aversion disregard of
this.12 The concept of CRRA works likewise for risk aversion and risk propensity. This,
and the fact that utility functions with CRRA are mathematically comparatively easy to
handle, has contributed to a vast proliferation in economic models and in the literature.
One of the most simple and adoptable functions satisfying the CRRA property is
u(x) = x1−r, (2.13)
where the parameter r ∈ (−∞, 1) represents risk preference, and RRA(x) = r. The
decision maker is risk seeking for r ∈ (−∞, 0) (convex function), risk neutral for r = 0
(linear function), and risk averse for r ∈ (0, 1) (concave function). In experimental
economics, it is often demanded to elicit information about the risk preferences of the
decision makers, i.e. to gain information about the individual parameters r. For this
purpose, a whole variety of standardized risk preferences tasks has been developed in
the last decade, some of which are presented in the following section.
Utility of Facing Risk. There is another, complementary view on risk preferences.
People might derive utility, e.g., in form of thrill, fun, or excitement, from participating in
12It must be pointed out that betting money in a casino implies risk propensity in the first place, since
the expected value of any game is (at best) slightly negative, which is easily proven mathematically,




lotteries or risky decisions per se. This fixed extra utility may overlay the utility derived
from the monetary payoffs and expected values of the lottery, which could substantiate
the common finding that people show to be generally risk averse, but oftentimes risk
seeking if the stakes are sufficiently small. This “attraction to chance” has been shown
to be particularly present when the decision about the degree of risk is in the subject’s
hands (Albers et al., 2000). Adam and Kroll (2012) related the attraction to chance
effect to physiological correlates of the decision makers’ expected emotions. The latter
observed that receiving the low payoff in a standard lottery (with no say in the degree of
riskiness) causes negative emotions whereas it does not for lotteries of the form (0.5, S+
X; 0.5, S −X), where S represents a fixed amount and X is the decision variable.
2.2.2. Risk Preferences Elicitation
Eliciting subjects’ risk aversion is necessary to establish a theoretical benchmark for
what could be the “correct” behavior of a subject in a particular decision situation. This
notion naturally assumes that subjects actually have preferences regarding risk and in
particular the trade-off between risk and expected value. Additionally, it is assumed
that these preferences are stable at least short term. Eventually, the preferences must
be assumed to be transferable from the control situation (e.g. the risk aversion task) to
the actual focus decision. The latter can typically not be guaranteed: specifically risk
preferences are known to vary among different domains such as health, financial issues,
or social behavior (cf. Dohmen et al., 2011).
There are different ways to elicit subjects’ risk preferences in the domain of the social
sciences, and experimental economics. Sometimes, people are simply asked to describe
their risk preference with their own words as, for instance, Dohmen et al. (2011) did
for the different domains in a large-scale survey. This method, naturally, is prone to
systematic biases. Subjects might just lie and state a wrong preference, simply because
there is no reason not to (lack of incentives), or because their actual attitude might not
occur socially desirable to them.
Another method is to elicit the willingness to pay for different lotteries by mechanisms
such as Vickrey auctions, and thus gain information about the height of the certainty-
equivalent (cf. Harrison et al., 2007). Other methods put the decision maker on the spot
of choosing one of two or more prospects for themselves. In multiple price list (MPL)
designs, this is done repeatedly, whereat the probabilities are held fix and only the related
payoffs change (e.g., Binswanger, 1980), or, conversely, the payoffs are held fix and only
the probabilities change (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002). This method is widely-used among
experimental economists, and will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
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Another class of tests lets the decision maker choose the desired level of risk on a (pseudo)
continuous scale. The “bomb” risk elicitation task (BRET) by Crosetto and Filippin
(2012) lets the decision maker choose how many (k) of 100 buckets he or she wants
to collect. Every bucket pays a certain amount of money γ. One (random) bucket,
however, contains a bomb. In case it is among the chosen buckets, the payoff is zero.
The probability of not hitting the bomb, when collecting k buckets, is p(k) = 1−k/100.
The expected value of choosing k buckets becomes EV (k) = kγp(k) = γ(k − k2/100),
which has a maximum at k∗ = 50. A higher or lower k will decrease the expected payoff,
eventually being zero for 0 or 100 buckets. The BRET is similar to the Columbia Card
Task (CCT) by Figner et al. (2009).
Another method is presented by Eckel and Grossman (2008). Subjects are asked to
chose one of five prospects, whereas each prospect represents a 50:50 gamble between a
high (h) and a low (l) payoff. In the no-loss framing, the payoffs (in US$) of the five
prospects are l1 = 16, h1 = 16, l2 = 12, h2 = 24, l3 = 8, h3 = 32, l4 = 4, h4 = 40, and
l5 = 0, h5 = 48. The expected value is increasing linearly from EV1 = 16 to EV5 = 24,
and so is the level of risk.
The Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion task “has been widely implemented in recent
laboratory experiments and involves a relatively transparent task,” (Harrison et al., 2007,
p. 437). It can, from a practical point of view, be regarded as the standard procedure for
risk preference elicitation in experimental economics. It is therefore chosen as a reference
for grounding risk preferences in the scope of this work and considered in more detail in
the following.
The Holt & Laury Risk Aversion Test. In their influential paper, Holt and Laury
(2002) presented a risk aversion test using a multiple price list (MPL) design with fixed
payoffs and varying probabilities. In this test, subjects face a series of 10 choices between
two lotteries (A or B) each. While lottery A represents a gamble with payoffs of either
US$ 2.00 or US$ 1.60 in the baseline treatment, lottery B entails payoffs of US$ 3.85 or
US$ 0.10. Let p denote the probability for the higher payoff in both lotteries. The low
payoff hence has a probability of 1 − p. The value of p increases over the course of the
10 choices, starting at p1 = 0.10, in steps of ∆ = 0.10. Thus, p10 = 1.00. Note that, the
probabilities for the high (and the low) payoff are identical for lottery A and B in every
of the 10 choice sets. Apparently, A entails a lower variance, and has a higher expected
value for small values of p. Lottery B becomes increasingly attractive for larger values
of p. The expected value of B exceeds the expected value of A first in the fifth row.
A risk-neutral decision maker would thus make 4 safe choices (A), and then switch to
the more risky alternative (B). A summary of all 10 rows, the respective probabilities,
values, and differences is provided on the left hand side of Table 3.2.
42
2.3. Social Preferences and Risk
Table 2.3.: Risk Aversion Classifications based on Holt and Laury (2002). #SC: number
of Safe Choices (out of 10). Range of Relative Risk Aversion (1 − r) for
U(x) = x1−r/(1− r).
#SC Range of (1− r) Classification Proportion
0 2.713 ≤ (1− r) “highly risk loving” 0.011 1.947 ≤ (1− r) < 2.713
2 1.487 ≤ (1− r) < 1.947 “very risk loving” 0.01
3 1.143 ≤ (1− r) < 1.487 “risk loving” 0.06
4 0.854 ≤ (1− r) < 1.143 “risk neutral” 0.26
5 0.588 ≤ (1− r) < 0.854 “slightly risk averse” 0.26
6 0.324 ≤ (1− r) < 0.588 “risk averse” 0.23
7 0.001 ≤ (1− r) < 0.324 “very risk averse” 0.13
8
(1− r) < 0.001
“highly risk averse” 0.03
9 “stay in bed” 0.0110
In addition to this basic specification of their experiment, the authors conducted the
test with 20, 50, and 90 times higher, and also with hypothetical payoffs, which is not
relevant in the context of this work and thus not further considered. Given that a subject
chooses lottery A first, at some point switches over to B, and then strictly chooses B,
a personal risk aversion parameter can be estimated. For this purpose, it is necessary
to assume a functional relation between (potential) payoff and utility, which is assumed
to be U(x) = x1−r/(1 − r) in the scope of Holt and Laury’s paper. With this, for
every subject, the boundaries of an interval for 1− r can be estimated. This is done by
equating the utility values piπ1−rh + (1− pi)π1−rl for A and B and solving for (1− r) for a
given row i, where πh and pil denote the high and the low payoffs and pi the probability
for the high payoff in that particular row i. A risky choice (lottery B) in this row i
means that the subject’s personal risk preference parameter is at least as high as (1−r).
A safe choice (lottery A) in this row means that the subject’s personal risk preference
parameter is at most as high (1−r). Table 2.3 summarizes these values, provides prosaic
classifications of the risk preference as given by Holt and Laury and also the proportions
of subjects showing the particular behavior.
2.3. Social Preferences and Risk
This section presents research on the joint consideration of other-regarding and risk
preferences. Both fields, seen individually, were subject to systematic research for a
considerable period of time. However, as it was often stated, “the literature, both at
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the empirical and theoretical level, has very little to say about how social concerns
operate in the presence of risk” (Krawczyk and Le Lec, 2008, p. 3). It can be argued
that the literature on decision making under risk has only lately, i.e. in the last years,
increasingly acknowledged the relevance of other-regarding preferences. Similarly has
the literature on other-regarding preferences for the most time abstracted from the
existence of uncertainty and focused on deterministic scenarios. In this context, Bolton
and Ockenfels (2010, p. 628) stated that “few contributions investigate risk taking in a
social context” and Trautmann and Vieider (2011, p. 1) noted that “economic research
on risk attitudes has traditionally focused on individual decision making issues, without
any consideration for potential social influences on preferences.” An increasing body of
theoretical and experimental work, however, was concerned with the interplay of both
aspects in the last years. Trautmann (2009), Trautmann and Vieider (2011), as well as
Gantner and Kerschbamer (2011) provided reviews thereunto.
Risk preferences were already studied in the early 18th century, allegedly starting with
the Bernoulli family (see Section 2.2). Other-regarding preferences in an economic sense
were studied starting from the second half of the 20th century by researchers who began
to interpret functions of social welfare from an individual, interpersonal perspective (see
Section 2.1). It was only until about the turn of the 21st century, when experimental
economists began to systematically investigate the interplay of both factors at once,
mostly by means of laboratory experiments, sometimes from a theoretical perspective.
There has emerged a considerable body of literature in that vein, which is examined in
this section. At first, though, some general insights into the foundations of how social
and risk preferences may interact and particularly into the concept of Procedural Justice
are provided.
2.3.1. Foundations
The American philosopher John Rawls, whose Theory of Justice (Rawls, 1971) is con-
sidered one of the major works of moral philosophy, stated that “if a number of persons
engage in a series of fair bets, the distribution of cash after the last bet is fair, or at least
not unfair, whatever this distribution is.” This means that the procedure, or the law for
a society itself may constitute fairness (ex ante), regardless of the result (ex post). Ac-
cording to the notion of Procedural Fairness, these rules are what should be considered
when evaluating whether society is fair or not. A thought experiment made by Rawls
constructs an ideal and fair society where all members meet to agree upon the rules and
principles they want to live by. However, this meeting is held behind a Veil of Ignorance.
It is assumed, that at the time these rules are made, “no one knows his place in society,
his class position or social status; nor does he know his fortune in the distribution of
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natural assets and abilities, his intelligence and strength, and the like” (Rawls, 1971, p.
137) and “therefore no one is in a position to tailor principles to his advantage” (Rawls,
1971, p. 139). The agreement upon procedures and principles ex ante occurs to be a way
to address questions of fairness and justice for a society. Procedural Justice is indeed
preferred over Distributive Justice (i.e., the fairness of the eventual allocation) from a
libertarian perspective. An illustrative example of a US prosecution trial in that vein is
instanced by Bolton et al. (2005), at which the judges argued in the sense of Rawls.
“The common rationale for the ex ante desirability of unbiased randomization
is uncommonly well articulated in the judicial ruling handed down in US v.
Holmes in 1842. The case centred on a leaky and overcrowded lifeboat from
which the crew chose to throw fourteen male passengers overboard. The
shipmen were ultimately found guilty of homicide, although not for throwing
people overboard—this was accepted as necessary to save some lives—rather
because the procedure they used to choose the victims, one that exempted
the crew, was judged ex ante unacceptable. In ruling, the judge argued that
the victims should have been chosen by a lottery in which both crew and
passengers participated. He said this would be “the fairest mode” because
‘In no other than this or some like way are those having equal rights put
upon an equal footing, and in no other way is it possible to guard against
partiality and oppression.13”’
Another way of looking at the conjunction of risk and social effects is the analysis of
group decisions, i.e. if not a single person is the decision maker, but a group has to
find a solution by common consent for an alternative. Beginning with the unpublished
master thesis by Stoner in 1961 (cf. Mackenzie, 1971), comparing individual and group
decisions involving risk, there has emerged quite a substantial body of literature on that
subject. Most of the experiments regarding the risky shift phenomenon found that the
existence of a group yields higher levels of risk, since the individuals mentally transfer the
responsibility (partly) to the other group members (Mackenzie, 1971). Group decisions,
in contrast to individual decisions in groups, are, however, not in the focus of this work.
Recall the thought experiment of Rawls where the decisions about rules, and thus even-
tually resource allocation, are made ex ante. Additionally, the role a person obtains
in society is assumed to be unknown at that point. One might assume that there are
different probabilities to end up as a member of one or the other societal class. A con-
sequent risk seeking would thus agitate for the privileges of the highest caste, hoping to
end up just there. It is now straightforward to make the connection between procedural
fairness and distributional preferences in the context of risky prospects. The selection of
13US v. William Holmes, 1 Wallace Junior, 26 Fed. Cas. 30.
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a risky project can be seen as the selection of a rule, or law, which is made in advance,
but eventually leads to one or another outcome allocation. The considerations made
here are similar to those of a society. They are, however, limited to questions of how
economic goods are distributed among the relevant actors. An example may illustrate
this.
Illustration. Consider the following simple thought experiment, including 6 players
and a regular, six-sided and fair die. The die is used to determine the players’ payoffs,
corresponding to the result, i.e. e 1 through e 6. One may now think of four (major)
possible procedures to determine the individual payoffs, see Figure 2.6.
a) Each player gets to roll the die individually and receives a payoff corresponding to
the result. The payoffs may be very different among the group, but also may be
identical for some players.
b) The die is rolled only once and all players receive the corresponding amount. Here,
equality among the players is guaranteed, whereas the total payoff may vary consid-
erably.
c) The predefined amounts of e 1 through e 6 are alloted to the 6 players, i.e. every of
the 6 different amounts will be received by exactly one player. Here, the grand total
is fixed, but (some degree of) inequality is guaranteed.
d) Every player rolls the die individually, but then the average over all results is taken
and paid out to every player equally.
… … 
… … 





Figure 2.6.: Procedural Fairness: Different Types of Risky Procedures.
Note that the expected grand total is X̂ = 21 (x̂ = 3.5 for any player i) in all cases a),
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The standard error of the group’s total payoff, however, varies due to the differ-
ent procedures. It is σt(c) = 0 for procedure c) since the total sum is always
1 + 2 + 3 + 4 + 5 + 6 = 21. Procedures a) and d) yield σt(a/d) =
√
6σ ≈ 4.183,
and procedure b) yields σt(b) = 6σ ≈ 10.247, since the random variables are indepen-
dent for a), and perfectly correlated for b). Mean and variability of individual and
grand total are only one of the aspects to look at when evaluating these different pro-
cedures. Variability may be interpreted as a measure of risk the group (or society) is
taking. While a completely egalitarian distribution yields the risk of a very low total
payoff where everyone obtains a poor result, this risk is mitigated when accepting the
possibility of inequality, where also by means of redistribution, the poorest players may
be supported by those who are better off. Distribution inequality or equality of oppor-
tunities, may thus be the relevant categories for many in that situation. One may think
about which procedure the different members of a group would prefer and due to which
reasons. In particular, if one’s dice-roll does not entirely rely on chance, but also on the
capabilities or prerequisites of the players, the different procedures may have different
advantages or disadvantages, depending on their respective situation in the group. Ex
ante considerations of uncertain events in a social or societal context are hence of high
relevance when it comes to questions of how to shape social order. It can be argued this
holds both on the micro level (Parental Example provided by Machina (1989)14) as well
as the macro level (governmental welfare).
2.3.2. Classification Framework
Social preferences and risk preferences may interact in different ways. In order to classify
these alternatives systematically, a set of 4 dimensions with 2 parameter values each is
proposed. These dimensions (and values) are:
1. decision relevant for oneself (yes, no),
2. decision relevant for the other (yes, no),
14Machina (1989) provided the following, illustrative example: “In this case, Mom has a single
indivisible item—a treat—which she can give to either daughter Abigail or son Benjamin. Assume that
she is indifferent between Abigail getting the treat and Benjamin getting the treat, and strongly prefers
either of these outcomes to the case where neither child gets it. However, in a violation of the precepts
of expected utility theory, Mom strictly prefers a coin flip over either of these sure outcomes, and in
particular, strictly prefers 1/2 : 1/2 to any other pair of probabilities. The random allocation procedure
would be straightforward, except that Benjie, who cut his teeth on Raiffa’s classic Decision Analysis,
behaves as follows: Before the coin is flipped, he requests a confirmation from Mom that, yes, she does
strictly prefer a 50:50 lottery over giving treat to Abigail. He gets her to put this in writing. Had he
won the flip, he would have claimed the treat. As it turns out, he loses the flip. But as Mom is about to
give the treat to Abigail, he reminds Mom of her preference for flipping a coin over giving it to Abigail
(producing her signed statement), and demands that she flip again.”
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3. risky choice involved (yes, no), and
4. decision about payoff alignment (individual, coupling).
First, the decision may affect one’s own chances or payoffs or not. It may, independently,
affect a peer’s (or a peer group’s) chances or payoffs. The decision may comprise a selec-
tion between different levels of risk, specified by expected value and standard deviation,
or critical r values. Eventually, it might comprise a component of how the payoffs should
be coupled from an ex ante perspective.
This yields a total of 24 = 16 cases, which are summarized in Table 2.4. However, not all
of these cases are considerable. Most certainly, if the decision involves neither a choice
about risk nor about coupling, there is nothing left to decide, neither for oneself, nor
for the reference person (or group). The first column therefore is blank.15 Also, if the
decision neither affects oneself nor any other person, there is no decision. The lower row
therefore is blank. Now, if there is no decision to be made about risk but only about
payoff coupling, this decision will inevitably concern both players, since, in the sense of
the word, the decision involves coupling. The 2 respective cases are thus obsolete, too.
The remaining 7 cases (i) through (vii) are described in the following paragraphs.
Please note: There are, of course, countless other dimensions, along which decision
scenarios involving risk and a social context may be structured. For instance, this may
be the type of the reference person(s), group size, gains versus losses, height of stakes
(∼e 1, ∼e 1,000), area of the decision (financial issues, gambling, health, exams, car
driving, smoking, etc.), and so forth. The selection used in the framework presented
here attempts to use the most important ones regarding the inherent structure of the
decision from the perspective of behavioral economics. For the examples provided in the
next paragraphs, a single person as peer reference is assumed.
(i) In this case no risky decision is made, but the choice affects both, oneself and
the reference person since the payoffs are coupled. An example would be the choice
between the two-players prospects A: [50% (1, 0), 50% (0, 1)] and B: [50% (1, 1),
50% (0, 0)]. In both alternatives A and B, both players face an identical individual
lottery. The choice between A and B does thus not constitute a risky choice, since
both alternatives are identical regarding expected value (µA = µB = 0.5) and standard
deviation (σA = σB = 0.5). But the payoffs are coupled differently. Where in A, only
15If both risky and peer-relevant aspects of the decision are absent, there is simply nothing left to
decide. The situation might although be interesting, in view of the players’ reactions to outcomes.
Consider 2 players throwing a die each and being paid off according to their respective results. One
might be interested in their evaluation of their respective contentment, which might vary significantly
for a dice roll of “4,” depending on what the other person rolled.
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Table 2.4.: Structure of decision scenarios entailing social and risky aspects
no risk risk
individual coupling individual coupling
self
other — (i) (ii) (v)
¬other — — (iii) (vi)
¬self
other — — (iv) (vii)
¬other — — — —
one of both players wins, either both or none of the players win in B. Note that the
absence of a real choice between different levels of risk (e.g., the choice between heads
or tails, assuming a fair coin, is not a real choice in terms of risk) does not mean that
risk is generally absent (it is still a gamble).
(ii) In this case, a risky choice is made and affects both parties, but there is no decision
about how the payoffs should be aligned beforehand. The payoffs might be determined
independently for both oneself and the reference person. This precludes the possibility
of ex ante payoff coupling. The payoffs might, however, be coupled in any way, as long as
it is not subject to the decision. An example is the selection of one out of two lotteries,
where the one that is chosen for oneself is independently played for the other person. In
the sense of the definition, a decision about payoff alignment would not be made even
if, in this example, the reference person received the exact same payoff as the decision
maker (perfectly coupled payoffs). Pivotal for the categorization is thus not whether the
payoffs are coupled or not, but whether the coupling (“whether or not, and if, how”) is
subject to the decision maker’s choice.
(iii) In this case, the decision does not affect the other person. The peer might just
serve as a reference point with a fixed income, or a prior decision. For instance: “The
other guy won e 4—would you like to get e 4 as well, or do you prefer a dice roll instead
(e 1 to e 6)?”
(iv) Here, the decision only affects the other person. An obvious example is a risky
choice on behalf of another person.
(v) This might be one of the most interesting cases, because the decision maker affects
both her or his own, as well as the other person’s payoff, and also decides about payoff
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alignment. Probabilistic dictator games as considered by Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010)
can be seen as an example for this. The dictator decides on how much of a 100 percent
chance to win a fixed amount is transfered to another person. With that, both parties’
chances to win are affected. The dictator might as well decide whether the subsequent
lottery is played out independently (once for every player), competitively (if A wins,
B loses, and vice versa), or (partly) positively correlated. The latter case is not fully
intuitive, consider thus the following example: After A transfered 30 percent (in terms
of tokens) to B, a random number between 0 and 100 is drawn, and whoever holds a
number of tokens higher than the drawn number, receives the amount at stake. With
that, the dictator can make sure that the other player wins the amount only if he also
wins it: 0-30, both players win; 31-70, only the dictator wins; 71-100, no one wins.
(vi) This case is of particular interest since it occurs in natural situations like the
roulette game. In terms of payoff, the decision maker does only affect his own chances
and payoffs. In addition to that, however, he can also decide on the way the payoffs are
coupled. Say, on a roulette board, the reference person put her money on “13 (black)”,
the decision now comprises two aspects. First, the level of risk must be chosen. A single
number yields a low chance for a very high payoff (36 times the bet), a color (red or
black) yields a higher chance (∼ 50 percent) for doubling the money at stake. That is
the first thing to decide on. Second, if going with the high-risk alternative, one may
put the money on the number “13” as well, so that if a “13” is actually rolled, both
players win. In contrast to that, one may deliberately choose a different number. Also
one might reason to choose “black”, since this yields the lower risk, and ensures at least
a small gain in case the other player hits the “13.”
(vii) In order to illustrate this last case, consider the following game. The decision
maker rolls a die and receives whatever it shows. There is no risky decision for
him. He must, however, on behalf of another player choose one of the following
alternatives. A: The other player will receive the same amount plus 2 additional
monetary units, or B: the other player rolls the die on her own and is paid off accord-
ingly. Thus, the decision on behalf of the other player affects her payoffs. It also is a
decision on payoff alignment, which, in the very sense of this notion, affects both players.
Using this structure, most of the experiments and decision situations found in the lit-
erature may be classified. Of course there are scenarios outside of or diametric to this
framework. For instance, uncertainty may be a structural property of an experiment
(e.g., an ultimatum game where the exact pie size is unknown to the responder). The
following section reviews a selection of relevant papers, experiments, and results in this
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context. Using the framework just presented as well as additional other factors, the re-
viewed literature is also summarized in Table 2.5. As it can be seen from this overview,
none of the reviewed contributions investigates a scenario of type (vi). Chapter 5 hence
addresses this particular situation.
2.3.3. Related Literature
As outlined above, the literature on other-regarding preferences under risk is often said to
be sparse. There have, however, been several contributions, in particular since 2008. This
subsection presents an overview, which certainly cannot be exhaustive, and discusses the
articles in light of the classification framework developed in the prior section.
Trautmann and Vieider (2011) found that fairness motives and uncertainty may interact
if (a) the decision maker is able to observe the payoff of other agents they consider
relevant, (b) the outcome of another person serves as a social reference point, and (c)
people try to achieve conformity with the behavior of their peers. Creating a social
context in a risky choice situation is thus likely to affect the decision, also when subjects
are merely affecting their own payoffs or chances. Weigold and Schlenker (1991) found
that particularly risk averse subjects become more risk averse when their choices are
observed by a passive partner, while risk seeking subjects become more risk seeking.
The question of how the presence of a peer affects self-directed decisions in terms of
riskiness is of high importance, since it constitutes a common scenario (e.g., stock trading
where views, ideas, and investments are exchanged with friends or colleagues, playing
roulette). Kroll et al. (2013) thus asked decision makers to express their risk attitude
in an individual (i.e., non-social) context using a multiple price list design, based on the
task proposed by Holt and Laury (2002). The authors contrasted that to an analogue
situation where choices and payoffs of the decision maker and a peer, who was facing
an identical task, were mutually transparent, i.e. where a social context did exist. Note
that there did not occur any strategic interaction in this setup: neither participant was
able to affect the other’s payoff in any sense.
Various experiments considered more or less variational scenarios, for instance proba-
bilistic dictator games, where, instead of a fixed pie, a 100%-probability to win the pie is
split (e.g., Karni et al. (2008), Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010), Brock et al. (2013), or where
uncertainty about the pie size is introduced (e.g., Haisley and Weber (2010), Ockenfels
and Werner (2012)). Brennan et al. (2008) and Güth et al. (2008), for instance, analyzed
subjects’ willingness to pay and -accept for sets of prospects with different combinations
of payoffs to oneself and to a peer. Other scholars focused on situations where the deci-
sion maker explicitly decided on behalf of a peer (e.g., Chakravarty et al. (2011), Pahlke
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et al. (2010), or Charness and Jackson (2009)), or where a deliberate departure from
one’s own preferred level of risk benefits an other player (e.g., Bradler, 2009). Most of
the research is based on laboratory experiments. One field experiment, conducted by
Ockenfels and Werner (2012), considered a dictator game with hidden pie size. Some
contributions developed formal models, e.g. Trautmann (2009); Fudenberg and Levine
(2012), representing the decision situation theoretically. Others strove to explain their
empirical findings by theoretical model approaches (Bolton et al., 2005; Bault et al.,
2008; Karni et al., 2008; Engelmann et al., 2009; Haisley and Weber, 2010; Gantner and
Kerschbamer, 2011; Cooper and Rege, 2011; Brock et al., 2013). Trautmann (2009),
Trautmann and Vieider (2011), and Gantner and Kerschbamer (2011) provided quite
detailed literature overviews.
Most of the experiments confronted the decision maker with a single human peer as their
reference person. Some experiments, however, considered the impact of a peer group.
Rohde and Rohde (2011, p. 205) investigated individual risky choices in the light of
group risks and found that “people prefer risks to be independent across individuals in
society rather than correlated.”
Cooper and Rege (2011) considered the impact of peer group choices in gambles. The
decision maker’s choice had no immediate impact on the peers’ payoffs. In their exper-
iment, subjects faced gambles with different sets of information about the chances for
the respective payoffs, depending on the treatment. The authors theorized about the
role of social regret and tastes for conformity. They stated that, among other factors,
“social interaction effects driven by social regret can cause peer group effects” (Cooper
and Rege, 2011, p. 109), i.e. that observing one’s peer taking high-risk (low-risk) ac-
tion increases the willingness to also take high-risk (low-risk) actions. Social regret as a
particular form of regret, the authors argued, explains this behavior since “regret is less
intense if others have chosen the same. In other words, misery loves company” (Cooper
and Rege, 2011, p. 92).
Reynolds et al. (2009) let their participants take risk for themselves and a reference
group. Their results indicated that “subjects take a statistically significant higher level
of risk for themselves as individuals than they do when other’s payoffs are at stake”
(Reynolds et al., 2009, p. 63). Goeree and Yariv (2007) as well as Corazzini and Greiner
(2007) conducted experiments investigating group decisions and conformity. The latter
do not “observe herding at all: most of our subjects exhibit non-conforming behavior,
choosing the alternative which (they believe) the fewest others have chosen” (Corazzini
and Greiner, 2007, p. 2).
In most of the experiments, the decision maker decides for both herself and the reference
person (or group). A common experimental setup in this context is the probabilistic dic-
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tator game. Here, the dictator allocates the chances of winning a pie among the players,
rather than the pie itself (e.g., Karni et al., 2008; Haisley and Weber, 2010; Krawczyk
and Le Lec, 2010; Brock et al., 2013). The picture, at that, is quite clear. A signifi-
cant proportion of dictators gives up part of their own probability to win. Typically,
this share is smaller in the risky than in the deterministic setting, even smaller when
the probabilities are unknown (ambiguity), or when the allocation is exclusive, i.e. the
lotteries are not played out independently for each player with the respective chances.
Chakravarty et al. (2011) conducted an experiment in which the decision maker either
decided for herself, or on behalf of the other person or group and found that “individuals
tend to be significantly less risk averse” when deciding on behalf of the other exclusively
(Chakravarty et al., 2011, p. 902). Pahlke et al. (2010) considered situations where the
decision maker had to make risky choices (also) on behalf of another person. At that,
decision maker and reference person simply received the same payoff. The authors,
contradictorily, found that “being responsible for somebody else’s payoffs increases risk
aversion” when own and the other’s payoff are affected (Pahlke et al., 2010, p. 1).
Brennan et al. (2008) and Güth et al. (2008) elicited subjects’ willingness to pay and ac-
cept distributional (risky) prospects. The first-mentioned found that “reservation prices
tend to decrease with both one’s own and other’s risk. This indicates that risk-aversion
not only refers to individual payoffs, but has also a social dimension” (Brennan et al.,
2008, p. 257). Statistically, these results were significant only for the individual, not for
the social dimension. Güth et al. (2008) did not find confirmation for a social impact on
risk preference. Contrary, Bolton and Ockenfels (2010, p. 632) found that “risk taking is
significantly affected by social comparison” in an experiment with safe and risky payoff
allocation sets. The authors noted that inequality does decrease attractiveness in safe
options, yet not so in risky options.
Linde and Sonnemans (2012) considered whether and how the (non-changeable) payoffs
of a peer affect risk preferences and decision making, as constituting a social reference
point. They found that “participants are more risk averse when they can earn at most
as much as their referent (loss situation) than when they are ensured they will earn
at least as much as their referent (gain situation)” (Linde and Sonnemans, 2012, p.
45). Seen absolutely, there were only gain situations in this study since the participants
always received a payoff greater than zero. What the authors denoted “gain” and “loss”
situations must be understood as relative gain or loss, i.e. receiving more or less than the
peer. One would, however, assume the opposite result in the light of Prospect Theory.
The authors concluded that straightforward extensions of existing theories on risk taking
for social comparison may not be accurate.
Fox and Dayan (2004) let participants choose among different options and subsequently
asked them to evaluate the outcomes. In line with the general notion of social comparison
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they stated that “when other significant referents have won much more than we have,
we may frame our positive outcomes as a failure [...]. Likewise, when others have lost
much more than we have, we might view our loss as gains, since we scored much better
than they did” (Fox and Dayan, 2004, p. 302). Other experiments with actual potential
losses were presented by Corazzini and Greiner (2007), Yechiam et al. (2008), and Pahlke
et al. (2010).
Bault et al. (2008) let their participants pick one of two prospects and contrasted the
possible outcomes (winning or losing) with those of a peer. They found that winning,
in case the peer player loses (“gloating”), is evaluated more positively than when both
players win (“shared relief”). Accordingly, losing is evaluated as less negative when both
players lose (“shared regret”) compared to when one loses but the other player wins
(“envy”). In contrast to Prospect Theory, stating that “losses loom larger than gains”
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979, p. 279), the authors did not find significant difference
for the private domain. They did find, however, that “social gains loom larger than
social losses” (Bault et al., 2008, p. 2), which refers to the unequal outcome conditions
“envy” and “gloating.” The outcome evaluation in this study was based on self-report
questionnaires as well as on the physiological measures heart rate and skin conductance
response.
Another approach presented by Engelmann et al. (2009) employed functional magnetic
resonance imaging in order to identify the cognitive processes of humans when evalu-
ating risky prospects. At that, the participants were either supplied with an expert
advice or not. Engelmann et al. (2009, p. 1)’s results support “the hypothesis that one
effect of expert advice is to offload the calculation of value of decision options from the
individual’s brain.”
With respect to payoff alignment, only few experiments put the decision maker in a sit-
uation of deliberatively choosing how the payoffs among the players should be coupled.
Bault et al. (2008) as well as Bradler (2009) discussed the effects of different ex post pay-
off constellations. The decision maker, however, has no actual choice at that. Corazzini
and Greiner (2007), as stated earlier, did not find indications of payoff alignment (“herd-
ing behavior”). Goeree and Yariv (2007) proposed an experiment in which subjects were
able to either obtain relevant (and private) information, which helped them to make a
more informed risky decision, or to rely on irrelevant (“word of mouth”) information,
which would enable an active coupling or decoupling with the group payoffs. They found
that between one third and half of all participants omitted the chance to obtain helpful
statistical information but rather chose to observe their peers’ behavior (and possibly
by that rely on the information these predecessors gained). The scenarios of Bolton and
Ockenfels (2010) and Linde and Sonnemans (2012) constituted situations with implicit
decisions on payoff alignment, emerging from the fixed and coupled lottery outcomes.
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The focus, however, is on different aspects in these contributions. One of the treatments
in Rohde and Rohde (2011) holds the possibility for the decision maker to decide on
the payoff alignment among the members of the reference group (but not with respect
to her own payoff). At that, the decision maker chose whether everyone should play
a lottery individually, or whether the “corresponding allocation” (Rohde and Rohde,
2011, p. 207), similar to the example provided in Figure 2.6 from above, was going
to be realized. The probabilistic dictator game experiments conducted by Krawczyk
and Le Lec (2010) and Brock et al. (2013) considered the effects of coupled versus in-
dependent payoff determination, and particularly, the role of competitive exclusiveness
(either A or B wins). In these studies, the decision maker did not choose how to align
payoffs. However, Krawczyk and Le Lec (2010) conducted a set of treatments checking
up on the differences between coupled and independent payoffs, using a within-subject
design. It was found that subjects (in the role of dictators in the DG) tend to share less
with recipients where “one’s success meant other’s failure” (p. 500) than in any other
condition. In this competitive condition, the payoffs were thus coupled negatively.
Gantner and Kerschbamer (2011, cf. p. 5), in the experimental part of their paper, ex-
plicitly excluded material externalities (deciding for the peer), information on outcomes
(knowing the peer’s payoff), and particularly, stochastic dependence (coupled outcomes).
They found that being exposed to the decisions of a (fictitious) peer in a MPL of risky
choices, “subjects on average switch later from the safer to the riskier lottery on the
list where the peer switches later from the safer to riskier lottery” (Gantner and Ker-
schbamer, 2011, p. 19), i.e. that a more risk averse peer actually induces a higher degree
of risk aversion.
Bolton and Ockenfels (2010) considered whether models of inequality aversion may ra-
tionalize risky choices in a social context. In their experiment, a decision maker had
to repeatedly choose between a risky and a safe alternative, whereat the payoff of an
anonymous peer was then also either risky or safe. The authors varied the height of and
the way the decision maker’s and the peer’s payoffs were coupled and found that “for
decisions with social comparison, there is more risk taking when the safe option yields
unequal payoffs” and that this holds (even though not statistically significant) partic-
ularly if the distribution is unfavorable for the decision maker (Bolton and Ockenfels,
2010, p. 630).
Theoretical considerations of how to integrate ex ante and ex post preferences over
prospects and outcomes were provided by Fudenberg and Levine (2012), Trautmann
(2009), and Saito (2013). Fudenberg and Levine (2012, p. 611) recognized that ex-
isting outcome-based “models of fairness do not focus on the role of lotteries, and the
preferences analyzed in Fehr and Schmidt (1999), Bolton and Ockenfels (2009), Char-
ness and Rabin (2002), Cox and Sadirij (2004) [sic] and Andreoni and Miller (2002)
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are defined for certain outcomes, without specifying how they are to be extended to
lotteries.” The authors extended the properties of utility functions to the notion of ex
ante fairness and basically stated that an initial preference order for deterministic al-
locations may be reversed if the allocations involve a risky component. This, in turn,
violates the property of independence (cf. Section 2.2.1). In this regard, also Traut-
mann (2009), building on the Fehr-Schmidt model, integrated expected values into the
player’s utility function, whereat only the payoff differences were evaluated using ex-
pected values (ex ante). For the own payoff x, the actually occurring value was used
(ex post), thus representing a mixed approach. Saito (2013) proposed a model using
both ex ante and ex post risk aggregation in a linearly weighted way. For risk aggre-
gation, the plain expected values were used, thus assuming strict risk neutrality. In
this expected inequality-averse (EIA) model, the decision maker’s preference is captured
by δU (E(x1), . . . , E(xn)) + (1 − δ)E (U(x1, . . . , xn)), where E(·) denotes the expected
value over all possible outcomes and U(·) represents the Fehr-Schmidt utility function.
The parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] weights the different approaches. This model is considered in
greater detail in Section 5.4.
It is, in this regard, often stated that social preferences violate the independence axiom.
This thought may be illustrated by the following example (cf. Saito, 2013). Consider
a decision maker who has to choose one of two payoff sets, which determines his own
payoff and the payoff of a reference person. The payoff sets are described by A : (10, 10)
and B : (10,−10), where in A, both players receive e 10, and in B, the decision maker
receives e 10 and the reference person loses e 10. It is commonly acknowledged that most
people in the role of the decision maker choose A, since—unless suggested differently—
there is no reason for the decision maker to harm the reference person. Most models of
social preferences such as inequity aversion, maximin preferences, and efficiency concerns
support the choice of A.
Recalling the independence axiom, the preference A  B should be invariant against
mixing both A and B with another constellation X in a linear and similar way. The
notion of mixing originally refers to convex combinations of two options, yielding the
form δA + (1 − δ)X, 0 ≤ δ ≤ 1. When assuming risk neutrality, this notion can be
extended to probabilities (p) instead of proportions (δ).
Let the additional payoff constellation for this example be X : (−10, 10) and prob-
abilities of each outcome p = 1 − p = 0.5. The decision maker thus faces
the choice between the two prospects AX : ((10, 10, 0.5), (−10, 10, 0.5)) and BX :
((10,−10, 0.5), (−10, 10, 0.5))16. Arguably, BX now might be preferred over AX, since
16The notation ((πa1 , πb1, p), (πa2 , πb2, 1 − p)) means that in the first case (probability p), player a
receives πa1 and player b receives πb1, and in the second case (probability 1 − p) the players receive πa2
and πb2, respectively.
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in BX both parties are equally likely to gain or lose, whereas AX favors the reference
person over the decision maker. By choosing AX, the decision grants the reference per-
son a certain gain of e 10 and puts himself under the risk of either gaining or losing
this amount. This empirical observation directly violates the independence axiom. This
examples suggests that social preferences under risk—particularly for ex ante decisions—
cannot be regarded as a mere extension of standard decision theory, limited to mean
and variance (cf. µ−σ preferences), but may need to extend to counter-factual thinking
as well as the co-variance between the respective payoffs (µm − σm − µy − σy − ρ(m, y)
preferences17). A such approach, however, is left to future research.
To sum it up, this section described different situations of decisions in the context of
both risk and a social context. The literature is classified along a framework, which was
developed in the context of this work. This framework allows to classify the type of
the decision situation in a mutually exclusive and exhaustive way. This does not mean
that other factors may not be applied for the decision analysis and classification. From
the literature review and particularly from the classification of the specific decision sce-
narios, a gap in the body of literature—concerning class (vi)—was identified. Chapter
5 thus investigates this type of decision in greater detail, both from an empirical and
theoretical perspective. The literature invoked in this section is summarized in Table
2.5. In addition to the classification of the decision situation as proposed in this section,
several other factors, such as type of the reference person, gain/ loss framing, physio-
logical assessment, experiment type, etc. are covered. The main Chapters of this work
(Chapters 4 and 5) are put into context.




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Measuring Risk Preferences in
Ad-Hoc Experiments
“Things should be made as simple as possible, but
not simpler.”
(Albert Einstein)
This chapter introduces a short version of the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion
test, which is designed to serve as a measure of individual risk preferences in economic
experiments conducted outside the lab. In this type of experiment, subjects are well
aware of the fact that they participate in an experiment, but they are approached by the
experimenter in the public sphere and participation is ad-hoc. This type of experiment
is thus hereinafter referred to as ad-hoc experiments. The short version of the risk
preference elicitation test is evaluated against the original test by means of two online
experiments comprising a total of 490 participants. Additionally, differences and design
issues of ad-hoc experiments in contrast to in-lab experiments are discussed.
3.1. Methodological Issues in Economic Experiments
Experimental economics applies experimental methods in order to investigate questions
in the context of economic decision making. Controlled experiments are used for several
purposes. Roth (1995, p. 22) identified four categories of how experiments are motivated
by researchers. First, “experiments [can be] designed to test the predictions of well
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articulated formal theories,” i.e. to discriminate between alternating, or to test the
predictive power and robustness of existing theories. Second, experiments can study “the
effects of variables about which existing theory may have little to say,” i.e. exploring and
carving out the causes of observed regularities. Third, with a body of facts and results
at hand, experiments can contribute to make sense out of it, helping that “theories of
the observed behavior can be proposed and then tested.” Eventually, Roth (1995, p.
22) named the “dialogue between experimenters and policymakers” as a motivation for
experiments, addressing “the kind of question raised by regulatory agencies.”
When dealing with experiment participants (in this context often called subjects), typi-
cally cash money is used as a motivation, to create realistic incentives—and thus: control.
“Such control can be achieved by using a reward structure to induce prescribed monetary
value on actions” (Smith, 1976, p. 275). Smith’s induced value theory subsumes this
notion. A main assumption is nonsatiation, meaning that an additional payoff yields
additional utility. This fact allows experimental economists to replicate real-life mar-
kets, auctions, negotiations, or other situations in the laboratory. But it also means
that large experiments may be expensive, since the participants have to be paid. So the
reason for payoff is both compensation for the time spent in the laboratory, but also the
creation of adequate incentives. The interplay of rewards and mechanisms is important,
since mechanisms “affect incentives, and decision makers respond to incentives” (Bolton
and Ockenfels, 2012, p. 666). Thus, the experimenter usually has to find a trade-off
between cost and sample size. As research budget is limited, sample size is limited.
Thus, the results have to be regarded in view of economic but also in view of statistical
significance, since they are based on a limited number of observations.
Albeit they have much in common, a distinction is made between experimental economics
and behavioral economics. Loewenstein (1999) defined this gap by the absence/ presence
of the consideration of psychological insights. Where experimental economics aims at
understanding the effects of structural characteristics of the environment, behavioral
economics rather tries to elicit the underlying principles and motives of human decision
making. However, both fields interact in many ways, so that a strict demarcation is often
just not sensible. Experimental economics has contributed to the understanding of how
markets, and market-like mechanisms work and has shed light on the interactions among
the players in and with those environments, both from an economic and behavioral
perspective.
At that point, the question arises how valid it is to transfer the findings from controlled
lab conditions to real world scenarios. The notion of external validity refers to “the abil-
ity to generalise from the research context to the settings that the research is intended
to approximate” (Loewenstein, 1999, p. 26). It stands in conflict to internal validity,
which describes “the ability to draw confident causal conclusions from one’s research”
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(Loewenstein, 1999, p. 26). Abstraction from influencing factors increases control and
thus internal validity. It does, however, presumably limit the possibility to draw conclu-
sions for the actual, real application scenario. Allowing for more influencing factors has
the opposite effect.
“Would you like to participate in an experiment?” Experiments may be con-
ducted in the classroom (e.g., using pen and paper), in laboratory settings (typically us-
ing computer terminals), or in the field. In the latter case, the experiment is conducted
in a natural environment, and subjects usually do not know that they participate in an
experimental study, i.e. their behavior is assumed to be (more) natural. As one way to
address both the issue of high costs of large sample sizes in laboratory experiments and
the trade-off between external and internal validity, one can think of ad-hoc experiments
as a compromise. At that, participants are not invited to the lab, but approached or
merely observed by the experimenter(s) in an everyday situation, e.g., in shopping malls,
in pedestrian areas, or during waiting times at the bus stop. It may be made clear that
the purpose of the approach is a scientific investigation, but the process might also be
presented as a survey, a lottery, a sales promotion, or a game.
In order to give a structure to the different types of experimental situations, one can use
the dimensions channel (laboratory, out-of-lab, impersonal), and the subjects’ awareness
of being part of an experiment (yes or no). In the resulting 2 × 3 matrix (cf. Table 3.1),
the upper left cell represents classical lab experiments, in which subjects are invited to
an experiment, and have to come to an on-site lab for the session. The 2 lower right
corners represent classical field experiments, in which subjects are observed in a natural
environment (offline or online), typically under alternating treatment conditions, and
are not aware of the experimental characteristic (e.g., tests of different user interfaces
on e-commerce platforms). If subjects come to the lab, they will normally be aware of
the fact that they are in an experiment. If this is not supposed to happen (lower left
corner), the actual experimental investigation must be a different one than assumed by
subjects (e.g., their behavior in the waiting room, see Brauer et al. (2012) for several
of such approaches), or may be disguised as a student job for instance. This type
thus is denoted “red herring.” The upper right corner contains online experiments, as
for instance conducted on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT, cf. Paolacci et al., 2010).
Finally, the upper cell in the center contains the type of ad-hoc experiments.1
Here, the experimenter approaches subjects actively, for instance at home on the
doorstep, at work, or at public places. The situation is short term, subjects may be
1For many target groups such as traders, lab, ad-hoc, and online experiments may not be distin-
guishable, since the only channel of access is a computer.
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Table 3.1.: Classification of different experiment types.
location
laboratory out-of-lab impersonal
awareness yes lab experiment ad-hoc experiment online experimentno “red herring” field experiment field experiment
in a hurry, which has implications on how they should be approached in the first place,
where they are typically not aware of the fact that their time, effort, cooperativeness
or rigidity, or skill will be rewarded. It thus may be necessary to initially lure subjects
into participation. There is also a restriction on how long the entire endeavor may take.
Where, for instance, 5 minutes might seem as an acceptable sacrifice for most passersby,
50 minutes will probably be considered intolerable. Besides the fact that there is no time
for extensive experiments, there is also no time for imparting complex rules, even if the
actual task is very short. Participants may not fully understand the rules and mechanics
of the experiment, if designed in a too complex manner, or if explained poorly. Scenar-
ios involving interaction between multiple participants might be particularly difficult to
realize, since this will usually cause waiting times for the first volunteers.
On the upside, such ad-hoc approaches enable a larger sample size for a given budget.
This is of course favorable from a statistical point of view. And also methodologically, it
enables the execution of one-shot experiments, ruling out learning- and over-time effects.
Where the average expected profit per hour in most student subjects pools presumably
varies somewhere between e 10.- and e 20.-, and even rather short lab experiment take
40 minutes or more, ad-hoc experiments may acquire an individual’s attentiveness for
much less.
In the trade-off between internal and external validity, ad-hoc experiments partially give
up control for a higher degree of naturalness and sample size. Besides obvious features
like gender, age, profession, etc., it may be of interest to the researcher to gain knowledge
about the participants’ risk preferences, as a control variable when trying to rationalize
their behavior. The peculiar requirements towards a risk preference elicitation task in
such ad-hoc experiment situations are considered in greater detail in the next section.
3.2. Ad-Hoc Risk Preference Elicitation
In order to be able to elicit people’s risk aversion in ad-hoc experiments, a questionnaire-
like test with real money incentives, comparable to tests used in laboratory settings, is
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desirable. As it was outlined in Section 2.2.2, there exist several test formats that are
used in lab experiments (e.g., Holt and Laury, 2002; Eckel and Grossman, 2008; Figner
et al., 2009).
3.2.1. Considerations and Requirements
Ad-hoc experiments, however, require such a test to have different properties compared
to lab experiments. In lab experiments, participants are comfortably seated, stay on site
for about one hour with usually no time pressure, and are mentally prepared to take
part in an experiment. Moreover, many participants are participating at the same time.
This makes is feasible to impart complex rules, since larger groups of participants can
be instructed at the same time. This all, however, does not necessarily hold for ad-hoc
experiments.
Here, situations are short term, subjects rush by and are approached by the experi-
menter. Sometimes they do not even know that they are part of an experiment, but
rather experience the situation like an interview, a survey, or a game. The situation may
be rather comparable to the approaches made by product promotion agents in urban
pedestrian areas than to typical laboratory experiments—and for this reason may be
expected to be more natural and at the same time more chaotic. From a common sense
reasoning, one may summarize the peculiar requirements for a risk preference elicitation
task in an ad-hoc experiment situation roughly as follows:
• simplicity, intelligibility: A risk aversion test designed for an ad-hoc context should
be as simple as possible. Subjects should be able to capture what they are supposed
to do intuitively, without much explanation. The test itself should be easy to
understand and follow.
• clarity, lucidity, and compactness: This also holds for the visual presentation of
the test. Items should be placed in a structured and logical way. The entire test
(excluding instructions) should fit into one single page on a tablet PC or tablet
computer so that all information items are available during the entire test.
• conciseness: The test should be achievable in a few minutes.
• segmentation: The test should discriminate between the subjects’ risk attitudes,
so that the classification is tolerably even.
• inherent validity: The test should by design enable and guide subjects to state
their risk preferences in a valid way, not being contradictory from a theoretical
point of view.
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• external validity, incentives: The test should provide real incentives (monetary
payoffs of sufficient size) to the subjects in order to create control and external
validity.
• connection, correlation: The test should be linkable to well established methods
from the literature.
A such test is proposed in the next section. Addressing the latter requirement, the test
here is designed based on the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion test. This means that
it implements a multiple price list (MPL) design with binary decisions in every row of
the list.
3.2.2. A Proposition based on the Holt and Laury Task
First of all, the number of items in the MPL design is reduced from 10 to 5. The simplified
version of the test will thus be referred to as HL5 (5 questions), whereas the original
version is referred to as HL10. Since most of the subjects typically switch from A to B
in one of the middle rows (3, 4, 5, or 6), it seems plausible to cut off the more extreme
rows at the top and the bottom of the list. Most people choose A in the first rows, and
B in the last rows, and personal risk aversion seems to be distributed around a rather
medium level among subjects. By cutting off questions, of course, the test will become
less powerful to distinguish between different degrees of risk attitude, particularly in the
range of very strong risk aversion or risk propensity. For these subjects, one can say
that their risk preference is at least or at most at a certain level.
As a second step, the complexity of the high-risk lottery (B) is reduced by replacing
the low payoff of e 0.10 by a zero payoff. This makes the corresponding probability
obsolete and the lottery may be explained in a more concise way: “You receive e 3.85
with a probability of 30%, and nothing, otherwise.” Third, the low-risk lottery (A),
which represents a payoff of either e 1.60 or e 2.00 for the participant is replaced by an
entirely safe payoff (100%). Hereby, the difference of the expected values of alternative
A and alternative B from the original test design is retained, so that the choice between
the prospects is comparable in that way.
An aggregation of the questions, payoffs, probabilities, and expected payoffs is provided
in Table 3.2. In terms of expected value (µ) and standard deviation (σ) of the different
prospects in each choice set, the HL10 and HL5 tasks are depicted in Figure 3.1. The
safer options (A) are depicted in green, the riskier options (B) are depicted in red. The
two corresponding prospects of a particular row are connected with a dotted line. The
sequences of prospects pairs are thus displayed like a fan, sorting the rows from the left
to the right.
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Figure 3.1.: µ− σ-structures of the HL10 and HL5 tasks in comparison.
Table 3.2.: HL10 Risk Aversion Test, Derivation of the Short Test.
Holt & Laury Risk Aversion Test Short Test
Option A Option B Option A Option B
p EUR EUR EV EUR EUR EV ∆(A-B) EUR EV
0.1 2.00 1.60 1.640 3.85 0.1 0.475 1.165
0.2 2.00 1.60 1.680 3.85 0.1 0.850 0.830
0.3 2.00 1.60 1.720 3.85 0.1 1.225 0.495 1.65 1.155 0.3× 3.85
0.4 2.00 1.60 1.760 3.85 0.1 1.600 0.160 1.70 1.540 0.4× 3.85
0.5 2.00 1.60 1.800 3.85 0.1 1.975 -0.175 1.75 1.925 0.5× 3.85
0.6 2.00 1.60 1.840 3.85 0.1 2.350 -0.510 1.80 2.310 0.6× 3.85
0.7 2.00 1.60 1.880 3.85 0.1 2.725 -0.845 1.85 2.695 0.7× 3.85
0.8 2.00 1.60 1.920 3.85 0.1 3.100 -1.180
0.9 2.00 1.60 1.960 3.85 0.1 3.475 -1.515
1.0 2.00 1.60 2.000 3.85 0.1 3.850 -1.850
Assuming a utility function with constant relative risk aversion, e.g., u(x) = x1−r, every
binary decision between risky prospects or between a safe option and a risky prospect
yields a risk parameter r∗, which would set the decision maker indifferent between both
options. In the third choice set of the HL10 task, for instance, this value r∗ may be
derived by solving the equation 0.3 × 2.001−r + 0.7 × 1.601−r = 0.3 × 3.851−r + 0.7 ×
0.101−r. This equation cannot be solved analytically for r, but must be approached
numerically, yielding r∗ ≈ 1.4866. For empirical data gathered with tests using a MPL
design, however, a subject’s individual parameter r cannot be determined without further
ado, since the MPL design merely allows to locate this value between an upper and a
lower bound2. In particular, the estimation for the highest risk border bin is subject
2Making a series of binary decisions, the subjects state their preferences in the form of “my r
parameter is at least (or at most) that high.”
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to vagueness, since there is no finite upper bound. In fact, there exists a lower bound
(which is zero) for lowest class, since only values of 1− r > 0 are meaningful for utility
functions with positive marginal utility. In order to use the risk preference estimations
for further computations, exact values are necessary. Let e = 1 − r. Hence, for the
bounded bins, the arithmetic mean e∗ = (eup + elow)/2 is used. Based on these values,
the values for the border bins are estimated by extrapolation. The values for e for s = 1
through s = 4 safe choices are easily calculated using the arithmetic mean as indicated
above. These values are e1 = 1.271, e2 = 1.000, e3 = 0.776, e4 = 0.579. Based on this,
the values for e0 and e5 are estimated by extrapolation using a second order polynomial:
es = 0.0187s2 − 0.3233s + 1.5747, (R2 = 0.9999)3. Thus, the estimates are e0 = 1.5747
and e5 = 0.4257. An illustration of the fragmentation of both the HL5 and the HL10
test is provided in Figure 3.2.
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Figure 3.2.: Critical (1−r) values (on x-axis), number of safe choices (option A preferred
to option B), and Holt and Laury (2002) empirical distribution (red) for the
HL10 and the HL5 risk aversion test.
Structural Properties. The HL5 test has a drawback in contrast to the original test,
which, however, is of rather theoretical nature. In the original Holt and Laury risk aver-
sion test, the payoffs in every row for each prospect A and B do not change. Prospect A
always pays either e 2.00 or e 1.60, prospect B always pays either e 3.85 or e 0.10. Only
the associated probabilities differ from row 1 to 10. Note that this makes the theoretical
calculus of preferences stable against any characteristics (curvature, discontinuities, etc.)
of the underlying utility function u(·), as long as the preference order condition
u(3.85) ≥ u(2.00) ≥ u(1.60) ≥ u(0.10) (3.1)




is satisfied. Hence, even the most bizarre utility function results in only one single
switching point from prospect A to B in the multiple price list. Once B is preferred to A,
in every subsequent row B must be preferred over A as well. Thus, any rational decision
maker, in disregard of her utility function, be it ever so odd, will only switch from A to
B once, and then stick to B (AB-criterion). This property might occur unessential, since
one may assume people to have passably well-formed underlying utility functions. Since,
however, switching back from B to A is regarded as flawed behavior, it is important to
note, that for the simplified 5 question test, it may be a perfectly rational behavior
for specific utility functions. One such utility function violating the AB-criterion is
depicted in Figure 3.3. The expected values of the risky prospects are indicated by the
red horizontal lines. Now, the safe prospect (e 1.65 with for sure) is preferred to a 30%
chance on e 3.85. The additional value of e 0.05 is very small, reflected by a flat section
of the utility function, so that the risky prospect “40% chance on e 3.85” is preferred
to the safe payoff of e 1.70. Then again, the slope of the utility function is particular
steep so that the safe prospect of e 1.75 is preferred to the 50% gamble on e 3.85. The
5 cents from e 1.70 to e 1.75 are thus valued much more than the 5 cents from e 1.65 to
e 1.70. In order to rationalize such preferences, one could think of the decision maker
in a shop. There are the options to buy a popsicle for e 1.65, or a sandwich for e 1.75,
but the additional 5 cents in between are really all useless, since the shop only offers
those two products and none at the cost of e 1.70. It may be pointed out, however, that
strictly increasing and concave functions do not violate the AB-criterion.
3.3. Experimental Design
In order to evaluate whether the HL5 risk aversion test is applicable for assessing sub-
jects’ personal risk preferences, it is benchmarked against the original version of the
test. At that, in particular the criteria conciseness, segmentation, validity, and correla-
tion are assessed, since the other dimensions as specified in the above section are design
related and met by construction. For that matter, two online experiments with a total
of ntotal = 490 subjects were conducted. The experiments differed in the height of the
stakes that the participants could earn, and are hence denoted LOW and HIGH. This
section presents the experimental design.
In both experiments, subjects were recruited from a pool of students at the Karlsruhe
Institute of Technology (KIT). The contact data for inviting the participants was drawn
from the Online Recruiting System for Experimental Economics (ORSEE, Greiner,
2004). Subjects were invited by email and by announcement in lectures. In both exper-
iments, subjects participated in the HL10 and the HL5 risk aversion test, whereas the
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Figure 3.3.: Example of utility function violating the AB-criterion for a risk neutral
decision maker.
sequence of these tasks was selected randomly. Both tasks had a probability of 50% to
be presented first. There was a monetary compensation offered. It was made clear in
the instructions that in either task, participants could earn real money, depending on
their decisions, and on chance. It was necessary to register for the experiment (realized
using the Lime Survey questionnaire environment), providing one’s real name and stu-
dent ID. This made sure that only those participants who actually engaged in the task
could appear and pick up their money, and also that every participant could take the
task only once. The payoff could be picked up on campus one week after the experiment
was run, and also by appointment any time after this date.
In experiment LOW, the stakes for both tasks were as described in the proceeding
section and every participant was paid accordingly, ranging from e 0.10 to e 3.85. In
the second experiment (HIGH), the stakes were multiplied by a factor of 10, however,
not every participant was selected for payoff. The probability of being selected was 10%,
which was communicated to the participants along with the other instructions. In the
high stakes experiments, the information whether one was selected for payoff or not was
revealed after completion. Thus, during decision making, all participants only knew the
a priori probability of being selected (10%). After completing the two risk preference
tasks, subjects provided information on gender, age, field of study, and prior experience








Figure 3.4.: Schematic representation of the 2 online experiments
3.4. Results
This section presents the results of the online study. After reviewing the general statis-
tics, correlation and regression analyses are conducted. The focus lies on the criteria of
inherent validity (“Do the participants state consistent risk preferences?”), conciseness
(“How long did it take?”), correlation (“Do both test formats correlate?”), and segmen-
tation (“Does the test actually discriminate between the risk preferences of the sample
population?”).
3.4.1. General Statistics
The general statistics about the participants of the online experiments, their decisions
and behavior are provided in Table 3.3. There were nlow = 94 participants in the
first (low-stakes) experiment, and nhigh = 396 participants in the second (high-stakes)
experiment, yielding a total of ntotal = 490 subjects. Average age was 22.243 years,
with a standard deviation of 2.886 years. The majority of subjects had a background in
economics and business engineering (65%). Other relevant categories were engineering
(10%) and computer science (5%). Roughly 3 out of 4 subjects were male, reflecting
the general gender proportions of the fields of study the participants were recruited
from. Roughly 2 out of 3 subjects had participated in at least one online or laboratory
experiment before.
First, behavior in terms of risk attitude is regarded briefly. In the HL5 test, subjects
chose on average 3.233 safe options. The height of the stakes has a markedly effect. Risk
aversion is significantly higher (more safe choices) in the HIGH condition (independent
samples t-test, p-value < 0.001). In the HL10 test, subjects chose on average 6.035
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Table 3.3.: General statistics, number of safe choices, validity of decisions, and time
spent on the tasks (s.d.: standard deviation).
all low stakes high stakes
mean s.d. mean s.d. mean s.d.
N 490 94 396
male 370 80 290
female 120 14 106
age 22.243 2.886 21.904 1.415 22.323 3.131
HL5 [#SC] 3.233 1.163 2.628 1.067 3.376 1.140
HL5 first 3.128 1.136 2.595 0.989 3.240 1.135
HL10 first 3.335 1.182 2.654 1.136 3.515 1.130
HL10 [#SC] 6.035 1.621 5.362 1.612 6.194 1.583
HL5 first 6.083 1.633 5.357 1.376 6.235 1.644
HL10 first 5.988 1.611 5.365 1.794 6.153 1.521
valid (HL5) 0.992 1.000 0.990
valid (HL10) 0.988 1.000 0.985
Time (HL5) [sec] 48.275 43.763 47.904 62.622 48.363 38.048
Time (HL10) [sec] 105.582 136.548 111.000 162.981 104.295 129.692
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safe options. Again, the height of the stakes has a markedly effect. Risk aversion is
significantly stronger (more safe choices) in the HIGH condition (independent samples
t-test, p-value < 0.001).
Regarding the criterion inherent validity, it can be said that both the original (HL10) as
well as the shortened (HL5) version of the task achieved markedly high values. 484 out
of 490 subjects fill out the original test consistently, 486 out of 490 fill out the shortened
version consistently. The numbers signify values of 98.8% and 99.2%, respectively, which
exceeds what typically is observed in laboratory experiments and also the values Holt and
Laury report in their paper (∼ 90%). These high numbers indicate that the experiment
instructions were read and understood and that subjects took the task with sufficient
seriousness and concentration. A McNemar’s test (dichotomous trait, matched pairs of
observations) reveals that there is no support for the hypothesis that these proportions
are significantly different from another (p-value = 0.754). Notice that this does not
statistically verify equality of proportions. Given the large sample size and the high
p-value, it appears likely, however, that the degree of inherent validity of HL5 and HL10
task are actually equal or at least very similar. The MPL design with only 5 questions
instead of 10 thus does not seem to cause arbitrary behavior. At least it does not more
so than in the 10 question design.
The criterion conciseness is assessed using the execution times associated with the re-
spective tasks. It took the participants roughly half as long to complete the HL5 task
compared to the HL10 task (∼48 seconds vs. ∼1 minute 46 seconds, paired samples
t-test: p-value < 0.001). The effect is consistent for both experiment runs (high and
low stakes). Recall that every participant was presented both tasks in random order. It
can be assumed that the first of both tasks presented takes longer to be understood and
executed, due to inevitable learning effects. Overall, it took the participants 27.088 sec-
onds longer to complete the HL10 task if it was presented first compared to when it was
presented second. The HL5 took 17.647 seconds longer when presented first compared
to when presented second. Thus, there exist order effects. Their magnitude, however,
is smaller than the effect caused by the test itself: the slow execution of the HL5 (when
presented first) is still 52 seconds faster on average than the fast execution of the HL10
task (when presented second). The bottom line is that it takes less than half of the time
to conduct the HL5, compared to the HL10.
3.4.2. Correlation and Regression Analysis
This section now addresses the correlation between the measures of risk attitude in both
tasks. It is of interest to understand how one test explains the results (e.g., number
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of safe choices) of the other (and vice versa) on an individual subject level. Therefore,
first the risk aversion scores are correlated. Additionally, regression analysis for each
direction (HL10 explaining HL5 and HL5 explaining HL10), including other relevant
factors such as sequence, stakes, and demographic factors, are conducted.
Correlation Analysis In order to assess the correlation between the HL5 and the
HL10 test scores, a non-parametric correlation analysis is run. Spearman’s rank correla-
tion coefficient (rho) is ρ = 0.631, which is statistically different from 0 (two-tailed test)
on a significance level of p < 0.001. According to Kotrlik and Williams (2003)—who
originally refer to Davis (1971), Hinkle et al. (2003), and Hopkins (1997)—the mag-
nitude of the correlation coefficient indicates a “substantial association,” a “moderate
correlation,” and can be interpreted as “large,” “high,” and “major.”
Table 3.4.: Correlation coefficients for different data subsets.
N Spearman’s ρ p-value
All 490 .631 <.001
HIGH 396 .626 <.001
LOW 94 .584 <.001
male 370 .620 <.001
female 120 .661 <.001
HL5 first 242 .618 <.001
HL10 first 248 .648 <.001
both consistent 480 .639 <.001
≥1 inconsistency 10 .236 .511
As it is shown in Table 3.4, the overall correlation is rather robust against dividing
the data into subsets along the dimensions stakes (low, high), gender (male, female),
sequence (HL10 first, HL5 first), and consistency (both consistent, at least one test
inconsistent). With respect to Spearman’s rank coefficient, the correlation in the high
stakes treatment is 7.2% higher than in the low stakes treatment. Also do women show
a 6.6% higher correlation than men. Moreover, starting with the HL10 test results in a
4.9% higher correlation than starting with the HL5 test. In contrast to that, the group
of subjects showing inconsistent behavior with regard to the CRRA model in at least




Regression Analysis Next, two linear regressions are conducted, explaining the num-
ber of safe choices on an individual level for the HL5 and the HL10 task. As explanatory
variables, the respective other measure (safe choices) is used. Additionally, the treat-
ment condition (low stakes or high stakes) and a dummy for sequence (HL5 or HL10
first), as well as the respective execution times, are used. The results, including the
adjusted R2 values, are summarized in Table 3.5.
Confirming the good correlation from above, the number of safe choices in one test,
proves to be the strongest explanatory variable for the number of safe choices in the
respective other test. When controlling for the mentioned factors, the height of the
stakes has a significant impact only on the HL5 test, not so on the HL10. Whichever
test is conducted first yields a lower number of safe choices, i.e. the participants act
more risk averse in the second task. Time does not affect the number of safe choices
significantly.
Table 3.5.: Regression models. Explained variables: number of safe choices in the HL10
and HL5 tasks. The overview list the regression coefficients (coef.), standard
errors (s.e.), and significance levels (sig.).
HL10 (#SC) HL5 (#SC)
coef. s.e. sig. coef. s.e. sig.
HL5: #SC .834 .052 < .001 — — —
HL10: #SC — — — .413 .026 < .001
HIGH stakes .190 .152 .213 .419 .106 < .001
HL10: first -.241 .117 .040 .235 .083 .005
HL5: time — — — -.001 .001 .130
HL10: time -.001 .000 .093 — — —
constant 3.384 .202 < .001 .355 .188 .060
N 490 490
R2adj. .377 .397
Regarding the criterion segmentation, the number of safe choices is distributed as
follows: 0: 1%, 1: 1%, 2: 30%, 3: 25%, 4: 26%, 5: 17%. It can be said that this
distribution is fairly even among the values 2, 3, 4, and 5 safe choices, however, very
few subjects showed even stronger risk seeking behavior (0 or 1 safe choice). This is
somewhat unexpected in the light of distribution of safe choices as empirically knwon
from the standard Holt and Laury task, depicted in Figure 3.2.
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To sum it up, the proposed short version of the Holt and Laury task elicits risk pref-
erences in an inherently consistent way. It may be conducted in less than half of the
time compared to the original version. The correlation, regarding the number of safe
choices made by the subjects, is high. It discriminates between different degrees of risk
aversion quite evenly, whereat the two bins of the highest risk seeking behavior seem to
be underrepresented4.
3.5. Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter discussed differences between laboratory and ad-hoc experiments and de-
rived implications for the design of a respective risk preference elicitation task. Clearly,
risk preference elicitation in ad-hoc experiments puts the researcher to the challenge
of explaining, conducting, processing, and paying out the entire task in much shorter
time compared to classical field experiments, if the task is designed comparable to a
standard risk preference test as used in laboratory experiments. A short version of the
Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion task was developed and evaluated in reference to
the original version by means of two online experiments with a total of 490 subjects,
yielding a correlation of 63 percent between the measures (number of safe choices) for
both tests. Taken as a whole, the shortened test presented in this chapter can be re-
garded as an adequate measure, which allows to elicit individual risk preferences within
a short amount of time, yielding a very high degree of validity, and is also ascribable to
the behavior shown in the established reference task by Holt and Laury (2002). Even
though not ruling out switching between alternatives A and B back and forth for peculiar
forms of utility models, it does for continuous, monotonic, and concave functions. The
within subject correlation for both test measures can be constituted “large,” although
not perfect. Possible reasons for different behavior between the tests may stem from a
variety of sources, e.g. because
• not all risk preferences of the HL10 test are actually distinctly expressible in the
short version,
• the availability of certainty in the short version—compared to ever uncertain
prospects in the original task—might alter the way risk is evaluated,
• subjects might try to optimize their overall risk portfolio and thus choose different
levels of risk in the different tasks, or
4When pooled with the experimental data from Chapter 5, where subjects also conducted the HL5
task, the distribution becomes smoother. A total of 970 subjects (one-shot) exhibits the following
distribution over (0, 1, ..., 5) safe choices: (6.4%, 5.4%, 28.2%, 30.3%, 15.3%, 14.4%)
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• some subjects might—after all—simply not understand what they are doing.
Of course, subjects also might feel compelled to act similar in both tasks, since they are
aware of the fact that they are in an experimental situation and their payoff depends on
their action. They might (erroneously) assume that “consistent” behavior is rewarded.
A means to address this would be to let subjects participate in the first task, and then,
after a considerable amount of time in between (e.g., a week), invite them to conduct
the second part of the experiment. This way, it would be rather hard to recall the exact
test and one’s choices and thus elicit risk preferences in a less biased way.
It is possible to elicit risk preferences in other ways, using for instance the Columbia
Card Task (Figner et al., 2009), the Bomb Risk Elicitation Task (Crosetto and Filippin,
2012, BRET), or the Balloon Analogue Risk Task (Lejuez et al., 2002, BART). Clearly,
these methods make circumstantial explanations unnecessary and let the decision maker
act in a more affective and less deliberate way. They differ, however, markedly from
the Holt and Laury (2002) format, which is the most common method in experimental
research, using a MPL design. This chapter has approached this conflict by presenting
a handy method, which is still comparable to the existing standard. Anticipating the
actual execution of the ad-hoc experiment in the field with 480 subjects (cf. Chapter 5),




Risky Decisions among Humans and
Computers
“Instead of racing against the machine, we need
to learn to race with the machine. That is our
grand challenge.”
(Erik Brynjolfsson, 2013)
This chapter examines the impact of the opponents’ type (human or computerized) on
arousal and bidding behavior in electronic auctions. In an electronic market experiment
with human or automated counterparts, skin conductance and heart rate are measured.
These measures serve as proxies for emotions and are combined with market results to
provide insight into the emotions of participants during first-price sealed-bid (FPSB)
auctions and at discrete auction events, such as submitting a bid and winning or losing
an auction. It is shown that arousal is stronger in human only markets and when the
stakes for the decision maker are higher. Arousal is negatively correlated with the bid
price in the human market treatment, but not so in the computer market treatment.
It is evident that the process of bidding and competing is more thrilling against other
humans, compared to computer bidders. Also, in the human market treatment, bidders
place slightly higher (i.e., more risk aversive) bids. This suggests that either higher levels
of arousal actually cause riskier bids (arousal is assessed prior to bid submission), or that
high arousal is experienced as an effect of risky behavior. Either way, this association
holds for the human market treatment exclusively, whereas computerized bidders appear
to mitigate the interplay of arousal and behavior in the auction market. These results
have important implications for the design of e-commerce platforms and markets that
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include both humans and automated agents—eBay and stock exchange are the most
obvious examples.
4.1. Auctions and Electronic Markets
Information technology has revolutionized markets. While traditionally, a market was a
place where people came together to trade, a large portion of today’s trading activity in
markets is conducted by and with computerized trading agents. A necessary precursor
to this development is the ubiquitous adoption of electronic markets in industry and gov-
ernment (Bakos, 1991). Today, electronic markets are pervasive and an integral part of
our everyday life. Billions of transactions take place in electronic markets and platforms
on a daily basis. They may be small like the purchase of an electronic newspaper or
large like in financial and spectrum auctions. In particular, auctions are frequently used
in electronic markets (e.g. ebay.com, dubli.com, madbid.com). Regardless of their size,
the bidding, search, matching, clearing, and settlement processes are all supported by IT
systems. Those systems are designed to reduce transaction costs, increase the probabil-
ity to find trading partners, and to support complex decision making. Hence, IS research
is highly interested in how mechanism and website design affect users’ perception and
emotions.
For the most part, society has come to accept the fact that humans are no longer
actively performing many of these tasks. As markets have automated and increased their
operating speeds, so have the participants in these markets. They rely on computerized
agents to represent their interests in these markets, such as sniping agents on eBay used
“to avoid a bidding war” (Ariely et al., 2005, p. 896). In modern financial markets, the
chances are greater to trade with an algorithm than with a human being (Hendershott
et al., 2011). It is unclear how accepting market participants are of this trend. However,
given the amount of negative public press surrounding algorithmic and high-frequency
trading in financial markets, it is safe to say that some participants are unhappy about
the current development.1 This brings up the question how the increasing presence
of computerized agents in electronic markets generally affects human decision-making
processes. One of the most advanced uses of computerized agents can be found in
financial markets. Computerized traders presumably are responsible for over 73% of
the volume in US stock markets.2 Hendershott and colleagues showed that algorithmic
traders were responsible for a large increase in liquidity available on the New York
Stock Exchange (Hendershott et al., 2011). Previous research showed that a subset of
1See: “High-Speed Traders Race To Fend Off Regulators,” Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2012.
2See “SEC runs eye over high-speed trading,” Financial Times, July 29, 2009.
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computerized traders, called high frequency traders (HFT), make up more than 50%
of the trading volume and that these traders are faster and more informed than non-
HFTs (Hendershott et al., 2011). Clearly, computerized traders play an important role in
electronic markets today. As part of this development, they have also become competitors
of human traders. Research regarding their impact is still in its infancy.
To study the impact of computerized agents on the market participants’ behavior, emo-
tional responses, and market efficiency, a NeuroIS laboratory experiment, in which par-
ticipants bid against other human participants in one treatment, and against computer-
ized bidding agents in the other treatment, is conducted and illustrated in this Chapter.
The type of the opponent (human or computerized) is the only difference between the
treatments whatsoever. During the experiment, the participants’ heart rate and skin
conductance are measured as proxies for arousal and immediate emotional responses.
These measures are combined with market results to provide insights into the partic-
ipants’ emotions during auctions and at discrete auction events, such as submitting a
bid and winning or losing an auction. By capturing the participants’ arousal in strictly
separated scenarios (human opponents/ computer opponents), a better understanding
of recent developments in markets is sought. The present study shall take a step towards
explaining the source and mode of action of the involved emotional factors. Combining
methodologies from neuro- and psychophysiology, experimental economics, and informa-
tion systems research, the new field of NeuroIS may provide long overdue insights into
the decision making process of humans interacting with information technology (Dimoka
et al., 2012; Riedl et al., 2010).
In a nutshell, the results show that participants are significantly more aroused when in-
teracting with other human bidders than with computer bidders. Moreover, participants
submit lower bids when they experience higher levels of arousal. Lower bids in such an
auction setting are necessarily associated with a higher degree of risk. It is striking
that the relationship between arousal and risk taking behavior is only present in human
opponent markets. In computer opponent markets, by contrast, bids and arousal levels
are lower overall—and uncorrelated. Additionally, the participants’ immediate emotions
in response to auction events, such as the revelation of results, are assessed. Again, par-
ticipants exhibit stronger reactions in the human market treatment. Thus, this study
represents a novel contribution to the literature, since the interplay of arousal, market
environment, and economic behavior has not been shown in a competitive, controlled
auction environment as yet.
The remainder of this Chapter is structured as follows. In the following section, the the-
oretical background of the study is outlined. Particularly, the role of emotions in market
decision making and how NeuroIS contributes to the understanding of human decision
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making processes are considered. The next section then outlines the experimental de-
sign. In the results section, the interplay of arousal and bidding behavior, the emotional
intensity in response to discrete auction events, and market efficiency are investigated.
Finally, the scientific and managerial implications of this study are discussed and the
main conclusions are presented.
4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
Over the past decade, the presence of computerized agents has become pervasive in our
everyday life. Where, traditionally, humans directly interacted with other human beings,
many users interact with computerized agents today. The influence of computerized
agents on the users’ affective processes and behavior has thus become an important
field of IS research (Gefen et al., 2008; Nunamaker et al., 2011; Riedl et al., 2011).
While previous research primarily focused on trust and cooperative interaction, the main
purpose of this study is to investigate the impact of computerized agents on affective
processes and bidding behavior in the competitive environment of electronic auctions.
In particular, the case of FPSB auctions is considered. In a FPSB auction, each of the n
bidders submits a single sealed bid before the bidder who placed the highest bid obtains
the item for the amount of his or her bid (McAfee and McMillan, 1987; Engelbrecht-
Wiggans and Katok, 2008).3
While classical auction theory assumes that bidding in an auction can essentially be
boiled down to a maximization of expected utility, this study starts from the intuition
that (i) bidding in an electronic auction is a dynamic process, which also involves af-
fective processes, and that (ii) these processes are influenced by whether a bidder is
competing with other human bidders or with computerized agents. Building on the ad-
vances in NeuroIS (Riedl et al., 2010; Dimoka et al., 2012; Vom Brocke et al., 2013), skin
conductance and heart rate measurements are used to investigate the bidders’ affective
processes elicited at different stages of the auction process and how they relate to the
presence of computerized agents.
3The FPSB auction format is particularly well suited for this study, as (i) it belongs to the class of
static auctions and thus enables a high level of control with little path dependence, (ii) the impact of
computerized agents can be investigated in a scenario with little interaction, and (iii) the FPSB auction
format is frequently used in markets world-wide.
80
4.2. Theoretical Background and Hypotheses
4.2.1. Immediate Emotions and Arousal during the Auction
Previous research has shown that interacting with information systems can induce affec-
tive processes in users, which may ultimately have an impact on their attitudes, beliefs,
and behavior (Deng and Poole, 2010; Riedl et al., 2011). In the context of electronic
markets, in particular the design of the user interface, the reputation system, and also
the market mechanism play an important role. Affective processes induced by the de-
sign of the user interface, for instance, can have an influence on the consumers’ fun and
enjoyment on the platform, their perception of trustworthiness, as well as their approach
tendency and search depth (Stafford and Stern, 2002; Cyr et al., 2009; Deng and Poole,
2010). Even including facial features in product images can increase consumers’ percep-
tion of trust and enjoyment (Hassanein and Head, 2006; Cyr et al., 2009). This effect is
usually explained by the psychological construct of social presence, i.e., the perception
of interaction with another human being (Gefen and Straub, 2003; Qiu and Benbasat,
2009).
Psychological research disclosed that humans exhibit an inherent tendency to long for
the presence of other humans, giving them a sense of human warmth and sociability.
Emphasizing or concealing the presence of other humans, or contrary to that, of com-
puterized agents, is an important design instrument for controlling the perceived level
of social presence on a website. This has also ramifications for the design of avatars to
represent computerized agents in virtual worlds (Davis et al., 2009). In the context of
product recommender agents, for instance, Qiu and Benbasat (2009) found that agents
which employ humanoid embodiment can enhance social presence, which in turn posi-
tively affects the customers’ perceptions and intentions. Nunamaker et al. (2011) created
an automated kiosk in order to interview human individuals and let computerized agents
actively assess the emotional state of users. The authors showed how the users’ percep-
tion of information systems can be changed by varying the appearance and demeanor of
the computerized interviewers. In this context, one major question is whether trusting
or competing with computerized agents induces different neurobiological processes in
comparison to trusting or competing with humans. Riedl et al. (2011) found that when
subjects think about the trustworthiness of an interaction partner, their mentalizing
network shows higher levels of activation if the trustee appears human rather than as
an avatar.
While the studies outlined above have provided important contributions to the under-
standing of how higher levels of social presence can induce stronger affective processes
in users, it is important to bear in mind that these studies primarily focused on the
cooperative interaction of humans with computerized agents. Building on these insights,
the increasing number of automated bidding agents in markets raises the question of how
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the competitive interaction with computerized agents affects human traders’ emotions
and behavior as well as overall market efficiency. The affective processes induced on
auction platforms may therefore depend on the website design in terms of type, pres-
ence, and immediacy of the competing bidders. Especially, one may assume that the
absence of other human bidders in computer markets results in a less emotionally-laden
environment and that, hence, the bidders’ affective processes are mitigated. Thereby,
the bidders’ immediate emotions, i.e., short lived subjective experience in response to
specific auction events (cf. Rick and Loewenstein, 2008), as well as the bidders’ overall
arousal during the auction process (cf. Ku et al., 2005), are of particular interest.4
Ariely and Simonson (2003) and Adam et al. (2011) argued that the bidding process
includes salient events that can induce immediate emotions as well as an increase in
the bidders’ overall arousal, which in turn may have an impact on bidding behavior.
This emotional experience contributes to the success of Internet auction platforms as
it distinguishes them from fixed-price competitors (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Stafford
and Stern, 2002; Möllenberg, 2004; Lee et al., 2009). One of the major events in this
regard is the revelation of the auction outcome. It reveals the winning bidder, the
auction price, and the realized profit or loss. The immediate emotions triggered in
response to winning or losing an auction are usually referred to as the joy of winning
and the frustration of losing, respectively (Astor et al., 2013; Ding et al., 2005).5 In the
context of auctions, Delgado et al. (2008) found that there is a stronger activation of
the right striatum when losing a FPSB auction in comparison to losing a theoretically
equivalent lottery. Astor et al. (2013) found that both winning and losing an electronic
auction can induce immediate emotions, that increase in relation to the money at stake.
Furthermore, also the event of submitting a bid or the suspense of waiting for the auction
outcome are possibly able to induce immediate emotions in the bidders (Ku, 2008; Adam
et al., 2011).
With respect to the relationship between social presence and the intensities of immediate
emotions, Sanfey et al. (2003) found that human subjects exhibit weaker activation in
the anterior insula when receiving unfair offers from computer opponents rather than
from human opponents. Likewise, Bault et al. (2008) showed that the responses to win-
ning or losing a lottery depend on the presence of a peer. First and foremost, when
only one of the players can win, the immediate emotions in response to winning and
losing are experienced stronger than when there is no second player at all. The authors
4The term arousal can be applied to describe both the intensity of immediate emotions and the
emotional state. In order to avoid such ambiguity, the term arousal is used only in reference to the
intensity of the emotional state.
5In addition, depending on the provided auction mechanism and information, a bidder may also
experience winner regret or loser regret in response to the auction outcome (Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok, 2008; Astor et al., 2011). These information events are deliberately excluded in our study.
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argued that in an interpersonal context, emotions such as envy and gloating serve to
“keep track of our social status” by representing relative social gains or losses and thus
affect decision making (Bault et al., 2008, p. 1). Hence, being among and competing
against other humans might cause stronger immediate emotions than competing against
mundane computer bidders, and an electronic market can be viewed as a social com-
petition (Van den Bos et al., 2008). Therefore, it is hypothesized that the presence of
computerized opponents mitigates the intensities of immediate emotions in electronic
auctions. Against this background, research hypothesis 1 states:
Hypothesis 4.1. The intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions in response to
salient auction events is lower when competing with computer
opponents than it is when competing with human opponents.
In addition, also the bidders’ overall level of arousal may be subject to the presence
of human or computerized opponents. In particular, the inherent social competition
of auctions suggests that the presence of other human bidders is a source of arousal
(Malhotra and Bazerman, 2008; Van den Bos et al., 2008). Ku et al. (2005) argued
that interpersonal rivalry, social facilitation, and time pressure are the main factors
that can induce an intense emotional state in bidders, which the authors referred to
as “competitive arousal.” Likewise, Adam et al. (2013) found that bidders experience
higher levels of arousal when acting under the influence of time pressure. Eventually,
competitive arousal can even culminate in head-to-head battles among a subgroup of
bidders and has therefore been identified as one of the main reasons for the phenomenon
of auction fever (Johns and Zaichkowsky, 2003; Jones, 2011). In this context, it must
be highlighted that previous research emphasized that the inherent social competition
is a necessary prerequisite for the occurrence of competitive arousal (Ku et al., 2005;
Malhotra, 2010). Building on these insights, it is hypothesized that the presence of
computerized agents can contribute to mitigate the competitive atmosphere and thus
decrease bidders’ arousal. This is reflected in research hypothesis 2:
Hypothesis 4.2. Bidders’ levels of arousal are lower when competing with com-
puterized, rather than with human opponents.
4.2.2. Social Competition and Bidding
Classical economic theory has mostly ignored the impact of emotions on human economic
decision making (Sanfey et al., 2003; Adam et al., 2011). In the last two decades, how-
ever, a substantial strand of literature has provided robust evidence that emotions play
an essential role in market decision making (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Stafford and
Stern, 2002; Ockenfels et al., 2006). Auction theory assumes that bidders are rational
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in the sense that they maximize their expected utility by taking the interdependen-
cies of the actions of other bidders into account (Vickrey, 1961; McAfee and McMillan,
1987). While these models are undoubtedly an important contribution to the design
and understanding of auctions, they seldomly include the influence of emotions on deci-
sion making and therefore “idealize the decision-maker as a perfectly rational cognitive
machine” (Sanfey et al., 2003, p. 1755). Reality appears to diverge significantly from
this assumption, particularly in auctions where competitive arousal plays a role (Ku,
2008).
In contrast to homo economicus, human decision makers may not only be interested
in their own individual gains and losses, but also in the payoffs of others (Van den
Bos et al., 2008; Bault et al., 2008). More specifically, humans are interested in the
relative payoff, e.g., the difference between their payoff and the payoff of others. Such
interpersonal comparisons have been identified as a key element in economic behavior.
Rewarding emotions in response to winning an auction, in this context, are intuitive.
When a bidder wins an auction, the sought-after commodity is acquired and some utility
is derived from it.6 In contrast, bidders may experience frustration when they lose an
auction because they did not achieve their goal, even though they could have. This
notion considers the monetary value that a bidder derives from winning an auction.
Due to the “social nature of [the] auctions” (Van den Bos et al., 2008, p. 487), however,
an auction has also the component of social competition (Delgado et al., 2008). With
regard to the joy of winning, Malhotra and Bazerman (2008, p. 80) argued that “people
enjoy winning—especially against their rivals—even at a price.” In other words, bidders
may derive utility from winning the social competition of an auction “over and beyond
any monetary payoffs” (Cooper and Fang, 2008, p. 1580). During the auction process,
i.e., prior to the revelation of the auction outcome, this social competition can cause
a strong desire to win (Malhotra et al., 2008; Malhotra, 2010). This desire could lead
participants to deviate from their typical bidding pattern and place higher bids (Ku,
2008; Van den Bos et al., 2008; Adam et al., 2013). An obvious example from the
consumer market, where the emotional experience gained from interacting with other
human bidders in second price auctions is seen as an important characteristic, is eBay.
In 2007, eBay launched an advertisement campaign called “shop victoriously” with the
slogan, “it’s better when you win it!” (eBay.com, 2007), stressing the competitive nature
of auctions. eBay also sends emails to bidders when some other user has taken over the
status of the currently highest bidder from them, prompting them to hit back with an
even higher bid. Accordingly, Lee et al. (2009, p. 77) identified “the thrill of bidding,
6In this regard, it must be noted that bidders may also derive negative utility when they pay more
for an item than it is actually worth. This is referred to as the “winner’s curse” (cf. Easley et al., 2010).
In this experiment, however, the bidders know the exact value of the item. The “winner’s curse” is thus
negligible.
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the excitement of winning, and the stimulation of beating competitors” as reasons for
the popularity of auctions.
Depending on how many other human actors are present and how strong this presence is
realized, the social context can become more prevalent. It turns market interaction into
a “play-to-win game” (Stafford and Stern, 2002, p. 44). The “uniqueness of being first”
(Ku et al., 2005, p. 89), especially among peers, can cause interpersonal emotions (e.g.,
envy, gloating, and spite (Bault et al., 2008)), which in turn may affect economic behav-
ior. In this sense, Palmer and Forsyth (2006, p. 236) concluded that “auction behavior
is, thus, a socially constructed behavior.” Human behavior in fact markedly depends on
the type of interaction partners, i.e. whether they are human or computerized oppo-
nents. In particular, human behavior has proven to be more sensitive to interpersonal
factors such as social competition and unfairness. Van den Bos et al. (2008) showed that
auction participants submitted significantly higher bids and were prone to the winner’s
curse when competing against other humans in common value auctions, but not, if the
opponents were computers. Sanfey et al. (2003) considered ultimatum bargaining and
found that unfair offers by computers were accepted more often than identical unfair
offers by humans.
Based on these findngs, this study seeks for a better understanding of how emotions and
bidding behavior are affected by the other bidders’ types, be it human or computerized.
With respect to the fact that a FPSB auction scenario in fact puts participants in a
situation of social competition and in view of the state of the literature, it is hypothesized
that the presence of human opponents increases the desire to win an auction and thereby
outperform the peer bidders, resulting in higher bids (Hassanein and Head, 2006; Van den
Bos et al., 2008; Astor et al., 2013). Consequently, the aspect of competition may
be mitigated in computer markets, resulting in comparatively lower bids. Research
hypothesis 3 captures this relationship:
Hypothesis 4.3. In FPSB auctions, bidders place lower bids when competing with
computerized, rather than with human opponents.
4.2.3. Arousal and Bidding Behavior
Potentially dangerous, exciting, or simply personally significant situations often bear
high levels of risk and stimulate attention, since the potential upsides and downsides are
substantial, or as Trimpop (1994, p. 89) put it: “every situation of perceived riskiness
is accompanied by arousal.” The presence of high risks may cause arousal, but also may
arousal cause an increased willingness to take such risks. Either way, “to understand the
processes connected to risk taking behavior it is important to incorporate the concept
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of arousal” (Trimpop, 1994, p. 53). In that sense, Mano (1994, p. 53) investigated the
impact of arousal on the willingness-to-pay for lotteries and insurances and found “evi-
dence that higher Arousal is related to risk-seeking and lower Arousal to risk-aversion.”
As a consequence, risk seeking behavior may be caused by arousal. Rivers et al. (2008)
presented a review on risk taking behavior under the influence of different factors such
as age, impulsivity, and arousal, and stated that arousal “is a risk-promoting factor in
the short term” (p. 128). Moreover, Ariely et al. (2006) showed that sexual arousal is
capable of increasing the subjective willingness to engage in unsafe sexual ventures, thus
being exposed to higher degrees of risk (e.g., concerning health, pregnancy, etc.).
In the context of FPSB auctions, a higher level of risk is necessarily associated with
submission of lower bids. This strategy increases the potential payoff and leads to a
lower probability of winning the auction in the first place, i.e. being the bidder with the
highest bid. According to the competitive arousal model (cf. Ku et al., 2005; Malhotra,
2010), a factor like rivalry stimulates physiological arousal, which in turn fuels the desire
to win against the opponent. Following this notion, high levels of physiological arousal
should be associated with high bids, since high bids are ceteris paribus more likely to win
an auction than low bids. Contrary to that, as was pointed out, high levels of arousal
are often associated with a high willingness to take risks (Ku et al., 2005; Ariely et al.,
2006; Adam et al., 2013). Thus, given the social environment, one may assume that risk
taking and arousal are positively correlated, and hence that arousal is associated with
comparatively lower bids. It is therefore hypothesized that lower bids are associated
with the experience of higher levels of arousal. Research hypothesis 4 states:
Hypothesis 4.4. Lower bids are related to the experience of higher levels of arousal
in FPSB auctions.
Previous research indicates, however, that the social context may play an important
role in the relationship between arousal and behavior. In the context of a power-to-
take bargaining scenario, Ben-Shakhar et al. (2007) found that arousal can even cause
subjects to destroy a significant proportion of their own payoff in order to harm other
participants. Sanfey et al. (2003) investigated ultimatum game bargaining and found
that unfair offers by humans induced stronger activation in the anterior insula than did
those of computer agents and that unfair offers by humans were rejected more often
than identical unfair offers by computerized agents. In a follow-up study, van ’t Wout
et al. (2006, p. 565) further investigated this matter to explore whether arousal is
related to decisions. Based on skin conductance measurements, the authors found that
arousal was higher for unfair offers and that higher arousal levels were also associated
with higher rejection rates. Interestingly, however, the authors found that this pattern
only existed when humans received “offers proposed by human conspecifics, but not for
offers generated by computers” (p. 564). In the context of auctions, previous research
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argued that interaction with other human bidders is a crucial condition for the influence
of arousal on bids (Ku et al., 2005; Adam et al., 2011). In this sense, bidders may
not only be less aroused when competing with computer opponents, but their behavior
may also be less correlated to arousal. Especially when competing with peers, high
risk may be related to high arousal, since the psychological evaluation of economic
dimensions (probability of winning, potential payoff) is enriched by the component of
social competition. Consequently, it hypothesized that the presence of computer agents
in the auctions mitigates the relationship between arousal and bids. H5 thus states:
Hypothesis 4.5. The relationship between arousal and bids is mitigated when com-
peting with computer opponents.
Note that this study abstracts from any graphical form of representation, as this might
be a potential source of variance, and thus limits the scope of possible causes to the mere
matter of fact and the consciousness of interacting with either humans or computers.
This market environment (treatment variable) is expected to have an impact on arousal
and bidding behavior, and also arousal is hypothesized to affect bidding behavior. It
is thus the question whether a mediating effect of arousal exists, partially or fully, and
also how this mediation is moderated by the treatment variable itself. The research
model linking the research hypotheses (H1 through H5) and the conceptual structure of
moderated mediation is depicted in Figure 4.1.
4.3. Experimental Design
This section presents the experimental design of this study. First, the overall treat-
ment and session structure and the auction format itself are illustrated. Second, the
experimental procedure in the laboratory is explained and information concerning the
physiological measurements is provided.
4.3.1. Treatment and Session Structure
The experiment comprises two treatments. First, in the human market (HM) treatment,
the subjects interact with human bidders only. Second, in the computer market (CM)
treatment, the subjects interact with computerized agents only. The CM treatment
sessions were conducted one week after the HM treatment sessions. The computerized
bidders in the CM treatment replicated the bids of the human bidders as collected in the
HM treatment one week earlier (see Van den Bos et al. (2008) for a similar approach).
By replicating the human bids, influencing the results due to the different bidding of
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Figure 4.1.: Research Model
agents is avoided. That makes the results comparable across treatments. Subjects in
the CM treatment thus faced the exact same bids from their opponents as subjects in
the HM treatment. The experiment is based on a between subjects design, i.e., the
subjects were randomly assigned to either participate in the HM or CM treatment, but
never both (see Van den Bos et al. (2008); Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok (2008) for
similar approaches). There were 12 sessions in the HM treatment, and 8 sessions in
the CM treatment. Each session comprised 6 subjects, yielding a total of 120 subjects
(NHM = 72, NCM = 48). In the HM treatment, the subjects were randomly reassigned
to groups of 3 bidders before every single auction period (random stranger matching).
Thus, subjects did not know which other subjects were currently participating in the
same auction. Each group then played a single FPSB auction independently with three
bidders. During the experiment, each bidder took part in a sequence of 30 FPSB auctions
with 2 other bidders. After every period, the subjects were re-matched into different
groups of 3, so that no learning effects from the interaction with the same opponents
was possible. In the CM treatment, every subject was matched with 2 computerized
bidding agents, which replicated the human bids from the HM treatment. Again, every
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subject was re-matched into a different group with 2 computerized bidding agents after
each auction period.
4.3.2. Auction Process
In FPSB auctions, all the bidders simultaneously submit single sealed bids (only the
auctioneer observes the bids ex post). The bidder who places the highest bid obtains
the commodity and has to pay the amount of the bid (Vickrey, 1961). In this experiment,
there are 3 bidders in each auction. This is commonly known information. Before an
auction starts, each bidder i is informed about his or her independent private value (IPV)
vi for the commodity to be auctioned. The IPV model dates back to the seminal work
of Vickrey (1961) (see Katok and Kwasnica (2008); Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok
(2008); Astor et al. (2013) for similar approaches).
This IPV is independently drawn for each bidder from a uniform distribution with
support on the discrete integer interval {11, 12, . . . , 109, 110}. It is expressed in monetary
units (MU). The bidders only know their own IPV and the general distribution of IPVs,
which, in this case, is the same for all bidders. The bid of participant i is denoted by
bi. The winning bidder i receives a payoff equal to the winning bid minus his or her
individual valuation for the commodity being auctioned (vi−bi). All other bidders receive
a payoff of zero. The equilibrium bidding strategy b∗(vi) for bidder i (cf. Krishna, 2002)
in an auction with three risk neutral bidders in total and the common and commonly
known distribution of IPVs as denoted above is given by
b(vi)∗ =
2
3(vi − 10) + 10. (4.1)
In order to exclude missed-opportunity and money-left-on-the-table effects (Filiz-Ozbay
and Ozbay, 2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008), a minimal information envi-
ronment is presented to the bidders. In that setting they are neither informed about the
highest nor about the second-highest bid (Armantier, 2004). At the end of an auction,
bidders only receive information about whether the auction was won or lost and their
payoff. The bidders’ identities are not revealed. In order to capture the physiological
reactions to specific events, information is provided in timed intervals of at least five
seconds (Sanfey et al., 2003; Adam et al., 2011). The auction process is depicted in
Figure 4.2.
In order to investigate the intensities of the bidders’ immediate emotions throughout the
auction process, three specific events in the auction process are considered (E1, E2 and
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Figure 4.2.: Auction process and timed intervals between different information events.
E3 in Figure 4.2). First, the bidders’ physiological response to placing a bid (E1) is an-
alyzed. Subsequently in the auction process, the bidders see an information screen that
informs them that the auction outcome will be revealed soon (E2), which constitutes
the second monitoring point. Finally, the moment in which bidders find out whether
they have won or lost the auction (E3) is considered. Contrary to several studies from
recent IS literature (Nunamaker et al., 2011; Cyr et al., 2009; Riedl et al., 2011), there
is no graphical representation of opponents (either other humans or computerized bid-
ding agents) at any point before, during, or after the auctions. The subjects, however,
know about the nature of their opponents. Since this difference is not emphasized any
further, the effect of knowing with whom you interact (awareness), is isolated from the
immediate impression (affect), as, for instance, induced by a graphical representation,
text messages, or the like. Keep in mind that the type of the opponents (humans or
computers) constitutes the only and single difference between the 2 treatments whatso-
ever. In fact, since the bids are replicated by the computer bidders, this difference is
virtually limited to the opponents’ designation in the experiment instructions.
4.3.3. Procedure
Before the first auction started, subjects went through a five minute resting period for
calibration and benchmarking purposes with respect to the physiological measurements
(cf. Sütterlin et al., 2011; Adam et al., 2011). Moreover, in order to ensure comprehension
of the rules of the experiment, subjects had to complete a quiz regarding the experimental
instructions and then participated in five practice auctions, which were irrelevant for
payoff. In order to control for heterogeneities in risk attitude, the subjects’ individual risk
attitudes were assessed using the Holt and Laury (2002) questionnaire with real monetary
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payoffs at the end of the experiment.7 This measure is used to distinguish subjects
according to whether or not they are (relatively) risk averse. When comparing the
number of safe choices S, the differences in individual risk attitudes between treatments
show to be insignificant, although subjects were slightly more risk averse in the HM
treatment (independent samples t-test, SCM = 5.68, SHM = 6.04, T = −1.169, p =
0.234, two-tailed).
The experiment was conducted at the laboratory of the Institute of Information Systems
and Marketing (IISM) at the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT). The experimen-
tal system was implemented using the z-Tree environment for economic experiments
(Fischbacher, 2007). In order to avoid artifacts due to body movements, participant
interactions with the experimental system were limited to mouse inputs, i.e., only the
dominant hand was needed. Moreover, subjects were equipped with a pair of earmuffs
to avoid sensitivity to background noise.
Participants were recruited from a pool of undergraduate students using the ORSEE
software environment (Greiner, 2004). Altogether, 27 female and 93 male subjects (6
subjects per session, 120 in total, mean age = 23.16 years) participated in 20 sessions.
A total of 12 sessions for the HM treatment (12×6 = 72 subjects) and 8 sessions for the
CM treatment (8× 6 = 48 subjects) were conducted. There was no lump sum payment.
The experimental currency was monetary units (MU) with 16 MU being equivalent to
e 1.00. Depending on their individual performance, all gains and losses accumulated
during the auctions went to the bidders’ individual accounts. The individual accounts
were paid out in cash to the participants at the end of the experiment. The average
payment was e 16.13, with a minimum payment of e 5.88 and a maximum payment
of e 28.44. Subjects were able to earn up to an additional e 3.85 in the risk aversion
questionnaire.
This study used heart rate as a proxy for the individual degree of arousal before a subject
placed a bid. Heart rate is measured in beats per minute (bpm). The heart rate signal
was derived from an electrocardiogram (ECG) recording device, using the lead I method
with single-use electrodes placed on the left and right wrist (Berntson et al., 2007). As
proxy for arousal before bidding, the bidders’ average heart rate (HR) in the time frame
6 to 3 seconds before bid submission is used hr6−3 (cf. Figure 4.2). This HR value is
normalized by the bidder’s individual HR baseline hr0, as measured during the initial





7See Chapters 2 and 3 for more detailed information on experimental risk attitude elicitation in
general and this task in particular.
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Normalization makes HR comparable across participants and treatments. An arousal
parameter of hrθ > 0 in this context means that a subject’s heart rate in the time
frame of 6 to 3 seconds before submitting a bid was higher than in the initial calibration
phase.8
Additionally, the subjects’ skin conductance was recorded throughout the experiment,
using a constant current amplifier measurement system and Ag/AgCl (silver/silver chlo-
ride) electrodes. The electrodes were attached to the thenar and hypothenar eminences
of the palm of the non-dominant hand with standard electrodermal activity (EDA) elec-
trode paste (Boucsein, 1992). As mentioned before, skin conductance can be used as a
measure of arousal in response to “sudden” events. In order to do so, the amplitudes
of such prompt increases (phasic component) must be separated from the general move-
ments of the signal (tonic component, e.g., due to body movements, thoughts, variations
of temperature, habituation, etc.). The amplitudes of these skin conductance responses
(scr∆) are a proxy for the intensity of immediate emotions and reflect short bursts of
sympathetic activity. These amplitudes were obtained by decomposing the skin conduc-
tance signal with the Ledalab analysis software (Benedek and Kaernbach, 2010). Only
amplitudes in the time frame 1 to 3 seconds after an event and with a value greater
than or equal to 0.01µS were used (Boucsein, 1992; Fowles et al., 1981). Following the
recommendation of Venables and Christie (1980), all raw scr∆ values x were transformed
by log(x+ 1).
The physiological measurement results of 17 subjects had to be removed from the data
sample. This was because the values of either hrθ or scr∆, or both, were outside the
range of the measurement system or because of too much noise on the signal. Thus,
the entire analysis is based on a data sample of 120 − 17 = 103 subjects (NCM = 39,
NHM = 64). The analysis of allocation efficiency is unattached by the physiological
measurements, so that all 120 were used.
All sessions were conducted within a period of two weeks (June, 15 to 24, 2011) with an
average room temperature of 24.1◦C (75.4◦F) and a relative humidity of 53.1%. These
values comply with the methodological recommendations of the Society for Psychophys-
iological Research (Fowles et al., 1981). Figure 4.3 displays a photograph of a computer
terminal as it was used for the experiment.
8It should be noted at this point that this measure for arousal appears somewhat conservative, since
it relates the heart rate values to the subject’s average heart rate during a five minute resting period.
In this resting period, the subjects sit idle, do not experience any stimuli so that a heart rate around
the basal (or resting) heart rate of 60 to 80 bpm can be assumed. Designating an increase of 3 bmp on
a basis of 60 bpm as an increase of 5 percent (3/60 = 0.05) technically assumes a natural null-point of 0
bpm. This, however, is fairly unrealistic, at least for alive beings. Since very low basal heart rates may




Figure 4.3.: Laboratory Computer Terminal with Physiological Measurement
Equipment.
4.3.4. Physiological Measurements
The methods of NeuroIS allow researchers to shed light on the visceral processes un-
derlying users’ emotions9 and decision making (Dimoka et al., 2012; Vom Brocke et al.,
2013). NeuroIS uses techniques from cognitive neuroscience to measure objective corre-
lates of human emotional processing while subjects interact with information systems.
The two correlates used in this study, heart rate and skin conductance, are proxies for
activation of the autonomous nervous system (ANS). The ANS consists of the sympa-
thetic and the parasympathetic nervous system. They typically function in opposition
to each other (Cacioppo et al., 2007). The sympathetic branch activates the organisms
for fight or flight, while the parasympathetic branch promotes digestion and recreation.
Both heart rate and skin conductance response are measures for arousal. In the context
of this work, SCR amplitudes as a proxy for the intensities of immediate emotions, i.e.
phasic arousal, in response to specific events during the auction process are measured.
9There are different types of emotions. This study is concerned with immediate and expected
emotions (Loewenstein and Lerner, 2003). An immediate emotion is a direct response to an event, e.g.,
anger or elation. Immediate emotions are directly experienced by the subject. Within an auction, the
joy of winning and the frustration of losing fall into this category (Adam et al., 2011; Astor et al.,
2013). In contrast, an expected emotion is not a directly experienced emotional response, but rather an
expected emotional reaction in response to a future event. According to Loewenstein and Lerner (2003,
p. 620), “expected emotions are not experienced as emotions per se at the time of decision making; [...]
they are expectations about emotions that will be experienced in the future.”
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The subjects’ heart rate, i.e. tonic arousal, is used as a proxy for the general level of
arousal.
Heart rate is a measure that reflects the activity of both sympathetic and parasym-
pathetic branches of the ANS (Berntson et al., 2007). In contrast, skin conductance
is a measure that directly reflects the activity of the sympathetic nervous system only
(Boucsein, 1992; Dawson et al., 2011). Skin conductance is measured in microsiemens
(µS) and can be broken down into tonic and phasic components. The tonic component
reflects the general arousal level of the individual (skin conductance level or SCL), i.e.,
the ongoing emotional state. The phasic component represents short monophasic bursts
of sympathetic activity (skin conductance response or SCR), which are usually elicited
by an external or internal stimulation (Wallin, 1981). SCRs typically occur 1 to 3 sec-
onds after a discrete event. The amplitude of an SCR (scr∆) has been identified as a
valid measure of emotional arousal (Lang et al., 1993; Bradley et al., 2008). In other
words, quantifying the amplitude of an SCR in response to an “emotionally competent
stimulus” provides a proxy for the intensity of the emotion experienced (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005, p. 339). From a psychophysiological perspective, a subjectively experi-
enced feeling is only part of the broader concept of emotion. It also comprises objectively
observable changes, e.g., in physiology. Bechara and Damasio (2005, p. 339) defined an
emotion as “a collection of changes in the body and brain states triggered by a dedicated
brain system [...] relative to a particular object or event.” In an auction, this type of
stimulus would be for instance the event of being informed about winning or losing the
auction, i.e., the auction outcome.
4.4. Results
This section presents the results of the study. In the first part, immediate emotional
responses to discrete auction events are considered. The second part analyzes the inter-
play of market environment, arousal, and bidding behavior. Eventually, the third part
briefly deals with allocation efficiency.
4.4.1. Immediate Emotions in Response to Auction Events
This subsection considers the bursts of arousal (i.e., immediate emotions) in response to
the discrete auction events bid submission (E1), an intermediate information screen (in-
forming subjects that the result is about to be displayed) (E2), and the auction outcome
(E3). This analysis aims at connecting these indicators to treatment, stakes, and the ac-
tual outcome (winning or not winning the auction), cf. Figure 4.2. It was hypothesized
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that such discrete auction events elicit stronger emotional responses when competing
with human opponents (H1). For the purpose of this analysis, as stated before, the
Table 4.1.: Value classes.
value interval
value class Lower bound Upper bound
0 very low 11 30
1 low 31 50
2 medium 51 70
3 high 71 90
4 very high 91 110
total range 11 110
subjects’ skin conductance response amplitudes are used. This section additionally con-
siders the impact of the IPV as well as the role of the outcome (winning or losing). For
the purpose of illustration, the IPV values are grouped into five categories. Table 4.1
reports the ranges for each value class.
Figures 4.4(a), 4.4(b), and 4.5(a), display the intensity of the participants’ immediate
emotions in response to the 3 auction events E1, E2, and E3. The results are grouped
by value class and treatment. All of the Figures indicate that emotional intensity is
generally lower in the CM treatment, and generally higher for higher value classes. The
strongest responses are triggered by displaying the auction outcome (E3), whereas E1
and E2 trigger less intense responses. To confirm the graphical evidence, three OLS
regressions are conducted, in which each bidder’s average scr∆ in response to E1, E2,
and E3 is regressed. For all events, treatment (CM: 1, HM: 0), value class (coded as 0 to
4), gender (female: 1, male: 0), and risk aversion (1: above average, 0: below average)
are controlled for. For E3(1), a dummy for the auction outcome (winning: 1, losing: 0)
is included. In addition to that, the interaction term value class × auction outcome is
included in E3(2).
The results of the regressions are presented in Table 4.2.10 The differences in the in-
tensities of the emotional responses between the CM and HM treatments are significant
and consistent for E1 to E3 (E1: b = −0.015, p = 0.007, E2: b = −0.021, p = 0.001, E3:
b = −0.029, p < 0.001), whereat the effect at E3 is stronger than at E2, and stronger
10Note that the number of observations for E3(1) and E3(2) could be expected to be 2×5×103 = 1030,
since there are 5 value classes, 2 outcome roles (winning and losing), and 103 subjects. Obviously,
however, not every combination of outcome role and value class does exist, since for instance, an
auction with an IPV from the lowest value class is highly unlikely to be won by the respective bidder.
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(b) Skin conductance response amplitudes in re-
sponse to E2.
Figure 4.4.: Skin conductance response amplitudes in response to E1 and E2.
at E2 than it is at E1. In summary, the null hypothesis can be rejected in favor for
hypothesis H1.
Result 1: The intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions in response to
salient auction events is lower when competing with computer opponents than
it is when competing with human opponents.
The general positive relationship between stakes and emotional intensity can also be
confirmed in this setting. The coefficient of value class is positive, significant, and
consistent for the three regressions E1, E2, and E3(1). Again, the magnitude of the
effect is increasing during the course of the auction process (E3 > E2 > E1).
Result 2: The intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions in response to
salient auction events is higher for higher induced IPVs.
Since the bidders cannot lose money but make a profit if they win the auction, the status
quo is maintained when an auction is lost, whereas a gain is realized when an auction is
won. One would thus expect a stronger emotional response to winning rather than losing
an auction. Regression E3(1) confirms this conjecture. The coefficient on the dummy
variable for winning is positive and statistically significant (b = 0.020, p = 0.014).
Result 3: The intensity of the bidders’ immediate emotions in response to
the auction outcome is higher if the auction is won.
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Additionally, regression E3(2) captures the interaction between outcome role (winning or
losing) and value class. The coefficient for the dummy winner is positive and significant
(b = 0.054, p = 0.001), i.e. at the lowest value class (coded as 0), winning causes stronger
emotional responses than losing. The coefficient of the variable for value class is also
positive and significant (b = 0.033, p = 0.004), i.e., in case an auction is not won, every
increase in value class will increase the emotional response significantly. The interaction
term winner × value class is negative and significant (b = −0.014, p = 0.006), i.e., the
just mentioned increase is lower, but still positive (0.033 + (−0.014) = 0.019) if the
auction is won. The interaction of winning and value class captures the notion that the
emotional response is stronger when a participant wins an auction unexpectedly, as it is
in case of low value classes. Note that the emotional intensity of losing even surpasses
the intensity of winning in the highest value class. Intuitively, this makes perfect sense
since one would expect to win when the valuation is very high. Losing despite a very
high valuation appears to evoke strong emotions. This pattern is consistent across
treatments. As depicted in Figure 4.6, the general intensity of emotions is higher in the
HM treatment and the responses are stronger for winning an auction—both in the CM
and the HM treatments. An interaction effect between treatment and auction outcome
cannot be observed: winning an auction (compared to losing) causes stronger responses
across both treatments. Participants in the HM treatment show stronger responses to
both winning and losing the auction than participants in the CM treatment do. The
values of scr∆ for winning and losing as well as for each of the 5 value classes are depicted
in Figure 4.5(b).
Result 4: The emotional intensities in response to the auction outcome are
higher for higher value classes for both winning and losing the auction (cf.
Result 2). This increase is stronger for winning than it is for losing the
auction.
4.4.2. Market Environment, Arousal, and Bidding Behavior
This subsection considers the general level of arousal before bid submission and aims at
connecting these values to treatment and bidding behavior. Engelbrecht-Wiggans and
Katok (2008) and Katok and Kwasnica (2008) established that when participants think
they do not have a realistic chance of winning an auction, as it may be the case for low


























































(a) Skin conductance response amplitudes in re-
























































(b) Skin conductance response amplitudes in re-
sponse to auction outcome and value class (E3).
Figure 4.5.: Skin conductance response amplitudes after auction result revelation.
60 MU, i.e., the upper 50% of the IPV distribution are used.11 This means that from the
series of 30 auctions, on average roughly 15 auctions are considered in the analysis.
General Statistics. First, the data is analyzed on a subject level. In this experiment,
bidders’ arousal levels hrθ are significantly higher in the HM treatment than in the
CM treatment (3.92% vs. 1.79%, independent samples, one-tailed t-test, T = −1.904,
p = 0.030). Thus, in line with hypothesis H2, and confirmatory of the results on skin
conductance responses, participants appear to be less aroused when they are bidding
against computer opponents, cf. Figure 4.7(a). This first result suggests that emotions
play a stronger role in markets with human opponents than in markets with computer
opponents.
Second, the average height of bids for the different treatments is considered. An in-
dependent samples t-test reveals that absolute bids do not significantly differ between
treatments (bHM = 72.36, bCM = 71.79, T = −0.564, p = 0.287, one-tailed).12 There
11Previous research found that bidding behavior for low valuations is rather different than it is for
high valuations (Kagel, 1995; Neugebauer and Selten, 2006; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008).
Bidders seem to realize that their probability of winning the auction in these cases is small and, therefore,
they even place bids in excess of their own valuation to prevent another bidder from making a high
profit.
12Additionally, a regular OLS regression is conducted, using the treatment dummy and average
IPV as explanatory variables for the average bid (on subject level). bvi = 0.667, pvi < 0.001, bHM =
0.408, pHM = 0.655, R2 = 0.200.
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Figure 4.6.: Skin conductance response amplitudes (SCR.amp) in response to winning
and losing information and treatment.
is no indication for an immediate, unconditioned effect of treatment on overall bidding
behavior—with or without controlling for induced valuation (as hypothesized in H3), cf.
also Figure 4.7(b).
The literature suggests that there is a relationship between emotions (specifically
arousal) and bidding behavior in auctions. Although not yet definitively established,
a link between arousal and bidding behavior seems plausible (H4). A Pearson correla-
tion (on subject level) indicates a negative but insignificant relation of average arousal
and average bid height (r = −0.106, p = 0.144, n = 103, one-tailed). As outlined above,
however, the impact of arousal on behavior (bids) might well be dependent on the mar-
ket environment (HM or CM). Hypothesis 5 stated that there is a conditional effect of
arousal on bids, dependent on whether the bidders face human or computer opponents
(cf. Figure 4.1). In order to assess whether such a relationship between arousal and bid-
ding exists, first, the correlations between the bidders’ average arousal and average bid,
grouped by treatment, are analyzed. The analysis reveals a statistically significant nega-
tive correlation between arousal and bids (n = 64, r = −0.232, p = 0.033, one-tailed) in
the HM treatment, whereas there is no significant correlation between arousal and bids
in the CM treatment (n = 39, r = 0.104, p = 0.265, one-tailed). Both correlations are
illustrated in Figure 4.8. In this figure, average bids increase with increases of arousal in












(a) Average level of arousal in the human mar-
ket (HM) and computer market (CM) treatment









(b) Average height of bids in the human market
(HM) and computer market (CM) treatment (error
bars: 95% CI).
Figure 4.7.: Basic interrelations of treatment, arousal and bid height.
correlation analysis. Participants are more aroused when they are bidding against other
humans, and also is their bidding behavior stronger associated with the individual levels
of arousal. Bidding lower in FPSB auctions brings about a higher level of risk taking.
By lowering their bids, participants reduce the probability of winning the auction, but
at the same time increase their payoff in case they win. In compliance with H5, the
computer opponents seem to have a mediating influence on the interrelation of arousal
and bidding.
It must be added that an entirely reliable conclusion about causality from arousal to
bidding behavior is not possible. Even though arousal was measured and averaged in the
time frame 6 to 3 seconds before the bid was submitted, it might very well be that subjects
intended to submit a particularly low bid and then—because of the thrilling thought
about the associated risks and potential gains—became more aroused. Eventually, they
might have submitted their bid according to their initial plan. This reflects a general and
methodological limitation of experimental approaches such as prosecuted in this study,
since it is not generally possible to assess the participants’ intentions and thoughts
during the experimental process. A noteworthy fact in this context, however, is the
non-correlation of (average) induced valuation and (average) arousal. Neither is this
correlation significant for the treatments separately (rHM = 0.137, pHM = 0.140, rCM =
−0.155, pCM = 0.173), nor for the total set of subjects (r = 0.050, p = 0.306, all p-values
one-tailed). Thus, the IPV as a common cause for arousal and bidding behavior does
not appear likely.
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Figure 4.8.: Correlation of arousal and bids in the human market (HM) and computer
market (CM) treatment. R2HM = 0.052, R2CM = 0.007.
The correlations between treatment, average arousal, average induced value, and average
bid are summarized in Table 4.3 (Pearson correlations, one-tailed significance values,
N = 103).
Regression Analysis. The previous analysis established a relationship between
arousal, bidding behavior, and the market environment on subject level. Though com-
pelling, the previous results may not hold up to more rigorous and differentiated analysis.
In particular, the individual differences of single auctions have not been assessed so far.
This aspect presumably is of high importance, since people are not generally aroused or
bidding in a certain way, but show varying reactions, depending on stimuli such as an
IPV. Hereinafter, the empirical data is analyzed on the level of single auctions.
For this reason, 3 different regression specifications are run. First, the level of arousal is
explained in specification (1). In specification (2) and (3), the bid height is regressed.
Independent variables in all specifications are a treatment dummy (1 in computer op-
ponent markets, 0 in human opponent markets), a gender dummy (1 for female, 0 for
male), and a risk aversion dummy (1 for above average risk aversion, 0 otherwise). Risk
aversion is measured by using a questionnaire administered after the experiment (Holt
and Laury, 2002). It is also controlled for induced valuations and auction sequence.
Specifications (2) and (3) include the bidder’s level of arousal (hrθ, mean-centered),
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Table 4.3.: Correlation Table: bivariat correlation between average bids, average arousal,
average value, and treatment on a subject level. Pearson coefficients, p-values
displayed in parentheses (one-tailed), significant correlations (p < 0.05) high-
lighted in bold face type. N = 110.
average bid average arousal average value treatment: HM
average bid 1.000 -.106 .445 .056
(.144) (< .001) (.287)
average arousal 1.000 .050 .186
(.306) (.030)
average value 1.000 .036
(.359)
treatment: HM 1.000
whereas specification (3) additionally includes an interaction term between arousal (hrθ,
mean-centered) and treatment (dummy: computer market). Since an interaction effect
is tested in the regression, the continuous variable for arousal hrθ is mean-centered. This
basically does not change the analysis but makes the regression coefficients and inter-
cepts interpretable in a sensible way. Following the recommendations of Preacher et al.
(2007), Table 4.4 reports the unstandardized regression coefficients.
Consistent with the previous analysis and hypothesis H2, specification (1) (arousal)
shows that arousal is significantly lower in the CM treatment (by 2.4 percentage points),
also when controlling for valuation, sequence, gender, and risk aversion (b = −0.024,
SE = 0.011, p = 0.026).
Result 5: Bidders’ levels of arousal are lower when competing with comput-
erized, rather than with human opponents.
Moreover, the IPV has a positive effect on arousal whereas the auction number has a
negative effect. Participants thus seem to be calming down during the experiment.
The results of specification (2) indicate that the market environment has no significant
unconditioned effect on bids (b = −0.689, p = 0.446), i.e. the working hypotheses ¬H3
cannot be rejected. Female bidders submit significantly higher bids (b = 2.397, p =
0.017). Naturally, the IPV affects bid height positively (b = 0.650, p < 0.001). The
general effect of arousal on bids is negative and shows a trend towards 5% significance
(b = −6.352, p = 0.080). It is significant on a 10% level.
Result 6: Lower bids are related to the experience of higher levels of arousal
in FPSB auctions.
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The regression in specification (3) confirms the results from above. There exists an
interaction effect between arousal and market environment. On an average level of
arousal, there is no treatment effect (b = −0.610, p = 0.497). In the HM treatment,
however, arousal does indeed affect bid height in a negative manner (b = −10.579, p =
0.020). In the CM treatment, on the other hand, this effect is superimposed by an
opposed, slightly stronger, and marginally significant interaction effect (b = 12.702, p =
0.069, significant on the 10% level) and thus abrogated (−10.579 + 12.702 = 2.123).
Result 7: The relationship between arousal and bids is mitigated when com-
peting with computer opponents.
Moderation-Mediation Analysis. Now, in order to gain an understanding of
whether and how bids are indirectly affected by treatment via arousal (depending on the
treatment), a moderation mediation analysis—based on the research model (cf. Figure
4.1)—is performed. The analysis is conducted according to the approach of Preacher
et al. (2007), using a bootstrapping analysis. Bootstrapping entails the advantage of
not requiring any assumptions about the shape of the sampling distribution. Based
on 5, 000 bootstrapped samples using bias-corrected and accelerated 95% confidence in-
tervals, the analysis reveals a significant indirect effect of arousal on bids for the HM
treatment (IEHM = 0.252, SE = 0.074, LL = 0.130, UL = 0.434). This indirect effect
(IE) is computed as follows: IEHM = −0.024 × −10.579 = 0.252, i.e. as a product of
the direct effect of treatment on arousal (−0.024) and the effect of arousal (in the HM
treatment) on bids (−10.579). LL and UL refer to the lower and upper limit of the
95% confidence interval. Since zero is not included in the 95% confidence interval, the
indirect effect is significantly different from zero at p < 0.05 (two-tailed).
Table 4.5.: Summary of Indirect Effects
Indirect Effect Boot SE LCI95 UCI95
Human Market 0.252 0.074 0.130 0.434
Computer Market -0.051 0.075 -0.204 0.096
For the CM treatment, the indirect effect is IECM = −0.051. It can be computed
as follows: IECM = −0.024 × (−10.579 + 12.702) = −0.051. In contrast, the corre-
sponding analysis for the CM treatment reveals that the indirect effect is not significant
(IE=−0.051, SE = 0.075, LL = −0.204, UL = 0.096). Table 4.5 summarizes these
numbers. Taken as a whole, there is an indirect effect of market environment on bids,
which is transmitted through arousal in one scenario (HM treatment), but not the other.
In the traditional context of human markets, bidders are more aroused and this arousal
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is also directly reflected in their bids. In the CM treatment, bidders are less aroused
and the indirect effect of arousal on bids disappears. In other words, the presence of
computer opponents reduces both arousal as well as its impact on behavior.
4.4.3. Efficiency
The analysis so far has focused on bidding behavior and arousal and the participants’
emotions in response to auction events and outcomes. Another question of interest
concerns outcome efficiency and the differences between human and computer opponent
markets. Following Vickrey (1961), an auction can be considered efficient if the bidder
with the highest valuation for the good wins the auction (and obtains the good). In
the case of a tie in terms of IPV, the auction is efficient if any of the highest IPV
bidders wins the auction. If bidders submit an identical, highest bid, the winner is
determined randomly. This auction is regarded as efficient, with a weight corresponding
to the ex ante chances of winning the auction for the bidder with the highest IPV.
The experimental results regarding efficiency for the HM and the CM treatment are
summarized in Table 4.6.
Table 4.6.: Efficiency of the auction outcomes.
Treatment # efficient # total % efficient % not efficient
Computer Market 427.0 480 .89 .11
Human Market 647.5 720 .90 .10
Overall, roughly 9 out of 10 of the auctions are efficient. Broken down by CM and HM
treatment, the results show little difference. Computer opponent markets are efficient in
89% of all cases. Human opponent markets are efficient in 90% of all cases. The difference
is not significant at any conventional level (Chi-squared test, p = 0.590). It appears
that despite the fact that participants are more aroused in the HM treatment, there is
little impact on efficiency. Despite the lack of significance, this is the first investigation
that links competition with computer opponents to auction efficiency. While there does
not emerge a conclusive answer and efficiency is not the original focus of this study, the
interplay of arousal, efficiency, and market type (human opponents, computer opponents,
both types) is interesting enough to be addressed in follow-up research.
106
4.5. Discussion and Conclusions
4.5. Discussion and Conclusions
Taken as a whole, this study shows that the presence of computerized agents reduces
participants’ arousal and the effect of arousal on bidding behavior. Both electronic
market platforms and human traders should be aware of this relationship and consider
it in market design and when making economic decisions. Given that some of the world’s
most important markets contain both human and computerized agents, understanding
the interaction and impact of this interaction on bidding behavior and efficiency is not
only of academic interest. With respect to technological progress, there is reason to
believe that in the future, interaction between humans and computerized agents will
become increasingly important in business processes and also in daily life. Certainly,
NeuroIS research will contribute to a better understanding of the underlying visceral
processes and thereby support the decision making process.
When participants are bidding against humans they are generally more aroused than
when they are bidding against computer opponents. Arousal leads participants to sub-
mit lower bids, which is often interpreted as increased risk taking, but only when the
opponents are human. In computer opponent markets, there is no relationship between
arousal and bidding behavior. These results are confirmed by measuring the intensity
of emotions experienced by the participants after distinct auction events: the emotional
intensities are higher when the opponents are human.
An overarching issue in electronic markets is allocation efficiency. Despite the differences
in the emotional state of the participants in a computer versus a human opponent
market, there occurs no evidence that this leads to differences in auction efficiency. In
most experiments and in reality, participants exhibit risk averse behavior. In FBSB
auctions, participants overbid in terms of the risk-neutral rational strategy. In general,
overbidding increases the probability of winning an auction, but decreases the payoff.
Arousal, presumably due to the social competition in markets with human opponents,
leads to more risk taking, i.e. lower bids, and thus a slightly but insignificant more
efficient allocation. A commonly as detrimental considered factor here works in favor of
overall efficiency.
Most of the important markets in the world have become electronic. This is not a new
development but a necessary condition for automating bidding, negotiation, and trans-
action processes in markets. Computerized agents in these markets support humans
and allow them to focus on other value-added tasks by alleviating the attention con-
straints involved in monitoring market activity continuously. In recent years, however,
computer agents have also become competitors of human traders. While traditionally
markets have been a place where human traders came together to trade, algorithms
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now dominate trading (Hendershott et al., 2011). In this work, the interplay of bidding
environment, arousal, and actual bidding behavior in FPSB auctions was analyzed in
a controlled laboratory experiment. The subjects were facing either other human par-
ticipants or computerized bidding agents as competing bidders in the auctions. The
economic and physiological results show that bidders in the CM treatment bid lower
(H1) and are less aroused on average (H2). In addition, treatment and arousal affect
bidding behavior in another way: A higher degree of arousal (prior to submitting a bid)
is associated with lower bids (i.e., more risk) in the HM treatment (H3). This effect
is mostly mitigated in the CM treatment (H4). In other words, there is an indirect
effect of arousal on bidding behavior, which is conditional on the opponents’ type. The
auctions are equally efficient in both treatments. The emotional intensities of the imme-
diate emotions in response to different auction events (submitting a bid, intermediate
waiting screen, auction outcome) are lower in the CM treatment than they are in the
HM treatment. The analysis shows that emotional intensity depends on the bidders’
individual valuations and is particularly strong in response to winning an auction.
4.5.1. Practical Implications
From the practical perspective of electronic market platforms, the study has several
implications. First, by letting market participants interact with other humans rather
than computer agents, the platform operator is able to induce a higher degree of arousal
by highlighting the social presence and hence the perceived competition among more
or less equal participants. Analogously, the presence of computer opponents might
have a mitigating effect on the emotional intensity in the market and its impact on
the market participants’ behavior. Depending on the context, market and platform
operators are able to manipulate the degree of arousal by emphasizing or concealing the
participation of other human peers. For consumer auction platforms, where the thrill
of beating competitors is a core element of the shopping experience (Lee et al., 2009),
emphasizing the presence of other human bidders may be an important instrument to
induce arousal.
Second, the type of the opponents as well as a higher degree of arousal may induce other
behavior, which may be exploited by the platform operator. In particular, the bidders
behave more emotionally when other human bidders are involved, which is reflected in
increased risk taking when arousal is high. In this context, it is important to highlight
though, that in FPSB auctions with IPVs, taking more risk translates into lower bids
since there is no uncertainty about the valuation. In common value auctions, where the
true value of the commodity remains unknown before the end of the auction, more risk
taking might also be reflected in higher bids (Van den Bos et al., 2008). Depending on
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the particular setting, the marketer can thus manipulate the level of emotional behavior,
which is mitigated when computerized bidders are involved. The platform operator may
wish to conceal the fact that computer agents are present in order to boost arousal and
emotional behavior (e.g., avoiding the perception of superhuman behavior by adding
response latencies or other human-like behavioral patterns). Hiding or stressing the
presence of computerized or other human actors, for instance by presenting profile pic-
tures, rankings etc., can in this light be seen as an important tool of market engineering.
Also directly affecting the users’ arousal may shift economic outcomes into the desired
direction. Stressing the notion of competition, or clock speed (Adam et al., 2013) may
serve as means for that purpose.On a more general level, the results give reason to be-
lieve that the dominance of algorithmic traders and high frequency traders in financial
markets does not only affect market efficiency and liquidity per se (Hendershott et al.,
2011), but also has a direct effect on the human traders’ arousal and behavior. This
should be taken into account by regulatory authorities as well as by the human traders
and the organizations they represent.
Third, besides the considerations regarding final prices and auction profit, platform
and mechanism design are also important means of attracting and retaining customers
(Cronin et al., 2000; Deng and Poole, 2010). In general, emotional experience plays an
important role for Internet auction site sponsors as it distinguishes them from fixed-
price competitors (Ariely and Simonson, 2003; Lee et al., 2009; Möllenberg, 2004). For
bidders in consumer auctions, emotional experience can even be seen as a source of
hedonic value (Childers et al., 2001). Single design elements of websites can promote or
mitigate affective processes in the user which in turn affect their behavior and general
attitude towards the platform (Cronin et al., 2000; Deng and Poole, 2010). Menon and
Kahn (2002, p. 39) argued that online marketers can use “very pleasing, enjoyable
stimuli to encourage browsing and receptivity to impulse shopping.” In this sense, the
platform should be designed to be experienced positively, in order to create hedonic
value for the customer. Auction format is one way to induce arousal. When comparing
the results with other studies, it becomes evident that different auctions formats are
associated with different emotional intensities. Adam et al. (2013) found that in Dutch
auctions, the frustration of losing is experienced relatively stronger than the respective
joy of winning. In contrast to that, and in line with the results of Astor et al. (2013), it
is found that the joy of winning in FPSB auctions is experienced particularly strong. By
choosing a specific auction mechanism, auctioneers may thus be able to control the set of
emotions a user experiences on the platform to some extent. By choosing a FPSB auction
over a Dutch auction, for instance, the marketer might particularly seek to promote the
rewarding joy of winning and mitigate the experience of negative emotions. In addition
to Astor et al. (2013), this study shows that the bidders experience distinctive emotions
in response to other, rather mundane auction events, e.g., in response to submitting
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their bid, and even more so if human bidders are present. Ku (2008, p. 14) argued that,
if bidding itself is arousing, this can “feed a vicious cycle of bidding and overbidding.”
Thus, in dynamic auctions, such emotions may eventually promote higher payoffs for
the auctioneer. E-bay, for instance, is practicing this by alerting bidders immediately
via email when another bidder has outbid them.
Finally, from the perspective of market participants, the results show that their behavior
is affected by arousal. There is reason to believe, that market participants can benefit
from an awareness and active consideration of this relationship. Since arousal may be
measured early enough before bid submission, it may well be that providing market
participants with real-time biofeedback helps them to re-evaluate their decisions (e.g.,
buy or sell orders, acceptance or rejection of an offer) before making irreversible decisions
with undesired consequences for themselves and the organizations they represent. To this
end, professional traders and investors have started to use serious games with biofeedback
in order to train their emotion regulation capabilities (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2010,
2012; Jercic et al., 2012). In this sense, IS design science, and particularly the field of
NeuroIS, can provide the methods and tools that help market participants to regulate
their emotions during trading in order to make better decisions (Vom Brocke et al.,
2013).
4.5.2. Theoretical Implications
One theoretical contribution of this study is the disentangling of competitive arousal
and risk taking in auctions with human and computerized bidders. Briefly, humans
experience more arousal and systematically bid higher when facing human opponents.
Theoretically, this suggests that human behavior is less driven by emotional factors
when computerized opponents are involved, which is consistent with previous results on
bargaining (van ’t Wout et al., 2006). Arousal and its impact on bids may be higher
when bidding against human opponents. This is due to the socially competitive nature
of auctions (if A wins, B loses, and vice versa) (Ku et al., 2005; Adam et al., 2011), i.e.
when one wins the social competition, rather than merely gaining a material surplus.
However, more arousal—due to the IPV setting—is associated with lower bids. Yet this
is only observed in the HM treatment. Thus, as outlined in the research model, market
environment and arousal interact, where automated counterparties seem to mitigate
personal arousal per se, as well as the effect of arousal on bidding behavior. On average,
bidding behavior is nearly identical for both treatments when arousal is not controlled
for, which also explains the fact that efficiency is not significantly impacted in this
particular setting. In accordance with the literature and the nature of the auction, it
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may be concluded that the link between arousal and economic behavior is the willingness
to bear risk (Ku et al., 2005; Maule, 2000; Adam et al., 2013).
In this Chapter, it was shown that the intensities of immediate emotions in response
to the auction outcome and to other events during the auction process are consistently
stronger in the HM environment. The picture is more complex, however, with respect
to the impact of the IPV. In general, the joy of winning an auction seems to be stronger
than the frustration of losing for most IPV classes, but is reversed for the highest value
classes. This provides support for the theories based on “equating the reference point
with expectations rather than the status quo” (Kőszegi and Rabin, 2006, p. 1135).
Based on their individual IPV, the bidders form expectations about the auction outcome.
Winning a bid for a low valuation is unlikely and thus surprisingly positive. Similarly,
the frustration of losing is undoubtedly stronger if the own IPV, and thus the chances
of winning, were comparatively high ex ante. This notion is confirmed. The frustration
of not winning even exceeds the joy of winning for the higher value class slightly. In the
regression analysis, this effect is accounted for using the interaction term value class ×
dummy winner (see Table 4.2). The effect is significant and negative, which reflects the
stronger impact of losing a high IPV auction. In this regard, the results are contrary
to the assumption of previous research. Van den Bos et al. (2008, p. 488) argued
that “winning and losing affect utility independent of the monetary consequences of an
auction.” This present results show, however, that higher nominal payoffs yield stronger
emotional responses. In particular for the highest values, the frustration of losing can
be stronger than the joy of winning, whereas the latter is usually assumed to be the
dominating emotion.
Also the emotions elicited in response to submitting a bid and waiting for the auction
outcome are experienced more intensely in the HM treatment and are positively corre-
lated with the individual IPV. In both events, however, the bidder does not receive new
information. Theoretically, this implies that in those moments the bidders experience
immediate emotions in response to thinking about past or future events (Bechara and
Damasio, 2005). The immediate emotion in response to placing a bid may, for instance,
stem from experiencing a fear of losing, or, putting it in a positive way, a desire to win the
auction, which is more intense for high IPV. In any case, the bidders already experience
emotions during the auction process even though their information set is not updated in
the sense of classical auction theory (Krishna, 2002). This provides a physiological indi-
cation for the existence and the intensities of these emotions and yields further insight
into the underlying visceral processes of humans interacting with electronic market web-
sites and other information systems. Even seemingly irrelevant information events may
trigger affective processes in the user. Such processes may have important ramifications
on website perception and success (Cronin et al., 2000; Deng and Poole, 2010).
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4.5.3. Limitations and Future Work
There are several limitations to this study. First, and most importantly, the experiment
focuses on FPSB auctions, “leaving no opportunity for competitive fire to escalate with
the progression of the auction” (Van den Bos et al., 2008, p. 484). The differences
in arousal already exist in a static, almost clinical environment, in which bidders are
isolated from each other by the use of dividing blinds and earmuffs and only interact
very indirectly by exchanging sealed bids. It would thus be interesting to investigate and
contrast the differences of physiological arousal and bidding behavior in more dynamic
auctions, e.g., Japanese, Dutch, or Dollar auctions (Murnighan, 2002). In particular,
the analysis indicated a marginally significant impact of heart rate variability (LFHF
ratio) on arousal, but not on bids. Since emotion regulation may be more important in
dynamic environments (such as stock trading (Fenton-O’Creevy et al., 2012)), it would
be interesting to investigate the affective processes of subjects with different emotion
regulation capacities in such settings (comprising time pressure, social facilitation and
the like). Moreover, in FPSB auctions, the bidders submit single bids. Future research
may therefore also take physiological responses to repeated bidding in the same auction
into account. Finally, with the increasing share of automated trading in stock market
activity in general, applying this experimental approach to continuous double auctions
could yield some promising findings for financial markets.
Another limitation is also related to the type of auction analyzed. Despite the differences
in the emotional state of the participants in a computer versus a human opponent
market, there is no evidence that this leads to differences in auction efficiency. The HM
treatment, which induces greater levels of arousal, seems to be slightly more efficient.
However, the difference in efficiency is not significant. This does not mean that there
may not exist a systematic difference between human and computer markets with respect
to efficiency. It appears promising to apply a treatment differentiation like the present
one to more dynamic auction mechanisms, e.g., English or Dutch auctions, where the
presence of the other participants is stressed more saliently than in FPSB auctions. The
potential impact of arousal might then be stronger since these auction formats leave
more room for impulsive decision making. In this context, previous research argued that
bidders are more susceptible to the phenomenon of auction fever in dynamic auctions
than they are in static auctions (Ockenfels et al., 2006).
The results of this study also give rise to a number of further research questions. In par-
ticular, future research may also consider increasing the degree of visibility between the
bidders by displaying names, profiles, or photos of the other participants (Van den Bos
et al., 2008). This increased level of social facilitation may also fuel competitive arousal
(Malhotra and Bazerman, 2008). In addition, the bidders may experience emotions of
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regret and relief if they get information on the bids of the other and it seems worthwhile
to analyze the interpersonal effects of winner and loser regret (Filiz-Ozbay and Ozbay,
2007; Engelbrecht-Wiggans and Katok, 2008). As computer agents become increasingly
part of our everyday lives, there is reason to believe that the emotional and behavioral
implications of human/ agent interaction are an important area of IS research. In this
regard, it seems promising to vary the appearance and other characteristics of the com-
puterized agents (Nunamaker et al., 2011; Riedl et al., 2011). The questions whether
humans behave differently when facing different types of opponents, or whether the
agents’ type and speed matters come to mind in this context. In this setting, there is no
dynamic interaction between human and computerized bidding; the bids are submitted
and ultimately the result of the auction is revealed. In this regard, competition between
humans and computer agents is auspicious, since the respective abilities in the different
involved domains, such as rationality, speed, predictability, intuition, or knowledge are
fundamentally different.
Given that some of the world’s most important markets contain both human and com-
puterized agents, understanding the interaction and impact of this interaction on bid-
ding behavior and efficiency is not only of academic interest. In regard of technological
progress, there is reason to believe that in the future, interaction between humans and
computerized agents will become increasingly important in business processes and also
in daily life. With these agents becoming more intelligent and natural in terms of deci-
sion making and “behavior,” this will put humans into afore unknown situations. Should
you act more or less fair, or polite towards computer agents? Fogg and Nass (1997), for
instance, actually found indications of politeness and gratefulness towards computers.
This study represents a step towards understanding the cognitive and emotional pro-
cesses of humans when interacting with other humans and computer agents in economic
settings. NeuroIS research and tools will contribute to a better understanding of the




Risky Decisions among Friends and
Strangers
“If friends make gifts, gifts make friends.”
(Sahlins (1972))
Economic decisions are typically not made in isolation. Being part of a socio-economic
environment, managers, for instance inevitably compare their decisions with those of oth-
ers: friends, co-workers—possibly collaborators—or competitors for the next promotion.
But the relationship type between decision makers, when distributional preferences are
expressed, is typically not considered in the literature. It is typically not even identified
as a potentially relevant factor. However, as it is shown in this chapter, other-regarding
preferences depend on the actual other.
Consider for instance, two department managers facing the choice between a high-risk
project A and a low-risk project B. If a manager successfully completes any of those
projects, this success comes along with an increase in prestige, maybe a promotion.
On the other hand, even if project B is completed successfully, the manager might feel
inferior to the other who succeeded in the high-risk project A. Such considerations could
ultimately affect, possibly impair the decisions. Trautmann and Vieider (2011) provided
an illustrative example of how relationships may affect the preferences and decisions
of individuals. The authors described a situation of two brothers in law. One of the
brothers faces the choice between a rather safe job with a sure annual income of e 50K
and a career as a writer with a risky income between e 40 and e 65K per year. His
decision might very well depend on the financial situation of his brother in law, being
an employee with an annual income of either e 48K or e 52K. This example describes
the case of an implicit social linkage between the persons.
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This Chapter hence considers a decision situation involving risk and the presence of a
peer—either a “friend” or a “stranger.” First, in order to assess the subjects’ actual
behavior, an experimental study is conducted. In this experiment, two individuals at
a time participate in a two-stage game, which is presented very much in the style of a
standard roulette game as it is known from casinos. In the first stage, each participant
picks one of several lotteries of different riskiness individually. In the second stage, the
players pick a lottery again, whereas now, the respective other’s prior choice is visibly
displayed on the game board. From a purely microeconomic perspective, there is no
strategic interaction in this game. The players, however, may anticipate feelings of envy,
gloating, and sympathy towards the other player when taking their decisions. In this
sense, the players face a choice between different levels of risk and have to choose on
how tightly they want to couple their economic fate to that of a friend or a stranger.
Second, by formally analyzing the decision problem for the first- and the second mover,
a rationale for the empirical findings is provided. The best responses and the existence
of multiple equilibria are carved out by particularly modeling the emotional motives
of envy and gloating, emanating from the prevalent Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model.
This approach is then compared to existing models of other-regarding preferences from
the literature, by deriving the model parameters and measures of fit using maximum-
likelihood estimation.
The results indicate that the behavior among friends differs significantly from that among
strangers. Consolidating other-regarding preferences and risk preferences thus appears
valid from empirical and anecdotal evidence. Combined formal models of other-regarding
preferences and risk, in this regard, represent a consequential step. It can be argued that
such models—like, apart from that, any model of other-regarding preferences—may ben-
efit from taking into account the relationship between the decision makers. Market
engineering, when designing incentive and payoff schemes, composing teams, or schedul-
ing project decisions may also benefit from considering this notion. In the context of
e-commerce applications with peer-to-peer interaction, IS design may consider relation-
ship types when addressing questions like whether or not to include social network data,
in which form to allow users to present themselves, what and how to anonymize, or
whether to restrict communication at the outset. This chapter thus attempts to make
a contribution towards understanding the interplay of risk preference and the social
reference from both an empirical and a theoretical point of view.
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Figure 5.1.: Game board as presented to players in the first stage.
5.1. The 2-Person Risk Game
In order to investigate how relationship types shape preferences under risk, a roulette-
like game is proposed, in which each player decides on how tightly to couple their own
economic fate to that of another player: the 2-person risk game. The game comprises
two stages. In the first stage of the game, each player individually faces the task to
choose between two risky prospects, without knowing the other player’s (simultaneous)
choice.
• The low-risk option L pays e 2.00 with a probability of 50% and e 0.00 otherwise.
• The high-risk option H pays e 4.00 with a probability of 25% and e 0.00 otherwise.
Both prospects thus entail an expected monetary payoff of e 1.00. Prospect L, however,
entails a smaller variance than H (σ2L = 1 < 3 = σ2H). The different prospects are
presented to each player individually in the form of a six field game board as depicted in
Figure 5.1. Each player picks one of the six boxes {1, 2, 3, 4, 1&2, 3&4}, where the four
boxes on the right hand side represent the high-risk prospect H and are equivalent. The
two boxes on the left hand side, in contrast, represent the low-risk prospects L: these
options 1&2 and 3&4 yield a payoff when either a “1” or “2” (“3” or “4”, respectively) is
rolled. A graphical representation with resemblance of a roulette board is used in order
to make the decision task as clear as possible to the participants. The L-boxes can thus
be seen as the color bets on a roulette table, which pay for either black or red.
In the second stage of the game, the game boards are exchanged and both players are
asked to pick one of the different prospects again. Now, however, the other player’s
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Figure 5.2.: Schematic process of the 2-person risk game.
(prior) choice is visibly displayed on the board. Hence, after the second stage, both
players have made an individual first choice on an empty game board as well as a
second choice, at which there existed a social reference point in form of the other player’s
selection on the game board. Subsequently, one of the boards is randomly selected with
equal probabilities (50%) to be the relevant board for payoff determination. This means
that only one of each player’s choices is relevant for payoff. It is always the combination
of one player’s first choice with the second choice of the other player. Like in a roulette
game, the actual number is now determined by chance. This is implemented using a fair
four-sided die. The payoffs for both players are determined by this single dice roll. The
entire process is schematically depicted in Figure 5.2.
Note that player A’s payoff is independent of player B’s choice, and vice versa. The
payoffs of player A and B, however, are coupled since they are determined by the very
same dice roll. Picking the same box as the other player will result in identical payoffs
for both players in any case. This action is referred to as perfect duplication. Chances
can be de-coupled in the same manner. Note that, even if a player picks a different level
of risk, it is still possible to either couple or de-couple the payoffs partially. Consider, for
instance, the case in which player A picks one of the two rows (low-risk) and player B
picks one of the pertained single boxes. This case is referred to as partial duplication. In
the following, both perfect and partial alignment of chances is addressed with the notion
duplicate (dup), and the term diverge (div) is used otherwise. There are four discrete
strategies in response to each observable first mover’s action H or L, resulting from the
two binary dimensions of choice (level of risk and duplication). In order to capture this,
the following notation from the second mover’s perspective is used. If a low-risk choice
L is observed and the response is a high-risk choice H on the other row (diverge), the
resulting situation is denoted by LHdiv, i.e. the first character represents the observed
(prior) choice (L or H), the second character represent the second mover’s (own) choice.
The superscripts dup and div denote whether the chances are aligned or not. Thus,
when faced with a high-risk choice, the second mover decides among the alternatives
HHdup, HHdiv, HLdup, and HLdiv. Accordingly, when facing a low-risk choice, the
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Figure 5.3.: Possible combinations of first and second players’ choices.
second mover decides among the alternatives LHdup, LHdiv, LLdup, and LLdiv. Figure
5.3 presents all possible combinations of both players’ choices—in disregard of effectively
equivalent combinations.
Moreover, Table 5.1 shows a full representation of the possible outcome constellations of
the 2-person risk game. The first mover selects either high-risk (left 4 columns) or low-
risk (right columns). Without loss of generality, number “1” is chosen as representative
for a high-risk first move, and row “1&2” is chosen as representative for a low-risk first
move. The second mover then selects one of the four strategies Hdup, Hdiv, Ldup, and
Ldiv. The outcomes for every die roll (“1” through “4”) are depicted in the form (first
mover, second mover).
Table 5.1.: Schematic overview of possible payoff constellations (EUR).
high-risk (“1”) low-risk (“1&2”)
“1” “2” “3” “4” “1” “2” “3” “4”
Hdup (“1”) (4, 4) (0, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 4) (2, 0) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Hdiv (“3”) (4, 0) (0, 0) (0, 4) (0, 0) (2, 0) (2, 0) (0, 4) (0, 0)
Ldup (“1&2”) (4, 2) (0, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0) (2, 2) (2, 2) (0, 0) (0, 0)
Ldiv (“3&4”) (4, 0) (0, 0) (0, 2) (0, 2) (2, 0) (2, 0) (0, 2) (0, 2)
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Figure 5.4.: Participant interacting with the experiment tablet computer.
5.2. Experimental Design
Subjects were approached on campus and either knew each other prior to the experi-
ment (friends treatment), or were randomly matched strangers (strangers treatment).
Altogether, 244 pairs participated in the experiment. There was no show up fee, and
the participants did not put any money at risk. Before the actual experiment started,
the rules and procedure were explained to the participants using a three minute video
tutorial, which they watched simultaneously on the same screen, wearing headphones
connected to the computer with a y-split cable. This way, it was ensured that both
participants knew that the respective other was provided with the very same (common)
information and that also this fact was commonly known. Communication between
participants was not allowed. The element of chance was implemented using a fair four-
sided die, which was presented to the subjects prior to the experiment. All decisions
were made in the light of actual monetary payoffs: subjects could earn up to e 7.851
in the experiment. The experiment was one-shot, i.e. every subject participated only
once. Effects due to learning or weariness could thus be excluded. If no questions on
experiment, procedure, rules, and payoffs remained, the actual experiment (2-person
risk game) was started.
After completing the actual experiment, but before determining the payoffs, the partic-
ipants filled out a short questionnaire, asking for gender, age, field of study, and type of
the relation to the other person. Moreover, the participants were asked for the under-
lying emotional motives of their decision in form of statements to which they expressed
1This number comprises the maximum payoff of e 4.00 from the actual experiment and the maxi-
mum payoff of e 3.85 from the risk aversion task.
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their (dis)agreement on a five-point Likert scale. These statements asked for participants
underlying intentions (envy, gloating, sympathy). Additionally, participants were asked
whether they anticipated to share the payoffs among each other after the experiment.
• “I tried to avoid ending up with a lower payoff than the other participant.”
• “I tried to enforce ending up with a higher payoff than the other participant.”
• “I tried to optimize the possible payoff constellations for the other participant and
me as a whole.”
• “I expect the other participant and me to share payoffs after the experiment.”
These questions were identical in both treatments. Finally, all participants filled out a
5-question version of the Holt and Laury risk aversion test with real payoffs (ranging
from e 0.00 to e 3.85), as it is presented in Chapter 3. The experiment was conducted
on the campus of the Karlsruhe Institute of Technology (KIT) in December 2011 and
January 2012. All user interfaces were web-based and accessed by the participants using
tablet computers (iPad). Figure 5.4 shows a photograph of the participants’ interaction
with the game board on the experiment computer.
All subjects indicated what type of relationship they had towards the other person, by
choosing one of the options friend, acquaintance, stranger, couple, family, or other. This
data is summarized in Table 5.2. Note that in every cell, the number of couples of the
particular combination is listed, i.e. the total sum is 244, corresponding to 244×2 = 488
individuals. Apparently, in most of the cases, both subjects denoted the relationship
towards each other with the same term (216 out of 244 cases, 88.5%). The boundaries
on campus between friends, fellow students, rather distant acquaintances, etc. may
not be drawn as easily as in other contexts. For the sake of manageability, a binary
classification into “existing substantial relation” and “no existing substantial relation” is
used. The first group contains friends and couples, since between peers of this designation
there arguable exist considerable social ties (→ friends treatment). The second group
hence contains acquaintances and strangers (→ strangers treatment). Naturally, one
might be interested in the specific differences between friends, acquaintances, couples,
and strangers on a more detailed level. Given the small number of observations in the
groups of couples and acquaintances, treating these as independent groups, however,
cannot be expected to yield meaningful or resilient results. Note that the classification
into one or the other treatment applies on an individual basis: Either subject of a pair
is classified according to what he or she stated about the relationship towards the other,
i.e., whether he or she considers the other a friend, acquaintance, or stranger. Hence, in
some cases, the two individuals of a pair are assigned to different treatments.2
22 pairs with friend/ stranger classification, 16 pairs with friend/ acquaintance classification.
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(b) Two-dimensional distribution of age constella-
tions.
Figure 5.5.: General age distribution and two-dimensional distribution of age
constellations.
The pairs of two were either male only (118), female only (55), or mixed (71). Average
absolute age difference among the pairs was 1.60 years with a standard deviation of 1.70
years, yielding a correlation (Pearson’s r) of r = 0.520 (p < .001).3 The overall distribu-
tion of participants’ age and the two-dimensional distribution of age constellations are
depicted in Figures 5.5(a) and 5.5(b).
Of the 244×2 = 488 participants, 480 are either in the friends treatment (314) or in the
stranger treatment (166). The remaining 8 participants are discarded from the dataset,
since, by choosing “family” or “other,” they are assumed to exhibit outright different
preferences in terms of monetary distributions or are not relatable to any group in a
reasonable way. For these pairs it is indicated in Table 5.2 whether one (d1) or both
(d2) of the individuals are discarded. Thus, there remain 480 participants, of which 302
are male and 178 are female. Mean age is 22.00 years with a standard deviation of 2.38
years.
3When differentiating for treatment type, the friend/friend pairs’ age is correlated with rf/f =
0.702, (p < 0.001, n = 134 + 4 + 9 = 147), whereas the stranger/stranger pairs’ age is correlated with
rs/s = 0.204, (p = 0.083, n = 61 + 2 + 10 = 73).
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Table 5.2.: Distribution of paired relationship designation.
stranger acquaintance friend couple family other
stranger 61
acquaintance 2 10
friend 2 16 134
couple 4 9
family 1d1 1d2
other 1d1 1d1 1d1 1d2
5.3. Empirical Results
This section elaborates on the empirical results of the 2-person risk game experiment.
As stated in the prior section, there were 480 observations in total, partitioned into 314
observations in the friends treatment and 166 observations in the strangers treatment.
In line with the general research questions of this work, the following aspects are of
particularly interest:
• treatment effects: Does the friends’ behavior systematically differ to that of
strangers? If so, how?
• risk preferences: Which levels of risk are selected in the first and in the second
stage of the game? Which factors are explanatory? Which factors are explanatory
for subjects changing their selected level of risk from the first to the second stage?
• choice coupling/ decoupling: Which strategy is chosen in the second stage? Which
factors are explanatory?
• emotional motives: How do the emotional motives of envy and gloating affect the
aforementioned characteristics?
First, the general behavioral data is analyzed. Second, a correlation analysis exposes
the most direct coherencies of behavior (risk selection in the first and second stage, risk
changing, alignment) and explanatory factors (e.g., age, gender, treatment, emotional
motives, observed behavior, etc.). This approach is also applied to the sub-datasets
for both treatments separately, in order to obtain an idea of how these factors and the
relationship type interact. Third, the key binary decision variables are explained by
regular logit regressions, for the entire dataset as well as for the subsets separately.
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5.3.1. Behavioral Data
The general behavior shall be addressed first. In the first stage, there are only two
alternatives (high-risk H and low-risk L). Given this other player’s first move, there are
four alternatives in the second stage. Table 5.3 presents the particular fractions for both
stages and treatments.
Table 5.3.: Fractions of observed behavior in first and second stage; disaggregated for
friends and strangers treatment (H: high-risk, L: low-risk).
stage 1 stage 2
H L H Hdiv Hdup L Ldiv Ldup
friends 0.532 0.468 0.408 0.303 0.105 0.592 0.449 0.143
strangers 0.518 0.482 0.518 0.404 0.114 0.482 0.259 0.223
all 0.527 0.473 0.446 0.338 0.108 0.554 0.383 0.171
The overall rate of high-risk choices in the first stage was 52.7%, and 44.6% in the
second stage. The percentages of high-risk decisions for the first and second stages for the
different treatment conditions are depicted in Figure 5.6(a)4. In both treatments roughly
half of the participants picked the high-risk prospect H in the first stage (friends: 53.2%,
strangers: 51.8%). A test5 for comparing the proportions confirms that this difference
is statistically not significant (two-samples z-test for proportions, z = 0.288, p = 0.774,
two-tailed6). This picture changes, however, in the second stage. While the overall share
of strangers picking the high-risk prospect remains constant (51.8% in the first stage and
also 51.8% in the second stage), the share of participants picking the high-risk prospect
in the friends treatment decreases from 53.2% to 40.8%. The difference between these
proportions is statistically significant (z = −2.315, p = 0.021). In other words, there
is a systematic shift in the friends treatment towards taking the low-risk prospect in
the second stage. The constant overall level of risk in the strangers treatment, however,
does not imply a lower switching rate compared to the friends treatment. This effect
is considered in more detail in the next paragraph. Thus, there exists an interaction
effect of treatment and risk level for the different stages of the game. The key difference
4Confidence intervals p̂ ± z
√
p̂(1− p̂)/n, where z = 1.96, distribution of error approximating as
normal.
5In order to compare proportions of different samples, a two-samples z-test for proportions may
be used. The test statistic z is computed using the respective sample sizes n1 and n2, as well as the
number of observations showing the characteristic of interest (x1 and x2). The test statistic then is
z = (p1 − p2)/
√
p̂(1− p̂)(1/n1 + 1/n2), where p̂ = (x1 + x2)/(n1 + n2) denotes the pooled estimate of
the overall proportion, and p1 = x1/n1 and p2 = x2/n2 the corresponding individual proportions.
6In the following, all z- and p-values refer to two-tailed two-samples z-tests for proportions. This
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Figure 5.6.: Risk level, risk changing, and coupling/ decoupling behavior.
between the treatment groups here is the reaction to the presence of the peer’s choice.
Where the strangers’ overall risk attitude is not affected, it is so in the friends treatment,
namely towards a higher degree of risk aversion. Note that the relationship type was
the only variation between the treatments.
Result 1: Friends and strangers choose about the same fractions of low- and
high-risk in the individual step of the game (roughly 50% in both groups).
When confronted with the peer’s choice, friends choose low-risk significantly
more often (∼ 60%), whereas the ratio remains constant for strangers.
Second, after looking at the grand total of risk propensity among the treatment groups,
it is now regarded, whether subjects individually altered their preferred level of risk from
the first stage to the second, and if so, towards which direction. Altogether 29.8% of
the participants changed their level of risk from the first to the second stage. In fact,
strangers tended to deviate from their initially preferred level of risk more often than
friends (33.7% versus 27.7%, z = −1.373, p = 0.170). This figure, however, summarizes
the deviation from low- to high-risk as well as the opposite direction. The risk-level
changes in the strangers treatment equalize out in sum, so that the overall level of
risk is unaffected. This behavior may be disentagled as follows. Roughly one out of
three subjects in the strangers treatment changed the risk level from the first stage to
the second, see Table 5.4. Figure 5.6(b) clearly shows that in the friends treatment,
in contrast to that, a markedly lower proportion of 16.3% of all initial low-risk takers
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Table 5.4.: Proportions of subjects choosing the different prospects; specific and overall
switching rates for both treatments.
friends strangers
low-risk high-risk low-risk high-risk
proportion (stage 1) 0.468 0.532 0.482 0.518
of those switch 0.163 0.377 0.350 0.326
overall switch (per treatment) 0.277 0.337
overall switch (all) 0.298
switches to high-risk, whereas the fraction of initial high-risk takers changing to low-
risk is 37.7%.7 Thus, the decisive characteristic for the overall risk reduction in the
friends treatment is not so much changing towards, but rather staying with one’s low-
risk choice.
Result 2: Overall, friends and strangers seem to change their level of risk
between first and second stage to an equal extend. Friends, however, saliently
stay with an initially made low-risk choice.
Third, the degree of alignment between the payoffs is regarded, that is, how often and
to which extend subjects chose to duplicate their peer’s choice. The overall rate of
duplication is 27.9%. The overall rate of perfect duplication is 9.0%. The percentages of
perfect and partial duplication for the different treatments are depicted in Figure 5.6(c).
With respect to payoff alignment, 15.7% of all strangers chose to perfectly duplicate
the other player’s choice in the second stage. This is close to the natural benchmark
of 1/6 (since there a six boxes on the game board), which would be observed if all
choices were made completely randomly. In contrast, only 5.4% of all subjects in the
friends treatment perfectly duplicated the other player’s choice. The difference in those
proportions is significant (z = −3.740, p < 0.001). This result is robust towards the
more general definition of duplication, including perfect and partial payoff alignment.
Here, friends duplicated significantly less often (24.8%) compared to strangers (33.7%)
(z = −2.066, p = 0.039).
Result 3: Strangers duplicate their peer’s choice more often than friends.
This holds for partial as well as for perfect duplication.
7The fraction of friends changing from low-risk to high-risk is significantly smaller than the fraction
of friends changing from high-risk to low-risk (z = −4.227, p < 0.001). The fraction of friends changing
from low-risk to high-risk is also significantly smaller than the fraction of strangers changing away from
low-risk to high-risk (z = −3.198, p = 0.001).
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Naturally, Result 3 may be framed in the sense that friends tend to diverge more often
compared to strangers. All numbers from above are summarized in Table 5.5.
After pointing out the most intriguing results, the next sections will take a broader
perspective. As it turns out, there may be found several pertinent interrelations in the
data. The first step to address these coherences as thorough as possible is a (linear)
correlations analysis. Note that not every significant correlation can be worked out as
distinguished result as it was done above. The results from above are naturally contained
in this analysis. Secondly, a series of logit regressions complements the analysis for the
most relevant binary attributes (high-risk/ low-risk, duplicate/ diverge, change/ stay).
Table 5.5.: Frequencies of observed behavior. p-values reported for a two-tailed two-
samples z-test for proportions, comparing friends and strangers.
overall friends strangers p-value
high-risk (stage 1) .527 .532 .518 .774
high-risk (stage 2) .446 .408 .518 .021
switch .298 .277 .337 .170
duplication .279 .248 .337 .039
perfect duplication .090 .054 .157 <.001
5.3.2. Correlation Analysis
A correlation analysis is conducted in order to reveal the most direct coherencies in
the data. The included variables and their abbreviations used in the correlation table,
are: dummy variable for the friends treatment (F), high-risk choice in the first stage
(HR1), high-risk choice in the second stage (HR2), risk changing from first to second
stage (CHNG), perfect duplication (PRFCT), partial duplication (PRTL), an observed
high-risk choice (HR(obs.)), staying with the exact same choice8 (STAY), and observing
a different risk level than the own one (DIF). Additionally, there are series of motives
that were each interrogated in the post-experimental questionnaire on a five-point Likert
scale: the motive of envy (ENVY), the motive of gloating (GLTG), the motive of sym-
pathy (SMPY), as well as the intention to share gains with other participant (SHRG).
Additional variables regarding individual personal aspects are: number of risky choices
in the 5-question Holt and Laury test (#RC), the participants’ age (AGE), and finally
the participants gender (GND, male=0, female=1). All 12(16
2 − 16) = 120 Pearson
correlation coefficients are displayed in Table 5.6, p-values in parentheses (two-tailed).
8i.e. not only staying with the same level of risk, which is reflected in the variable CHNG, but also
choosing the exact same box on the game board (e.g., “1”) in both choices.
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Significant correlations (p < 0.05) are highlighted in bold face type. In the following,
selected correlations are described in more detail.
Friends vs. Strangers. Friends choose the high-risk option in the second stage of the
game significantly less often than strangers, whereas this difference is not observable for
the first stage of the 2-person risk game. Also do friends duplicate (both partially and
perfectly) less often than strangers. Moreover, friends express higher agreement to the
motives of sympathy (regarding both participants’ payoffs as relevant and thus subject
to optimization) and are more likely to assume that payoffs will be shared ex post.
Risk Preference. With regard to the participants’ choices, the first and second stage
risk levels are distinctly correlated (r = 0.413, p < 0.001). Moreover, the number of
risky choices in the 5-question Holt and Laury risk aversion test is positively correlated
with both these measures. This correlation is stronger for the first stage of the game.
On the one hand, the emotional motives of envy and sympathy are associated with a
tendency to choosing the low-risk option in both stages. The motive of gloating, on the
other hand, is associated with a tendency to the high-risk option in both stages. The
assumption of sharing the payoffs yields a tendency to the low-risk option, significantly
so, however, only in the second stage of the game.
The general risk attitude among the treatment groups is not significantly different. The
number of risky choices in the risk aversion task (cf. Chapter 3) may be used as a measure
for this purpose. Friends make 2.475 (out of 5) risky choices on average, strangers
make 2.488 risky choices on average. An independent samples t-test confirms that the
hypotheses “the distribution means are equal” cannot be rejected (T = 0.100, p = 0.920,
equal variances assumed F = 0.039, p = 0.843). In view of the large sample sizes (314
and 166, respectively), and the p-value of 92.0%, it is indeed very likey that the inherent
risk preferences are actually similar among friends and strangers.9
Risk Changing. There is a general tendency in switching from the high-risk towards
the low-risk option: a high-risk choice in the first stage is associated with a higher, a
high risk-choice in the second stage with a lower probability of changing the level of
risk. Interestingly, the motives of envy and gloating are both associated with a higher
probability of switching, i.e. seem to rationalize this behavior to some degree.
9Since the distributions of the number of risky choices cannot be considered normal, a non-
parametric Mann-Whitney-U-Test is used to confirm the results of the t-test. Again, the hypothesis
that the distributions of risky choices are equal between the treatments friends and strangers, cannot
be rejected (p = 0.781).
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Ex ante Payoff Coupling and Decoupling. When being faced with the other par-
ticipant’s choice, friends tend to diverge from this particular box or row. With other
words, strangers are more likely to duplicate. This holds for both perfect and partial
duplication. What is striking the eye is that the tendency to stay with one’s own choice
from the first stage is associated with a higher tendency to duplicate the other par-
ticipant’s choice. In other words, moving away from one’s own choice yields a higher
probability of diverging from the other’s choice. It is hard to say whether one is causal
for the other, since the decision about both aspects is made implicitly at the same time.
Eventually, the motive of sympathy and the assumption of sharing are associated with
a lower probability of duplicating.
Emotional Motives. The motives of envy and gloating are positively, but rather
weakly correlated (r = 0.158, p = 0.001). Envy is also positively correlated with sym-
pathy, which occurs quite unintuitive (r = 0.201, p < 0.001). Gloating is negatively
correlated with the assumption of sharing the payoffs (r = −0.107, p = 0.019). Finally,
the strongest coherence here is found between the motive of sympathy and sharing
(r = 0.507, p < 0.001).
Other Factors. The demographic characteristics gender and age are mostly uncorre-
lated with the aforementioned factors. Older participants are less likely to name gloating
as a relevant motive. Male participants tend to stay with their (exact) first choice more
often. The high-risk option is chosen more frequently if the other participant is female,
i.e. participants show riskier behavior towards women, regardless of their own gender.
5.3.3. Logit Regressions
In order to assess the joint impact of an array of explanatory variables on the behavioral
characteristics, a set of regular logit regressions is conducted. The dependent variables
in the analysis are:
(i) whether in the first (individual) stage, the high-risk option was chosen,
(ii) whether in the second stage the high-risk prospect was chosen,
(iii) whether the other player’s choice was duplicated, and
(iv) whether the level of risk was changed from the first to the second choice.
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Note that these variables are subject to being explained, but, if reasonable, also used
as explanatory factors. Finally, the values envy and gloating, which were measured on
a five point Likert scale in order to create a link between the expressed intention and
actual behavior, are used as explanatory variables. The results of these 4 regular logit
regressions are summarized in Table 5.7.
Table 5.7.: Logit regression coefficients and significance levels. Dependent variables are
(i) level of risk (1st stage), (ii) level of risk (2nd stage), (iii) duplication, and
(iv) risk change from first to second stage. Method: enter. ε = 0.001.
(i) risk (1) (ii) risk (2) (iii) duplicate (iv) change
coef. p coef. p coef. p coef. p
high-risk (1) — — 1.714 < ε .609 .042 1.098 < ε
high-risk (2) — — — — -.850 .004 -.971 < ε
duplicate — — -.693 .005 — — -.643 .010
risk change — — -.950 < ε -.812 .006 — —
friends .066 .752 -.758 .001 -.559 .010 -.519 .021
envy -.606 < ε -.368 < ε -.040 .652 .224 .014
gloating .606 < ε .301 .001 .030 .727 .180 .037
constant .113 .589 -.099 .715 -.328 .212 -1.134 < ε
Observations 480 480 480 480
Nagelkerke R2 .222 .334 .056 .143
Hosmer-Lemeshow p .928 <.001 .885 <.001
0-hitrate .527 .554 .721 .702
hitrate .642 .806 .721 .810
The logit regression analysis confirms that, first, both treatment groups (friends and
strangers) tend to choose about the same level of risk on average in the first (individual)
stage of the game, and that the share of risk seeking behavior drops significantly among
friends in the second stage. In contrast to that, it remains constant among strangers.
Also, the results indicate that the stated motives of envy and gloating seem to affect risk
taking. The motive of envy has a significant negative impact on risk taking behavior,
the motive of gloating, in contrast, has a significant positive impact. In addition to that,
it is found that the actions duplication and risk level changing are associated with less
risky choices in the second stage. Thus, when choosing to duplicate, subjects rather
tend to use a low-risk duplication strategy. Also, subjects switched from a high-risk to
a low-risk choice more often than contrariwise.
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Second, looking at choice alignment, the effect indicated in Figure 5.6(c) is confirmed
when controlling for the other factors mentioned before. Friends are more likely to
diverge from the observed choice, i.e. choosing a different box or a different row more
often. Quite unexpectedly, however, the expressed emotional motives envy and gloating
do not have a significant impact on choice alignment, which will be gotten back to in the
discussion. Furthermore, diverging is more likely to occur for high-risk choices in the
second stage, which seems plausible since there exist simply more combinations to diverge
(namely 3) than to duplicate (namely 1) for high-risk/ high-risk. More interestingly, risk
changing comes along with significantly less duplicating, i.e. more diverging behavior.
Note that risk changing also induces less risky choices as shown in (ii), which should
have a positive impact on duplication per se. This strengthens the thought that the
level of risk is deliberately changed in order to make a low-risk diverging response to the
other player’s first move.
Finally, whether or not the level of risk (high or low) is changed from the first to the
second stage is affected by the entire set of explanatory variables. A high-risk choice
in the first stage makes a change to low-risk more likely. Likewise does a low-risk
choice in the second stage, which corroborates the thought that subjects are more likely
to switch towards low-risk choices than obversely. Friends are less likely (overall) to
change their initially chosen level of risk. Note that the changes that are observed in
the friends treatment, however, are more systematically (from high- to low-risk). Both
the motives of envy and gloating are associated with a higher probability of changing,
which seems reasonable, since a socially affected subject might actually have a reason
to do so, whereas this is not the case for someone who does not care at all.
As it is reflected by both the Nagelkerke R2 and the hit rate improvement, the overall
regression fit is best for the second stage level of risk (ii), and worst for choice alignment
(iii). AllR2 values, 0-hitrates and regression hitrates are listed in Table 5.7. Additionally,
the p-values of a Hosmer-Lemeshow test are reported.10 The regression models (i) and
(iii), in this regard, may be seen as well-fitting, whereas (ii) and (iv) are not.
A complementary logit regression analysis on the disjunct data subsets for each treat-
ment group backs these results. Some effects, however, are attributable to one or the
other treatment only, other effects are prevalent in both treatments. Some effects are
prevalent but weak in both treatments, where only the aggregated dataset provides
enough statistical power to flag these effects as significant. The results of the individual
10This test divides subjects into 10 ordered groups and compares the actual observed number of
subjects in each group to the number predicted by the logistic regression model. The p-value indicates
the result of a test for goodness of fit between actual and predicted numbers. For p-values greater
than 5 percent, the null hypothesis that there is no difference between actual and observed frequencies,
cannot be rejected, indicating a well-fitting regression model.
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logit regressions for the friends and the strangers treatment only are reported in Tables
C.3 and C.4 in the Appendix. In those regressions, naturally, the explanatory variable
for the treatment is not considered.
With regard to the subsets, the impact of the emotional motives envy and gloating
on the preferred levels of risk both in the first and in the second stage holds for both
treatments. There is thus no interaction effect observable. The same holds for the
explanatory variable high-risk (1) for estimating high-risk (2). But there are also quite
distinct interaction effects indicated by the data: The coherency of duplication and
high-risk (2) is only found in the strangers treatment. The coherency of risk change and
duplication, as well as the coherency of risk change and high-risk (2) is only prevalent
in the friends treatment. Moreover, the envy motive increases the probability of risk
changing in the strangers treatment only, whereas the gloating motive does so only for
the combined dataset.
Robustness. The logit regressions were checked for robustness by including different
sets of additional explanatory variables. The factors gender, age, and age difference
between the subjects neither provide any significant explanatory power in the regressions,
nor alter the effect directions or magnitudes of the other factors. Additional control
variables with some, but not outstanding explanatory power are the number of risky
choices (HL5), sympathy, and sharing. The number of risky choices (HL5) was assessed
using the HL5 risk aversion test as presented in Chapter 3, ranging from 0 to 5 risky
choices at most. The variable sympathy addresses the personal sympathy for the other
experiment participant (see Section 5.2). Finally, the variable sharing addresses the
intention/ belief that the players will share the common payoffs after the experiment
(see Section 5.2). There is a significant impact of sympathy (negative) and the number of
risky choices (HL5) (positive) on the probability of making a high-risk choice in the first
stage of the game; the other factors are unaffected in terms of direction and magnitude.
There is also a significant impact of sympathy (negative) on the probability of making
a high-risk choice in the second stage of the game. Again, the other factors remain
unaffected. Both sympathy and sharing have predictive power for the probability of
duplicating the other player’s choice (both negative). When controlling for those two
factors, the treatment variable becomes insignificant, which appears reasonable from
a relational point of view, and may indicate an approach to explaining how friends
actually act differently in comparison to strangers. When using the factors sympathy
and sharing individually, it turns out that the impact of sympathy is small compared
to sharing. Finally, none of the mentioned factors has any significant impact on the
probability of risk level changing from the first stage to the second (risk change).
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5.3.4. Intermediate Summary
The empirical results of the 2-person risk game experiment quarry an array of interesting
facts about the differences between friends and strangers in risky decision scenarios.
There may be drawn three main conclusions. First, whereas both groups are very similar
in terms of risk preferences individually, the respective behavior is saliently affected by
the presence of a friend, but not so by a stranger. Being visually confronted with the
other person’s choice, and by that with the payoff constellation for oneself and the
other, leads to more risk averse behavior among friends. This effect is mainly driven
by the phenomenon that the participants, once settled for a low-risk decision, saliently
stick with this decision when confronted with a friend. Second, friends show a strong
tendency to diverge from their peer’s choice, yielding exclusive payoffs for either one or
the other. Where the latter effect may be rationalized by the intention to share and
split payoffs subsequent to the experiment (“team play”), the first phenomenon is not.
Third, the emotional motives of envy and gloating are reflected exclusively in the way
the different levels of risk are selected, and not in the decisions of ex ante payoff coupling
and decoupling. This appears somewhat counter-intuitive, since duplicating (diverging)
is how to ensure identical (different) payoffs for both players, and thus appears as what
would be the most direct way to address the anticipated emotion of envy and gloating.
Thereby, envy is associated with risk aversive, gloating with risk seeking behavior. The
preferred level of risk thus occurs to be the way participants express their interpersonal
preferences. If they seek a higher payoff than their peer, they bluntly risk more, and not
explicitly go for the different bet. If they seek not to end up with less, they simply risk
less, and not explicitly tie their fate to that of their peer. Taken together, relationship
type and risk preferences appear to interact. Experimental economic research, in view
of distributional preferences, but also practitioners may profit from considering decision
makers’ actual relations. The next sections take on this notion and consider the interplay
of risk preferences and socially directed motives from a game-theoretical perspective.
5.4. Formal and Strategic Analysis
In this section, the decision scenario of the 2-person risk game is formalized and analyzed
from a game theoretic perspective. For this purpose, first, a utility function, comprising
socially and risk-related characteristics, based on the Fehr and Schmidt model is sug-
gested. Then, the second mover’s decision problem is elucidated and illustrated. With
this at hand, a strategic perspective for the first mover can be taken and the game
equilibria are derived.
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5.4.1. Utility Function and Risk Aggregation
By design, the 2-person risk game involves no strategic interaction between the players
whatsoever from the classical economic perspective. In particular, a player’s choice in
stage 2 should not depend on the other person’s choice in stage 1, because the payoffs
do not depend on each other either. Including weighted terms for the motives of envy
and gloating in the utility function is a way to address the notion that the second mover
actually does consider the first mover’s action and hence the combination of payoffs. For
that reason, a variation of the Fehr and Schmidt (1999) model is used. The Fehr and
Schmidt model does not allow for a positive utility from payoff surpluses over the other
person. In the Fehr-Schmidt model, people are assumed to be completely inequality
averse, even if the payoff difference is in their favor. This assumption is challenged in
this section. Having less than the other player is assumed to yield disutility, very much
like in the original model. The (linear) weight of this disutility is denoted α. It can
be interpreted as envy. Now, in contrast to the standard Fehr-Schmidt model, a payoff
surplus is assumed to have a positive effect, linearly weighted with the parameter β.
This part of the utility function can be interpreted as gloating. This means that the
players, holding the other’s payoff fixed, strictly prefer higher own payoffs and, holding
fix their own payoff, strictly prefer lower payoffs for the other. The motive of gloating
is thus easily mistaken for spitefulness. Spitefulness, however, should be rather seen
as directed towards the other’s payoff (regardless of the own payoff). Now, a ceteris
paribus decrease of the other’s payoff necessarily increases also the payoff difference.
A very spiteful player (assuming linear utility) would lower both payoffs to the same
extent, whereas a gloating player would not. In the present decision scenario, there is
no reason to assume spitefulness since the players cannot manipulate the other player’s
payoff. The consideration and the decision is limited to one’s own payoff and the possible
payoff constellations. Additionally, given that both players’ payoffs are increased by the
same amount, the higher payoff constellation is necessarily preferred. Player x’s utility
function thus has the form
ux(πx, πy) = πx − α max{πy − πx, 0}+ β max{πx − πy, 0}, (5.1)
where the variables πx and πy denote the payoffs to oneself (πx) and the other player
(πy), and α, β ≥ 0 represent the model parameters. The weight for a player’s own payoff
is held fixed and normalized to 1. As stated before, the model parameters α and β
can be interpreted as measures for envy and gloating, respectively. Another aspect that
easily comes to mind is the incorporation of efficiency concerns, for instance, by adding
a term for player y’s payoff. See Kohler (2011) for an example. Engelmann (2012), in
this regard, pointed out that such approaches are misguided, since the inclusion of an
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efficiency term to the standard Fehr-Schmidt model yields redundancy. The model in
the scope of this work is thus strictly limited to the components own payoff (πx), positive
difference (πx− πy), and negative difference (πy − πx), very much like the original Fehr-
Schmidt model.
Now, the decision situation is not deterministic. Resulting from the nature of the 2-
person risk game, there are four possible outcomes, all of which are equally likely to occur.
It does now not follow immediately, how the aggregation of these different scenarios
should be tackled. One could think of calculating the expected (utility) value for every
subject and then applying the social utility function to those values. This does, however,
not account for the fact that the respective outcomes might occur in a certain relation
towards another, i.e. being coupled. One might, on the other hand, calculate the
social utility value for every possible outcome constellation and then aggregate using the
expected utility function.
In fact, there have been recent considerations of how to integrate functions of social
utility and the existence of multiple possible outcomes in the literature. Trautmann
(2009), building on the Fehr-Schmidt model, applied expected values for both players
to the weighting terms for the (expected) payoff differences. Gantner and Kerschbamer
(2011, cf. p. 23), for the case of only three different possible payoffs, proposed a non-
functional form, i.e. a lookup table for the transformation from payoff to utility. These
values are then evaluated in the social (Fehr-Schmidt) function, whereat also unweighted
values are used for the payoff differences. The approach thus appears incomprehensible
to some extent. Fudenberg and Levine (2012, p. 608) assumed the Fehr and Schmidt
function to be an expected utility function, i.e. that it “socially” aggregates expected
values of lotteries. Saito (2013), on the other hand, proposed a model using both ex
ante and ex post risk aggregation in a linearly weighted, and risk neutral way. In
his approach, the parameter δ ∈ [0, 1] assigns weights to the two components. In this
expected inequality-averse (EIA) model, the decision maker’s preference is captured by
δU (E(x1), . . . , E(xn)) + (1− δ)E (U(x1, . . . , xn)) ,
where E(·) denotes the expected value over all possible outcomes and U(·) represents the
Fehr-Schmidt utility function. Note that the risk aggregation function is rudimentary,
i.e. implying risk neutrality.
For the experiment considered in this work, the aforementioned approaches do not ap-
pear applicable, since the expected payoffs (for both players) are equal to e 1.00 in any
case and the consideration of actual risk preferences (other than risk neutrality) is of
particular interest. In order to formalize this, let p = (p1, p2, . . . , pn) denote the prob-
abilities of all possible outcomes. Let then πx(X, i) be the payoff for player x and his
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or her decision X ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4, 1&2, 3&4}, in the case of dice roll i ∈ {1, 2, 3, 4}. Analo-
gously, πy(Y, i) denotes player y’s payoff after choosing alternative Y in case of outcome
i. These values are summarized in Table 5.1. Recall that the monetary payoffs for both
players are independent of the respective other player’s choice (πx is a function only of
X, not of Y ). The players individually maximize their expected utility, whereat it is
assumed that they have an underlying utility function v(·) with constant relative risk
aversion (CRRA). With CRRA, the term R(πx) = −πxv
′′(πx)
v′(πx) is constant, i.e. indepen-
dent of πx (cf. Pratt, 1964). A frequently applied function that satisfies this condition is
v(π) = π1−r where the parameter r represents the player’s risk attitude (Holt and Laury,
2002), and π denotes the reference value (e.g., a monetary payoff). A player is said to
be risk neutral if r = 0 and risk averse (risk seeking) if r > 0 (r < 0). This parameter is
assessed for each participant of the experiment by using a 5-question version of the Holt
and Laury (2002) risk aversion test (cf. Chapter 3). Hereafter, this function is used to
aggregate the different possible outcomes’ social utility values. Thus, a nested utility
model is assumed, where the social utility function is applied to the payoffs, and the
risk weighting function is applied to the resulting utility values. In doing so, a thought
of Güth et al. (2008) is adopted, who applied the risk aggregation function to the en-
tire “inner” argument (distributional and time preferences), yielding an expected overall




piux (πx(X, i), πy(Y, i))1−r. (5.2)
The optimal decision for a player may now very well depend on the other player’s
decision, since the payoffs are passively interlinked in the utility function. Naturally,
the optimal decision will still depend on the player’s own risk attitude, expressed in the
single parameter r. Depending on the weights α and β, the preference now, however,
may be shifted. This thought is outlined in further detail in the following sections.
5.4.2. Decision Alternatives
In order to understand the decision situation, the 2-person risk game is analyzed starting
from the second stage. At this point, the first mover has made a choice—high-risk or
low-risk—and the second mover is confronted with the situation. In both cases, there
are four different actions available to the second mover: HHdup, HHdiv, HLdup, and
HLdiv if observing a high-risk choice. Accordingly, when facing a low-risk choice, the
second mover decides among the alternatives LHdup, LHdiv, LLdup, and LLdiv. The
utility value of a specific response to a given first move is defined in (5.2) and piecewise
built on the distributional preferences as specified in (5.1). Applied to the concrete
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payoff and probability values of the 2-person risk game, the expected utility value for
every response strategy can be computed. These values are summarized in Table 5.8.
Table 5.8.: Utility values of responses to high-risk and low-risk first moves.
first move






Hdiv 14(4 + 4β)
1−r − 14(4α)
1−r −12(2α)
1−r + 14(4 + 4β)
1−r
Ldup α ≤ 1 14(2− 2α)




α > 1 −14(2α− 2)





1−r + 12(2 + 2β)
1−r −12(2α)
1−r + 12(2 + 2β)
1−r
Note that the risk weighting function v(u) = u1−r is applied to the aggregated utility
value u of a certain outcome alternative (social utility function u := ux(·, ·) for player x)
as defined in (5.2). This inner utility value u may be positive or negative. For negative
values, the general exponent will not be applicable—as root extraction in the real number
domain is mathematically not defined for negative arguments. For this reason, the sign
of the argument is factored out, and the absolute value of the argument remains inside
the functional evaluation. This technically transformed risk weighting function v∗(u)
thus is defined by
v∗(u) := sgn(u)v (abs(u)) . (5.3)
For all but one response value, all summands are either positive or negative, regardless of
the parameters α and β. For the low-risk duplication response to a high-risk first move,
however, the sign of the argument depends on the envy parameter α. For 0 ≤ α < 1, the
argument is positive. If α is sufficiently large (α > 1), the argument 2− 2α is negative,
which makes a case-by-case analysis necessary. Both cases are listed in Table 5.8. No
case-by-case analysis is necessary for the low-risk first move.
5.4.3. Best Responses
As described before, there are four possible (discrete) responses that emerge from the
combination of risk level (high-risk or low-risk) and the level of payoff alignment (du-
plicate or diverge) for both possible first moves (H or L). Equating two of the four
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indifference curves of best responses to an observed action of the other player’s choice
in stage 1 (for a given and fixed r). These indifference curves β = βr(α) are summarized
in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. For some of the equations (vii and ix), the implicit curves are
solved with respect to α, since the inverse function is mathematically not resolvable in
closed form.
Table 5.9.: Indifference curves βr(α) in response to to high-risk first move.
β = βr(α), if α ≤ 1 β = βr(α), if α > 1









ii HHdup = HLdup 12
(
41−r − (2− 2α)1−r
) 1
1−r − 1 12
(
41−r + (2α− 2)1−r
) 1
1−r − 1




















v HHdiv = HLdiv −1 −1
vi HLdup = HLdiv 12
(
(4α)1−r + (2− 2α)1−r
) 1
1−r − 1 12
(
(4α)1−r − (2α− 2)1−r
) 1
1−r − 1
Table 5.10.: Indifference curves βr(α) in response to to low-risk first move.
β = βr(α)
vii LHdup = LHdiv αr(β) =
(
(2 + 2β)1−r − (2 + β)1−r
) 1
1−r





ix LHdup = LLdiv αr(β) =
(
2(β + 1)1−r − (β + 2)1−r
) 1
1−r





xi LHdiv = LLdiv −1





Table 5.11.: Other indifference curves.
αr(β) =






The first player’s choice is naturally a choice merely between the two different risk levels,
which can be high-risk or low-risk. For both these situations, the second mover’s best
response can be determined by comparing the respective utility values. In the scope of
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this analysis, the focus is set on the emotional motives of envy and gloating. It is hence
straightforward to evaluate the possible strategies and best responses, depending on the
different combinations of the parameters α and β. For this purpose, a two dimensional
representation is used: the parameters are plotted on the axis of a simple Cartesian
coordinate system. The abscissa represents the parameter α, the ordinate represents β.
Both parameters are naturally restricted by α, β ≥ 0, i.e., the constructs of “negative
envy” or “negative gloating” are not considered.11 On the other side, there is no upper
bound for α and β. It can be argued that—compared to the reference weight of one’s own
payoff—values of 2, 3, or more are unrealistically high, since the utility assigned to the
payoff differences would in that case exceed the utility for the actual own payoff by these
factors. In order to include all structural characteristics of the parameter combinations
in the graphical representations, a maximum value of 4 for both axis in the diagrams is
chosen.
To obtain the respective best responses for any constellation of α and β, it is feasi-
ble to compare the indifference curves and successively discard irrelevant curves. The
remaining critical curves indicate which response should be chosen by a fully rational
player at a given constellation of the parameters α and β. Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(b)
depict the regions of best responses for a risk averse player (0 < 1 − r < 1) to a given
first mover action (high-risk or low-risk). Figures 5.8(a) and 5.8(b) depict the regions of
best responses for a risk seeking player (1 − r > 1) to a given first mover’s action. As
indicated, some of the indifference curves become obsolete since both responses captured
by the curve are dominated by another strategy in that area in any case. These curves
are plotted in gray. The effective indifference curves are plotted bold and black. In the
following, the best responses of a risk averse and a risk seeking player to a high-risk and
a low-risk first move are considered.
Risk Averse Player. As it is shown in Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(b), a variety of best
responses is possible, depending on risk attitude and the constellation of α and β.
The graphical representation of the parameter space and the associated best responses
shall now be illustrated by using 3 scenarios as selected examples (cf. to points A, B,
and C in Figure 5.7(a)). Assume that the first mover has chosen the high-risk strategy
and a fixed parameter β ≈ 0.8 for the second mover, i.e. a surplus over the other player
11Negative envy would mean a positive utility from a relatively lower payoff compared to a reference
person. This appears somewhat counterintuitive but can be applicable for certain contexts, as is it
elaborated on in Chapter 2. A suitable term would be “heroism”. Negative gloating would mean a
negative utility from a relatively higher payoff compared to a reference person. This actually seems
much more likely to appear in real contexts. Psychological rationales would be “guilt” or “shame”, most
of the economic literature has settled for the terms of “inequality aversion” or “similarity seeking,” cf.
Fehr and Schmidt (1999).
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(a) Best responses of a risk averse player to a high-
risk choice ((1− r) = 2/3).
LHdup = LLdup 
LHdiv = LLdup 
LHdiv = LHdup 
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(b) Best responses of a risk averse player to a low-
risk choice ((1− r) = 4/5).
Figure 5.7.: Best responses of a risk averse player.
is assigned about 80% of the weight of the own (absolute) payoff. This player could be
called competitive to some extent. There are 3 conceptually different situations with
respect to the parameter α:
• α ≈ 0.0: Envy is (almost) not a motive in this case. The best response is the
strategy low-risk diverge (HLdiv). Playing low-risk best meets the original risk
preference (risk aversion) and diverging allows a potential surplus over the other
player (gloating), cf. point A in Figure 5.7(a).
• α  1.0: This is the other extreme. The envy parameter, loosely speaking, the
fear of ending up with less than the other player, dominates the consideration.
Thus, even though the original risk preference should require a low-risk strategy,
the need to make sure not to end up with less is dominant and leads to high-
risk duplicate (HHdup). This strategy represents the only way to ensure identical
payoffs for both players. The social consideration thus has overwritten the player’s
inherent risk preference in this case (cf. point C in Figure 5.7(a)).
• α ≈ 0.5: This case falls in between. Both concepts risk preference and alignment
are intermingled here. The resulting best response is a low-risk duplicate strategy
(HLdup) (cf. point B in Figure 5.7(a)).
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Note that, in the case of a high-risk first move and a risk averse second mover, the
strategy high-risk diverge (HHdiv) is dominated for any combination of the parameters
α and β. If either one of the motives (envy or gloating) dominates, the best response will
be straightforward determined by this motive. A highly envious player will copy a high-
risk move, since it is the only possibility to guarantee not to end up with less than the
other player. This holds, even though the player is actually risk averse. A player with a
strong motive of gloating will seek to end up with a higher payoff than the other player,
which is in consequence effectively equivalent to creating the possibility for different
payoffs. In combination with risk aversion, this results in a low-risk diverging strategy.
A particular interesting case emerges when both motives are about equally distinctive
but rather weak compared to the weight given to the own (absolute) payoff, which is
equal to 1. Here, the best response to a high-risk first move is a low-risk duplication
strategy. The ambit of this strategy, however, is limited to the bubble in the lower left
corner of the diagram.
The response to a low-risk first move is less complex, see Figure 5.7(b). The second mover
chooses a low-risk strategy in any case, which is in line with the original risk preference.
Depending on the constellation of α and β, either a diverging or a duplicating strategy
is chosen. A prevalent envy motive will result in a duplicating response, a prevalent
gloating motive in a diverging response.
Based on this analysis, it can be concluded that if either the parameter for envy (α)
or gloating (β) prevails, and both parameters are high compared to the weight of the
own payoff, the best response is distinctly determined. A risk averse player will respond
to a high-risk strategy by playing low-risk and concurrently diverging, if gloating is the
dominant motive. This holds identically for the response to a low-risk first move. The
latter is duplicated perfectly, if the envy motive is predominant. A risk averse player,
however, will also perfectly duplicate a high-risk first mover if the envy motive is strong
(compared to the other motives), and thus deviate from the inherently preferred level of
risk: other-regarding preferences may thus turn milquetoasts into daredevils.
Risk Seeking Player. Now, consider the best responses of a risk seeking player (1−
r > 1). The indifference curves for the best responses to high-risk and low-risk first
moves are depicted in Figures 5.8(a) and 5.8(b). Again, the best response here depends
on the constellation of α and β. A risk seeking player duplicates a high-risk first move
with a high-risk move on her part if the envy motive prevails and chooses a high-risk
diverging strategy if the gloating motive prevails. If both motives are particularly strong
and rather balanced, the best response will be a low-risk duplication strategy. This area
of specific parameter composition is figuratively jammed between the other areas of best
responses.
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(a) Best responses of a risk seeking player to a
high-risk choice (1− r = 2.0).
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(b) Best responses of a risk seeking player to a low-
risk choice (1− r = 2.0).
Figure 5.8.: Best responses of a risk seeking player.
The situation is different for a low-risk first move. The best response is high-risk diverge
if the gloating motive prevails and it is low-risk duplicate for a prevailing envy motive.
Again and in between, for relatively weak impacts of envy and gloating, the best response
is a high-risk duplication strategy.
5.4.4. First Mover Perspective
Now consider the strategic perspective of the first mover, as the 2-person risk game
represents a sequential game in its originally form. For this analysis, it is assumed that
the first mover knows the second mover’s risk preference as well as the parameters α
and β with certainty. Furthermore, the players are assumed to be identical with regard
to the parameters α and β.
In order to assess a rational first mover’s behavior, the following reasoning is used. The
first mover anticipates the second mover’s actions to any of her own choice alternatives
and evaluates her resulting utility values. The second mover responds according to her
best response function as developed in the previous section. With respect to the players’
risk attitudes, three cases are considered: risk averse players, risk seeking players, and
a mixed constellation in which one player is risk averse, and one player is risk seeking.
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In the latter case, the sequence, i.e. whether the risk seeking or the risk player is first
mover, is of importance, too.
Risk Averse Players. The first move can either be high- or low-risk. A low-risk first
move will result either in LLdup or LLdiv. These values (which are equal for first and
second mover, since the players are assumed to be symmetric) are now compared to the
corresponding outcomes of a high-risk first move. For this reason, the relevant areas
from Figures 5.7(a) and 5.7(a) are superimposed and compared case by case.
The first mover compares the outcomes LLdup and LLdiv withHHdup, HLdiv, andHLdup.
Since this notation denotes the utility values from the second mover’s perspective, the
resulting utility for the first mover can be derived by simply switching the first two letters
of the corresponding situation, e.g., the utility value for the second mover in LHdup is
equal to the utility value for the first mover in HLdup. The superscripts dup or div of
course remain the same.12
For this pairwise comparison, each of the possible outcome constellations as a response
to a low-risk first move is compared with each constellation as a response to a high-
risk first move. Technically, this process mainly combines different sets of inequations as
preconditions for the validity of the best responses. The approach is somewhat extensive
but straightforward. The respective sets of inequations—as summarized in Tables 5.9,
5.10, and 5.11—are thus omitted here. In conclusion, the low-risk first move is preferred
in any case. Thus, a risk averse player chooses a low-risk strategy, regardless of the
parameters α and β in the symmetric case, if the other player is risk averse, too.
Risk Seeking Players. Again, the first move can either be high- or low-risk. A high-
risk first move will result either in HHdup, HHdiv, or HLdup. The first mover compares
these values with the possible outcomes of a low-risk first move, which are LLdup, LHdup,
or LHdiv. In conclusion, the high-risk first move proves to be the preferred choice in
any case. Thus, a risk seeking player will choose a high-risk strategy, regardless of the
parameters α and β in the symmetric case, if the other player is risk seeking, too.
Mixed Risk Preferences. Eventually, the players can be of different types: one
player might be risk seeking, the other risk averse. The analysis for this case is more
complex, since now the sequence of decisions (risk averse or risk seeking player first) does
play a role for the final outcome. The course of action is similar to that before. It must
12The actions of duplicating or diverging inherently involve both players likewise. It is not possible
that one player diverges and the other simultaneously duplicates on the same board.
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(a) First mover decisions for mixed player types.
First mover is risk averse (1 − r = 0.5), second
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(b) First mover decisions for mixed players. First
mover is risk seeking (1− r = 2.0), second mover is
risk averse (1− r = 0.5).
Figure 5.9.: First mover analysis for mixed player types.
be taken into account, however, that the “regions of best responses” (circumscribed by
the indifference curves) may cover different, sometimes overlapping areas between the
different alternatives (high-risk or low-risk first move, risk averse or risk seeking player).
The results, i.e. the respective first moves (first character in bold) and the consecutive
responses (in parentheses), are depicted in Figures 5.9(a) and 5.9(b).
If the risk averse player has the first move, broadly speaking, she chooses low-risk if either
the motive of envy or gloating is strong, and chooses high-risk in the band between,
that is, if both motives are particularly strong (colored red in Figure 5.9(a)). If the risk
seeking player has the first move, broadly speaking, she almost always chooses high-risk.
Only for very restricted constellations of α and β, the first move will be low-risk (colored
green in Figure 5.9(b)).
5.4.5. Equilibria
This section takes a look on possible equilibria in pure strategies, still assuming sym-
metric players with respect to the parameters α and β. The parameters of risk attitude
are not assumed to be symmetric. As a basis for the equilibrium analysis, the preceding
analysis of first moves and best responses is employed.
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Obviously, if the best response to a low-risk first move is a low-risk second move (diverg-
ing or duplicating), no player has an incentive to choose a different strategy, after the
other player made her responding choice. The resulting situation is stable and thus rep-
resents an equilibrium. The same holds analogously for high-risk first and second moves.
Assuming symmetric players, any “same-risk” response thus yields an equilibrium, since
the best response to a high-risk (low-risk) first move then is also a high-risk (low-risk)
move, which would in turn similarly be responded by the first mover. It becomes obvi-
ous, that this also allows for situations with two coexistent equilibria, e.g., in mutually
played high-risk or low-risk strategies, or even in a mixed situation, where the players
choose different levels of risk. More than two equilibria, however, are not possible. This
is due to the fact that the two players may a) mutually prefer to answer a high-risk
strategy with a high-risk move (either on the same or on different boxes), they may b)
prefer to respond with low-risk to low-risk (either on the same or on different rows),
or they may c) mutually prefer to play different risk levels (again, either on different
or partially on the same boxes). The two alternatives in a) are mutually exclusive, the
players cannot prefer to respond a high-risk move with duplicating and also prefer to
diverge, one of the two is simply better. The same holds for b). Each of the two cases in
a) and b), however, can be combined with one of the cases of the respective other, which
yields 4 different situations with 2 coexisting equilibria. The reasoning for c) is similar.
There are two disjunctive alternatives (duplicating and diverging) and two ways to al-
locate the risk level among the players (player 1: low-risk, player 2: high-risk, and vice
versa), which yields another 4 situations with 2 coexisting equilibria. None of the cases
in c) can be combined with any case of a) or b), since the assumptions are contradictory.
Note that, however, it is also possible that no equilibrium exists for certain parameter
constellations. All constellations of equilibria are summarized in Figures 5.10(a) and
5.10(b) and are described in more detail in the next paragraphs.
Risk Averse Players. Minding the argumentation from just above, it can be easily
seen from Figure 5.7(b), that for risk averse (and symmetric) players (0 < 1 − r < 1),
there exists an equilibrium for any combination of the parameters α and β. It is either
LLdiv if the parameter β prevails, or LLdup if α prevails. The line of separation can be
derived by equating the respective values of (5.2) for LLdiv and LLdup, as provided in
Table 5.10, cf. curve xii in Figure 5.10(a). There exists, however, another equilibrium
for risk averse and symmetric players in the high-risk strategies for certain combinations
of α and β, that is, the best response to a high-risk first move, being a high-risk second
move. In Figure 5.7(a), this equilibrium area is restricted by the indifference curve
between HHdup and HLdup to the left, and the indifference curve between HHdup and
HLdiv to the top, as summarized in Table 5.9 (curves ii and iii). Here, indeed, the motive
of envy is of such relative importance that even a originally risk averse player will copy
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(a) Equilibria for symmetrical, risk averse players
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(b) Equilibria for symmetrical, risk seeking players
(1− r = 2.0).
Figure 5.10.: Equilibria for symmetrical risk preferences.
a high-risk first move of her counterpart, in order to make sure to not fall behind in any
case. Hence, there exist two distinct equilibria for these specific parameter constellation.
Both (symmetric) players prefer the equilibrium in low-risk strategies, cf. the first mover
analysis to this effect.
Risk Seeking Players. The situation is somewhat more complex for risk seeking
players. Starting point of this analysis are the diagrams in Figures 5.8(a) and 5.8(b). In
total, there arise four different situations. Again, the lines of separation are identical to
those of the best response analysis, summarized in Tables 5.9 and 5.10. In the upper left,
both players choose a high-risk diverging strategy, since the gloating motive is dominant
(above curves i and iv). In the lower right of the diagram, there exists an equilibrium
in high-risk duplication strategies, since the envy motive is dominant (below i and ii).
In addition to that, if the envy motive is even more distinctive, another, additional
equilibrium in low-risk strategies co-exists (below viii and x). Here, the original risk-
preference is overruled by the envy motive. Furthermore, for the combination of both
strong and balanced envy and gloating parameters, there occurs an area in the parameter
space with no equilibrium at all (between ii and iv). Here, the best response to a high-
risk first move is HLdup, however, the best response to a low-risk first move is LHdiv.
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1st letter: risk averse player 
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Figure 5.11.: Equilibria for mixed risk preferences. 1− r1 = 0.5, 1− r2 = 2.0.
That means that one player prefers to pick the same box, whereas the other prefers to
choose a different one, which is obviously not a stable situation.
Mixed Players. The situation is even more complex for players with different risk
preferences. A summary of the resulting equilibria is depicted in Figure 5.11. As it
can be seen, high values of α lead to two coexistent equilibria, where both players pick
the same box in either high- or low-risk strategies (below viii and x). The first mover
coordinates the game according to her risk preferences. Additionally, for rather balanced
values of α and β, there exists a band with no equilibrium (below vi and iii, above i , ii,
and vii). This also included the area of the “bubble” (see Figure 5.11). Comparatively
high values of β yield a unique equilibrium with different risk levels and diverging, at
which the risk averse player chooses low-risk, and the risk seeking player chooses high-
risk (above vi and iii). Additionally, for rather low values of α and β, there exists an
area where this setup is present, but with duplicating instead of diverging (below vii).
Summary. Incorporating the motives of envy and gloating into the decision analysis
under risk yields a set of insights.
• Even originally risk averse players may end up taking high-risk actions if accord-
ingly motivated by their believes about the other player’s action and a sufficiently
high level of anticipated envy.
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• This analogously holds for risk seeking players. They might end up taking low-risk
actions if accordingly motivated by believes about the other player’s action and a
high level of envy.
• These counterintuitive equilibria co-exist beside stable constellations in the respec-
tive other (expected) risk levels. It is thus a matter of coordination to retrieve the
overall desired outcome. From a principal’s view, selecting players with suitable
individual characteristics (in terms of envy, gloating, risk preference), determining
the sequence of actions, and providing information (or creating beliefs) about the
other player’s action may be a means of doing so.
• For the case of risk seeking players, very strong and balanced occurrences of the
motives of envy and gloating yield a situation with no equilibrium. One of the
players in this case will be motivated to choose a different action.
• For players with opposed risk preferences, the space of parameter combinations,
in which no equilibrium emerges, is much larger.
• The resulting degree of risk diversification or clustering depends on the players’
motives, at which envy increases the probability of pooling (duplication), and
gloating increases the probability of diversification (diverging). This tendency
holds universally for both risk seeking and risk averse players.
Taken as a whole, consolidating other-regarding and risk preferences appears valid from
empirical and anecdotal evidence. It is suggested that combined formal models of other-
regarding preferences and risk are capable of capturing facets of actual human behavior
in this regard. This approach assesses the interplay of risk preference and the social ref-
erence from a theoretical point of view. It was applied to a simple decision scenario with
a coincident choice about the degree of risk and the socially motivated outcome correla-
tion. In the next section, the model is fitted to the experimental data and benchmarked
against existing models of other-regarding preferences from the literature.
5.5. Model Fit and Benchmark
Based on the responses made by the second mover in the experiment, the parameters
of the presented model are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimation (MLE)
method. Thereby, the method of risk aggregation as formally described in 5.2 is used
throughout all models. The goodness of fit measures and the parameter estimates are
compared to those of the approach based on envy and gloating. The likelihood function
is specified based on the different response strategies, S = {FHdup,FHdiv,FLdup,FLdiv},
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where F serves as a place marker for the first mover’s choice (either H or L). As specified
in 5.2, each of these responses s ∈ S obtains an expected utility value ψs = EU(s|F),
which depends on the model parameters and the first mover’s decision as specified in
the previous section. In order to allow for non-perfect decisions, the absolute (and
non-dimensional) utility values ψs are converted into probabilities by using a logistic
quantal response function (cf. McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995) where the probability p(s)




Here, the parameter λ ≥ 0 specifies the player’s selectivity, or “rationality” in terms of
compliance to the model. For the extreme case λ → ∞, the best option would always
be selected with certainty, even if the second best option has only a slightly lower value.
For λ = 0, all (four) options are equally likely (25%). With that, the following (general)
likelihood function for the n observations of a sample is obtained, see Chen et al. (2012)
for a similar approach:





In order to fit the envy & gloating model, L(·) is maximized on the three parameters α,
β, and λ simultaneously. The maximum likelihood estimates are the set of values for α,
β, and λ, which maximizes the empirical data’s likelihood (5.5) of being observed, given
that the individual probabilities are determined as in (5.4). The maximum value for
L(α, β, λ) is determined by evaluating the set of possible parameter constellations. All
numerical computations were conducted in Java. The MLE is conducted similarly to that
described in Gimpel (2007). Separate MLEs on both subgroups are conducted. There
are nf = 314 observations in the friends treatment and ns = 166 observations in the
strangers treatment, where every subjects represents an observation. A likelihood ratio
test assumes that the test statistic LRi = −2log(
LMLE\i
LMLE
) follows a χ2 distribution with
one degree of freedom, where LMLE is the likelihood evaluated at the MLE (full model)
and LMLE\i is the likelihood of the model when one parameter i is held fix (in this case
fixed to zero). It tests whether the model, which is reduced by the tested parameter i,
yields the same fit as the full model. With this at hand, a p-value for every estimate can
be determined, which denotes the probability of erroneously rejecting the null hypothesis
that the estimate is equal to zero. The results of the MLE are summarized in Table
5.12.
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In order to evaluate the model regarding its goodness of fit, the following measures
may be used. First, the Count R2 indicates, how often the model predicted the actual
behavior, i.e. how often it assigned the highest probability value to the observed choice.
This measure, however, is prone to overestimating the model’s actual predictive power if
one type of observation occurs very frequently. Thus, the Adjusted Count R2 is adjusted





where ncorrect denotes the number of correct predictions, nmax is the number of the most
frequently observed alternative, and ntotal is the total number of observations. This
hit rate can be interpreted as a measure of sensitivity, that is, how often the model
makes a correct prediction. This measure, however, is prone to assigning high values
to non-specific models. In the extreme case, a null-model would be “correct” in 100
percent of all cases, since it assigns the same (arbitrary) value to all decision alternatives.
Therefore, another additional measure to compare the model fits is used. The McFadden





and compares the estimated likelihood value for the model without any predictors (L0)
to the likelihood value for the model including the predictors (Lmodel).
Note that the parameter domains are limited. In particular, the restrictions α ≥ 0, and
β ≥ 0 imply that the model is limited to the notions of envy and gloating, rather than
similarity seeking or inequality aversion in general. The rationality parameter is limited
to λ ≥ 0. As can be seen in Table 5.12, the motive of envy is neglected by the MLE model
fit and the motive of gloating is assigned significant weights in both treatments, which
is slightly stronger in the friends treatment (0.789 > 0.697). This suggests that subjects
consider the payoff surplus over the other player as almost as important as their own
absolute payoff. For the friends treatment, the value of λ is also higher (0.873 > 0.754)
indicating a higher degree of “rationality” with respect to the model prediction. The
overall fit of the data is better in the friends treatment, which is expressed by Adjusted
Count R2 and McFadden R2.
5.5.2. Sensitivity Analysis
In order to test the results of the MLE with regard to robustness, a sensitivity analysis
is performed. Every parameter is varied around the retrieved optimum while holding
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Table 5.12.: MLE results overview for friends and strangers treatment.
friends strangers
parameter estimate p-value estimate p-value
envy (α) .000 — .000 —
gloating (β) .789 <.001 .697 <.001









all other model parameters fixed. This reveals whether the retrieved local optimum is
distinctive, i.e. the curve of the L(·) function is smooth, or whether it falls into a noisy
range. The latter case would be unfavorable, since it indicates that the retrieved value is
less reliable. Depending on the optimal value of the respective parameter, a range from
0 to 1, or 0 to 2 is chosen. The granularity is always 100 steps, i.e. 100 different values
are tested. The output value is set in relation to the respective optimum, so that the
highest value of L/Lmax is always 1. The results of the sensitivity analysis for the model
of envy and gloating are illustrated in Figures 5.12(a) through 5.13(c). Apparently, the
L(·) function curve is smooth in all cases.
5.5.3. Comparison to Existing Models
The envy & gloating model and its fit of the data is now compared to that of other
tractable models of social preferences from the literature. Namely, the models of Fehr
and Schmidt (1999, FS), Charness and Rabin (2002, CR), Tan and Bolle (2006, TB), and
Cox et al. (2007, CFG) are considered. These models were introduced in Chapter 2, an
overview is provided in Table 2.2. Again, separate MLEs for both treatment subgroups
are conducted. The results of this comparison are listed in Table 5.13. The results of the
sensitivity analysis for the estimates of those reference models are illustrated in Section
D in the Appendix.
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(c) λ, friends treatment.











































































(c) λ, strangers treatment.
Figure 5.13.: Sensitivity analysis: envy & gloating model, strangers treatment.
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Table 5.13.: MLE summary for selected models of other-regarding preferences for fitting
our experimental data sample.
#pred. R2adj.C. R2McFadden Log-L.
envy & gloating
friends 182 .237 .061 -408.860
strangers 70 .030 .047 -219.421
FS 1999
friends 241 .578 .006 -432.892
strangers 119 .525 .013 -227.132
CR 2002
friends 199 .335 .008 -431.658
strangers 81 .141 .014 -227.000
TB 2006
friends 131 -.058 .061 -408.750
strangers 72 .051 .058 -216.790
CFG 2007
friends 145 .023 .024 -424.790
strangers 95 .283 .018 -225.890
The results indicate that, while the highest McFadden R2 values are obtained by the
envy & gloating and TB approaches, the FS model yields the highest hit rates. This,
however, is due to the fact that both parameters in the Fehr and Schmidt model are
dismissed (α = β = 0). Consequently, the model has no discriminatory power regarding
the data sample. The other models fall in between. There is no clear indication for the
dominance of any model regarding both measures and both treatments. The numbers
of Table 5.13 are illustrated in Figure 5.14. The estimates and p-values of the referenced
models are summarized in Table 5.14.
The results of the MLE show that the envy & gloating model does not fit the data
worse than existing models. In the friends subset, the envy & gloating model performs
particularly well, where it strictly dominates the model of Cox et al. (2007), and is com-
parable those of Charness and Rabin (2002) and Tan and Bolle (2006) in one dimension
each, but markedly better in the respective other. The single parameter estimates of the
reference models are not subject to further discussion in the scope of this work.
5.6. Discussion and Conclusions
This chapter highlighted social interaction effects in risky decision scenarios from 3 per-
spectives. First, an experimental study demonstrated the impact of peer presence on
individual behavior under uncertainty. This impact was shown to depend on the type
of the relationship to the peer. Second, using a model of distributional preferences,
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Figure 5.14.: MLE summary for selected models of other-regarding preferences for fitting
the experimental data sample.
the interplay of competent interpersonally directed motives and risk attitude was for-
mally analyzed. This established a theoretical baseline for further considerations from
a market- and mechanism design perspective. Third, a MLE brought together the em-
pirical data with the theoretical model and located the approach as well as the results
in the literature.
5.6.1. Practical Implications
Examples for direct applications of risky decisions in a social context are peer-to-peer
lending and social trading platforms. On social trading platforms, users trade shares
and other financial products and may be connected to actual friends or simply observe
the behavior of other users. Either way, a social context exists. As it was established
in this work, social context and risk taking behavior may interact. A social trading
platform operator may thus want to manipulate the appearance of a user’s surrounding,
depending on the actions these users take (e.g., emphasizing the high-volume, high-risk
trade of a friend).
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Table 5.14.: Model estimates for the reference models.
friends strangers
estimate p-value estimate p-value
FS 1999
λ .941 .028 1.328 .014
α .000 — .000 —
β .000 — .000 —
CR 2002
λ 1.136 .007 1.360 .012
γ .045 .103 .006 .602
δ .000 — .000 —
TB 2006
λ 1.164 < .001 .683 < .001
a .535 .045 .436 .575
b -.198 < .001 -.304 < .001
CFG 2007
λ 2.357 < .001 1.364 .004
α .735 < .001 1.000 —
θ .038 .018 -.515 .115
The coherence of relationship type and behavior should be of interest for market and
platform operators in the context of social media, too. One fundamental design issue
here may be whether to connect users with each other or not. “Connecting” users may
be as simple as enabling access to other users’ public profiles, or extend to the possibility
of communication. A company may try to maximize social and peer presence in order to
create a personal reference to its product or service and to utilize one’s friends as brand
ambassadors. In the context of risky decisions, however, it is unclear whether this fosters
or hinders the actual desired behavior—as many purchase- or sign-up-or-not decisions
can be seen as inherently uncertain—due to unknown product quality, actual necessity
and usage, trend development, and so forth. The existence of friends in e-commerce
applications may have an impact on economic exchange, if regarded as a signal for
trustworthiness. Especially those friends with a credible history themselves may thus
constitute “social capital.” As it is practiced by Airbnb, Inc. for instance, peer-to-
peer intermediaries may animate their users to actively maintain online appearances or
even to integrate their facebook profiles. This enables potential transaction partners to
conduct “background checks” and may eventually stimulate exchange activity. Lin et al.
(2013), in this context, studied the relation between online friendships and transactional
outcomes on the peer-to-peer lending platform Prosper.com and found that borrowers
with online friends were more likely to receive loans. Any peer-to-peer platform operator
might hence want to think about ways to stimulate interaction by providing ways for
users to signal their credibility. A set of friends might serve as such a signal, in particular
when these friends have a history of acting favorably on that platform, not raising the
suspicion of fake accounts or detrimental exploitation.
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Also in managerial contexts, risky project selection might be affected by a social expo-
sure of outcomes. The relationship type among the decision makers should thus be taken
into account. As was suggested by the study in this chapter, this holds particularly when
project success can be fully or partly coupled—or deliberately decoupled. Intra-corporate
incentive design might profit from considering this idea. In the presented study, stakes
were comparatively low and there was no risk of actually losing money. Real scenarios,
however, typically involve considerable material and non-material consequences. Per-
sonal and interpersonal considerations might be even more important. In the context
of managerial decisions, this leads to the questions whether or not companies should
enforce the mutual exposure of decisions and outcomes (cf. Ockenfels et al., 2010), and
whether acquainted or rather unbeknown, or even anonymous decision makers should be
put up for project decisions as illustrated in the introductory example (project A versus
project B). From the perspective of a firm’s principal, the selection of decision makers
might benefit from including individual factors like risk propensity, interpersonally di-
rected emotional motives, and other personality traits. Also the formalized process of
decision making (player X or Y first?, simultaneously or sequentially?) should be of
interest. Given a particular staffing, the principal might want to make sure that at the
time of action, the decision makers’ identities are not, or deliberately revealed to one
another.
Consider, for instance, an investment company with two traders, one of which is highly
risk seeking, the other rather risk averse. A personality test now reveals that both
traders are very prone to experiencing envy. In the long run, the company’s board
desires a rather risky portfolio. Without replacing the risk averse trader, the firm can
use the psychological insights and institutional design to drive the firm’s overall risk
portfolio into the desired direction, e.g. by letting the risk seeker perpetually make first
moves—and letting the more risk averse trader know these decisions (for instance by
letting the first report his strategy on Tuesdays, and the other on Thursdays). This
uses the second mover’s anxiety to end up with less without even actively impinging. Of
course, this simple example does not capture real life complexity and detailed project
scenarios and decisions—it is rather meant to illustrate the general principle.
5.6.2. Theoretical Implications
It is assumed that people consider the possible payoff constellations of a lottery ex ante,
and thus evaluate “who gets what” in which cases. The multiplicity of these social out-
come constellations is aggregated using a simple isoelastic risk weighting function. This
approach particularly differs from the concept proposed by Saito (2013), which assumes
risk neutrality and thus does not entail an expression of individual risk preferences. It is,
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however, conceivable that the evaluation of expected values plays a role when thinking
about outcome constellations. This aspect is ruled out in this experiment insofar as
both players’ expected payoffs are always equal to e 1.00, regardless of their choice.
The results with regard to the model fit are not entirely conclusive. On the one hand, the
model does not clearly outperform existing models of social preferences. It does, on the
other hand, also not systematically perform worse. Envy as a motive is not corroborated
in this formal setup. Gloating, on the other hand, seems to play a significant role—the
weight associated with it is only little lower than the weight associated with one’s own
payoff. This difference is smaller for the friends treatment. This may be thought of as a
friendly way of competition among peers—whereas the compared performance is not so
important among strangers. This is in line with the findings of Bault et al. (2008) who
claimed that “gains loom larger than losses” in the social domain, where it is the other
way round in the private domain. There is no support found for the theoretical concept
of envy in the MLE. It appears, however, that the emotional motive of envy, as assessed
by self-report, is associated with subjects’ actual behavior.
Given the rather small stakes of the experiment, it is conceivable that the choices are
shifted towards risk propensity, whereas subjects in the same situation would act much
more risk averse if the stakes were higher. This “peanuts effect” may be due to the low
magnitude of the foregone alternative (disappointment or regret) in case the risky choice
turns out not to pay off (cf. Weber and Chapman, 2005). For the time being, the risk
aggregation function used in this approach does not allow to express risk aversion for
high, and risk propensity for low stakes. This extension may not be the most urging
since individual risk attitude (1−r) is generally formulated and may extend to any type
of risk attitude.
For the most part, experiments have abstracted from the role of personal relations among
decision makers. This was not for no reason. Introducing this aspect is problematic in the
laboratory environment, since the entire process of experiment execution and participant
invitation is laid out for anonymous stranger matching. Taking the experiment into the
wild, as was described, introduces a variety of new problems and certainly gives up some
degree of control. It was shown that the role of relationships should be taken greater
account of, since it was identified as an effective factor. Even though there has not
emerged a closed-form theory of how to include the variable yet, modeling behavior may
benefit from at least discriminating the data with respect to relationship type. The
results indicate that future research should deliberately include the relationship type in
some form or the other.
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5.6.3. Limitations and Future Work
As it was shown, other-regarding preferences apparently play a role when people decide
between risky alternatives, consciously or unconsciously. The approach of using the
relationship type as a treatment variable is novel to the literature. Of course, however,
the approach followed in this Chapter has several limitations.
Naturally, human relationships comprise a variety of different aspects and are much
more complex than being simply “friends” or “strangers.” The classification of the ref-
erence person into these groups is admittedly broad. The potential gradations between
lose friends, acquaintances, colleagues, fellow students, love-hate relationships, family,
or couples could not systematically be considered. Also, the effect of asymmetric rela-
tionships could have a much greater effect than was presumed in the scope of this work.
However, even when using a highly granular and accurate classification, relationships
under the same name tag might still differ substantially from each other. Which factors
exactly let people behave in one or another way is hence not entirely allegeable. Putting
it positively, there is an indication for systematic differences regarding risk taking behav-
ior and distributional preferences even at a rather broad level of differentiation. Taking
into account relationships in decision scenarios with peers thus appears valid. Further
differentiation may further increase the results’ quality and significance.
Using the type of the relationship between the decision makers as a treatment variable
clearly could benefit from a broader basis of foundational research from the perspective
of experimental economics. This would imply to conduct established experiments (e.g.,
Ultimatum Games, Dictator Games, Prisoners’ Dilemmas, Trust Games, etc.) among
different groups of subjects with different relationships. It also appears reasonable to test
a more differentiated array of relationships in order to identify common and distinctive
features that determine the subjects’ behavior.
The choices for a certain level of risk in the 2 stages of the game, and especially the
notion of changing the level of risk from one stage to the other, may be caused by a
variety of reasons. Participants might simply want to play both of the two options, in
order to be sure not to miss anything. They might observe that the other player has
chosen a different risk level than themselves and simply imitate this behavior without
any deeper thought. Moreover, the super-lottery, resulting from a combination of a low-
risk (l) and a high-risk (h) choice, might best match the player’s risk preferences. Since
either stage is selected for payoff with equal probabilities, the µ − σ−figures for one’s
own payoff yield µh/h = µl/l = µh/l = 1, and σh/h = 1.633, σl/l = 0.943, and σh/l = 1.333.
Hence, when regarding both stages as a whole, combining high-risk and low-risk yields
an intermediate degree of risk (σl/l < σh/l < σh/h). Apart from that, both the first and
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second stage actions might be taken completely at random by some participants, which
would cause random risk changing for some of these participants, too.
An additional and complementary way of conducting the experiment, besides as a one-
shot game, is the strategy method. This method can arguably be traced back to Selten
(1967). In this particular case, the second mover would be asked for a response to all
possible first moves by the other player. This bears the advantage that data is collected
for any possible state of the game, and not only for the actual reached one. It would
enable the indubitable identification of duplication or divergence motives, but also create
a huge array of possible intermediate strategies.
Another method would be a dynamic variation in which both subjects are able to follow a
common screen in real time and can repeatedly update their decision, until a predefined
time is up. This would represent a more realistic model of many situations where it is
possible to measure up the intentions of one’s counterpart, react to it, and also one’s
own actions do not remain arcane.
One hypothetical explanation for copying the other’s choice is informational guidance.
Such effects may be present where, for instance, the other’s decision serves as an indi-
cation about the quality of the uncertain alternatives. In the present setting, it can be
argued that such considerations can mostly be neglected, since there is no ambiguity
and complexity is low. Subjects are acquainted with he height of the stakes, the gains
are paid off immediately, and the relevant probabilities should be known from any coin
flip or game situation (they are neither particularly high or low, nor conditioned). The
entire situation can hence be assumed to be assessable intuitively and easily.
The experiment is limited to the notion of gains. Subjects do not put any own money at
risk. Many application scenarios do arguably entail the risk of losses, so that an extension
in this regard would be intriguing. Generally speaking, the stakes of the experiment were
rather small. One could argue that in the magnitude of e 2.00 through e 4.00, subjects’
do not care much about one or the other. On the other hand, expenditure of time and
effort for participation was rather low, too.
It is possible that participants in the friends treatment intended or believed that they
will pool and share their payoffs after the experiment—as a form of “insurance against
not being lucky” among friends. The post-experimental questionnaire actually asked
for this intention. Despite that, subjects could share their payoffs no matter what they
stated before, and it was out of experimental control whether they did or not.
Another issue in view of the self-reported motivation is social desirability. Subjects might
not want to declare motives of envy or gloating, since the societal connotation is negative.
This may ultimately distort the measurement. The post-experimental questionnaires,
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with exception of the risk aversion test, did not entail any monetary incentivization or
compensation. Like in most questionnaires, the interpretability of the indications are
subject to the participants’ honesty and effort to express their characteristics and motives
accurately. There is, on the other hand, no compelling reason to assume intentional
manipulative behavior.
Admittedly, the post-experimental questionnaire must be seen as a first attempt to raise
some data about the participants’ motivation in view of the payoff distribution. All
constructs comprise a single item only, which is due to the timely restrictions during the
experiment. The questionnaires should certainly be further developed and validated.
This Chapter attempted to incorporate the interconnections among decision makers
and into the notion of economic risks. Thinking of decision making as interpersonally
motivated appears reasonable, as has been shown throughout innumerable experiments.
But also the type of the relationship matters: real life actions among real life people are
not taken anonymously in separate cubicles but with regard to personal attitudes towards
the other, be it a friend, an ally, a rival or competitor, or a stranger. Future research
may exhibit, whether confounding other-regarding and risk preferences can, after all, be
tackled as a combination of the classical economic building blocks, or whether it must





“A common mistake that people make when
trying to design something completely foolproof is
to underestimate the ingenuity of complete fools.”
(Douglas Adams)
This chapter concludes this work. First, a brief summary is given, coming back to
and answering the research questions as stated in the introductory section in short and
thus summarizing the contributions of this work. Second, limitations of this work are
discussed and henceforth propositions for future research are made. Lastly, the main
conclusions of this work are presented.
6.1. Contributions
This work considered human decision making in different economic scenarios, which are
characterized by the presence of a social context and risk. Both aspects are relevant from
a mere economic perspective, the junction of them, however, is only sparsely covered in
the existing literature (cf. Yechiam et al., 2008; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2010; Trautmann
and Vieider, 2011). The subject is particularly relevant in view of the recent develop-
ment of peer-to-peer platforms and economies, which are mainly rooted online. It was
demonstrated that the driving factors, considerations, and insights, however, are not lim-
ited to online contexts, but are applicable in economic decision scenarios involving risk
and a social context in a more general manner. This may apply to managerial decisions
concerning team composition, insurance, or budget allocation. One main conjecture of
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this work is the differentiated influence of the social context on arousal and behavior.
Whereas almost all prior studies in experimental economics created an abstract social
context, i.e. matching subjects with anonymous and unknown other experiment par-
ticipants, this binary concept is challenged and sought to be disentangled in this work.
In a first step, the general difference between human and computerized reference play-
ers was established. Building on the insight that the presence of human peers causes
stronger emotions and also a stronger correlation of arousal and behavior than com-
puterized peers, in a second step, the role of human peers was investigated in greater
detail. Specifically, the type of the relationship between the decision makers and their
peers was subject to investigation. In fact, not only did the presence of a peer affect
economic decision making in general, also did this impact differ for different types of
peers (friends or strangers). This speaks in favor of the working assumption, that the
established methods of experimental economics may benefit from such an extension.
At the outset of this work, the underlying concepts of risk preferences, social preferences,
and emotional motives were considered. Moreover, existing theories and empirical find-
ings were reviewed. In order to give structure to that literature review, a classification
framework was proposed. As a first finding, one type of decision had almost not been
considered from an economic perspective: ex ante payoff coupling where only one’s own
chances can effectively be controlled but not the peer’s (similar to playing roulette).
Then, in the first instance, a risk preference elicitation task for ad-hoc experiments was
developed and evaluated. The task was a methodological prerequisite for the execution
of the study involving friend- and stranger relationships between subjects. It was open
whether this short test version would be able to capture risk preferences analogously to
its established prototype, the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion test. The research
question in this regard stated:
Can a short version of the Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion task serve
as a substitute? How well do the results correlate and which factors are
determinant?
In order to investigate the correlation of both tests, two online experiments with a total
of 490 subjects were conducted, in which every subject was facing both tasks (within
subject design). The original risk aversion test and the shorter version correlate in a
“large,” “high,” or “major” manner. The correlation is robust among various subgroups
such as different height of stakes, sequence, and gender. The new, shorter test was
executable by users in less than half of the time on average, compared to the original
procedure of Holt and Laury (2002). It has, in addition, proved successful when employed
in the experiment presented in Chapter 5.
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The next chapter then considered bidding behavior when facing other humans, or in
contrast to that, computerized bidding agents in first-price sealed-bid auctions. The
emergence of web platforms on which users may interact with both types of counter-
parts (cf. sniping bots, algorithmic trading, etc.) was addressed. Initially, the relevant
theoretical concepts in the light of this scenario were reviewed (competitive arousal, he-
donic value, computerized trading, NeuroIS). In order to address the research questions,
a laboratory experiment with 120 participants was designed and conducted. The first
research question in this context stated:
Is there a difference in bidding behavior in first-price sealed-bid auctions
where the other auction participants are either human or computerized?
In a nutshell: it depends on arousal. In auction environments with exclusively human
bidders, the bidders’ arousal affects their bids in the sense that higher arousal yields lower
bids, i.e. a higher degree of risk taking. This effect is not observable when the decision
maker faces computerized bidding agents. That is, the impact of arousal is mediated by
the presence of computer bidders. Note that, when collapsing the dimension of arousal,
the average bid height for both treatment groups is almost identical—the variation,
however, differs. This important aspect could only be addressed when controlling for
the impact of arousal. The second research question thus concerned the bidders’ arousal
and stated:
Is there a difference in arousal in first-price sealed-bid auctions where the
other auction participants are either human or computerized—and how do
auction environment, arousal and bidding behavior interact?
The impact of arousal is definite. Bidders show higher degrees of arousal when facing
other humans in the auctions, compared to computerized counterparts. This holds for
the general level of arousal prior to submitting a bid (captured by heart rate) as well
as for reactions to events such as the presentation of the auction outcome (captured by
skin conductance response amplitudes). Moreover, higher induced IPVs for the auctioned
commodity yield higher levels of arousal. The difference of the strength of the reaction
to winning or losing an auction depends on this value, too: Where from very low to
high values, winning causes a stronger SCR amplitude, only for very high valuations,
this relation reverses. In the light of these results, practical implications for the design
of e-commerce applications were discussed.
In Chapter 5, the impact of different types of relationships among the decision mak-
ers was investigated in greater detail. Building on the literature review carried out in
Chapter 2, it was revealed that particularly decisions of ex ante payoff coupling under
risk had been considered only to some limited extend. This fact was addressed by an
accordingly designed experiment, which modeled the relevant aspects in the form of a
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stylized roulette game. In order to be able to systematically manipulate the type of the
relationship between subjects, the laboratory did not appear as the suitable environ-
ment for conducting a such experiment. Neither would it have been feasible to invite
groups with pre-existing friendships into the lab, nor would it have been promising to
artificially create any reliable types of relationships during the experiment. Hence, the
decision scenario was relocated into a natural environment, which allowed for using the
actual, existing relationships between the subjects: the campus. In the course of this
experiment, the following research questions were addressed:
Is there a difference in economic behavior among friends and strangers, re-
garding risk preference and the desire to align or de-align payoffs ex ante in
prospect selection?
And indeed, when it comes to risky decisions, there occur distinct differences between the
treatment groups. Where socially unexposed, decisions yield the same degree of risk for
friends and strangers. The presence of a social context reduces risk taking significantly
in the friends condition, whereas it does not so for strangers. Also, friends de-align their
choices with those of their peers significantly more often than strangers. It was found
that envious players tend to be less risk seeking, and gloating players seek higher degrees
of risk, whereas these motive showed no particular connection to the actions of ex ante
payoff alignment.
In a second step, a formal model depicting those motives in a linear manner, analogously
to the approach of Fehr and Schmidt (1999), was derived and analyzed from a game-
theoretic perspective. One of the insights from this analysis was that even risk averse
players might end up in equilibria choosing high-risk actions, caused by a mutual motive
of envy. Analogously, intrinsically risk seeking players may be caught in low risk actions.
From a principal’s perspective, aspiring a specific overall portfolio of risk, for instance
when staffing workers for a certain task, or arranging payoff rules, this has implications
for the design of the scheme of interaction, regarding factors such as sequence, team
composition, personality traits, or information availability to the actors.
In a next step, the model was then fitted to the empirical data and evaluated and
benchmarked against other, existing models from the literature. The associated research
question stated:
Can a model with the emotional motives of envy and gloating explain the
observed data? How well does it in comparison to other existing models?
The results here are not entirely conclusive. Whereas the motive of envy is not backed
when fitting the model to the data using MLE, the term for gloating does provide ex-
planatory power. The approach using the motives of envy and gloating does not strictly
166
6.2. Limitations
dominate other models in the dimensions of hit rate and McFadden R2. It is, on the
other hand, also not dominated itself. The model’s McFadden R2 values are comparably
high, whereas the hit rate is medium for the friends treatment, and comparably low for
the strangers treatment. Overall, the theory is supported to some extend, and it per-
forms comparably well with regard to other approaches. In particular does the model of
envy and gloating fit the data of the friends treatment well, whereas it does poorer for
the strangers treatment. One possible explanation is that these interpersonally directed
motives do just not apply sufficiently for strangers. Drastically expressed: a stranger
is a stranger, why should one care? This might have fundamental ramifications for ex-
periments investigating social preferences in general, since their design mostly relies on
interaction with randomly and anonymously matched strangers.
Chapter 6 summarized objective, research questions and results of this work, indicates
limitations, and proposes potential directions for future research. Eventually, the main
findings are discussed and conclusions in the context of market engineering and Internet
economy are drawn.
6.2. Limitations
In addition to the limitations outlined in sections 3.5, 4.5.3, and 5.6.3, of course, the
scope of this work has its limits and the used methodologies have shortcomings. First,
a brief summary of the aforementioned limitations is provided for every chapter, which
is then extended to the broader context of this work as a whole.
When evaluating a test for Measuring Risk Preferences in Ad-Hoc Experiments
(Chapter 3), it must be acknowledged that there exists a variety of reasons that could
lead subjects to behave differently during the two tasks, which could not be controlled
for (e.g., random play, super-lottery, etc.). Also might the erroneous assumption that
“consistent” behavior was rewarded, distorts results. Eventually, in the scope of this
work, the results could not experimentally be compared to other existing methods and
scales for measuring risk preferences in a similar way.
In Chapter 4 (Risky Decisions among Humans and Computers) the focus was
limited to first-price sealed-bid auctions. Other auction formats might provide valuable
insights, particularly since first-price sealed-bid auctions do not allow for dynamic inter-
action among the decision makers. The individuals’ arousal was measured using heart
rate and skin conductance response, but it can be argued that the individual capability
to regulate one’s emotions is another important aspect in this context, which should
be incorporated, too (cf. Gross and John, 2003). One can argue that in many realistic
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settings, the decision maker neither faces exclusively human or exclusively computerized
counterparts. One may rather face a mixed population of both types. Also it might of-
ten be not clear which type is actually present, so that the ambiguity about the others’
nature may have a distinct effect, too. The approach chosen here, strictly separating be-
tween human and computerized counterparts and with that leaving no ambiguity about
the type, must thus be seen as a first and developable attempt.
With respect to the concept of physiological measurements in economic decision making,
a set of methodological issues becomes apparent. First of all, the method has by now
proven to be a suitable way of assessing market participants’ arousal during economic
decision processes and thus may supplement the classical techniques of market design.
It must be acknowledged, however, that the actual type of emotion cannot be identified
and that arousal may extend to many different feelings, both of positive and negative
valence. Neuroimaging (e.g., fMRI, EEG) is arguably a way to address this. Dimoka
et al. (2012, p. 682) argued that NeuroIS tools as employed in this work “use various
sensors attached to the human body that may themselves induce stress and bias the
results.” Other potential sources of error and variance are the many factors that cannot
entirely be controlled for, such as differences in room temperature, noise, or individual
artifacts.1
The setting in Chapter 5 (Risky Decisions among Friends and Strangers) cannot
rule out other reasons for changing or staying with one’s level of risk in the different stages
of the experiment. Moreover, the classification of the reference person into the groups
“friends” and “strangers” is admittedly broad. Also, the stakes of the experiment were
rather small. An important issue are the questions that were used to assess the personal
motives of action. Each construct was based on a single item, which can typically
hardly be regarded as sufficient for a reliable measurement. There were, however, no
established questionnaires, suitable for the context of an experiment “in the wild.” The
development and evaluation of completely new questionnaires from scratch in this regard
was not aimed at in the scope of this work.
Even though the empirical data can be explained quite well by using the emotional
motives envy and gloating as sampled in the questionnaires, the results of the model
fit itself, in contrast to that, are not entirely conclusive. Additional analyses, for in-
stance using the single terms of the utility function piecewise, could lead to a better
understanding in this regard.
1There are, however, of course technical means to mitigate these potentially detrimental influences,
e.g., having experiment participants wear ear muffs, controlling temperature and air moisture by using
air condition or heating, and separating participants from each other in cubicles.
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Furthermore, the method of experimental economics has its downsides in general. The
most important issue, which was briefly discussed in Section 3.1, concerns external valid-
ity. The significance of the results depends on their transferability to actual, “real world”
contexts. It may well be argued that gambling in the sense of participating in a game,
as which an experimental session might be considered by students, is not comparable to
“regular” decisions when it comes to financial issues.
Moreover, experimental results can be expected to be biased since participants who
volunteer for experiments (even though they are compensated) constitute a distinct
subgroup of the entire population of students, which again constitutes a distinct sub-
group of the population. This holds for recruiting participants from a subject pool—for
which again not every student subscribes—using tools like ORSEE (Greiner, 2004), as
well as for recruiting participants “on the fly” in pedestrian areas or frequented spots
on campus. Using the latter method, it is clear that different characters will respond
differently to being approached by someone who invites them to participate in a “sur-
vey,” “study,” or “experiment.” Also will different characters have a different ex ante
probability of strolling on campus in the first place. Since spontaneous, curious, open-
minded, communicative, and sociable types can be expected to end up participating in
the experiment with a higher probability than reluctant, shy, anxious, timid, or hasty
types, the sample population is necessarily biased in this regard.
Another issue is that questionnaires (with exception of the risk task) generally do not
offer any form of incentives to tell the truth when asking for motives, personality traits,
or other information as simple as gender, age, and major. Also might the societal
connotation of specific aspects be seen as negative, for instance regarding the admission
of feeling envy, which may ultimately distort the measurement. Subjects might simply
not feel obliged to provide true or meaningful information, or, due to concerns of social
desirability over- or understate specific aspects.
Most of the issues listed, after all, are immanent to the method of experimental economics
and the measurement of psychophysiological parameters. Of course, the limitations
and imperfections associated with the methods employed in this work should be taken
into account when interpreting the results. The aspects mentioned point out several
directions for future research.
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6.3. Propositions for Future Work
The previous section illustrated several limitations of this work. Following up on that,
this section now provides propositions for future research in order to rule out shortcom-
ings and extend the scope of the investigation accordingly.
Other risk elicitation tasks. Besides the widely used Holt and Laury (2002) risk
aversion test, there exist other, potentially suitable tests (cf. Section 2.2.2). It would
be of interest to systematically analyze execution times, validity, and correlation among
those measures in a controlled overarching study. In addition to that, online interfaces
would allow to gradually explore personal risk preferences by presenting a sequence of
adaptively fitted choice sets to the subject, also ruling out or discovering systematic
inconsistencies, and thus providing a higher degree of robustness.
Humans & computers in other experiments. The differences in perceiving and
dealing with human and computerized competitors in first-price sealed-bid auctions is
evident. It would be interesting to apply this treatment structure to a wider range
of other competitive and cooperative situations in a comparable manner. Negotiations
represent a scenario in which the collision of human and computerized agents and the
access to psychophysiological parameters appears particularly interesting. Negotiations
yield an even higher degree of interaction than first-price sealed-bid auctions. Here,
feelings for unfair treatment, reciprocity, and revenge might be even more powerful,
since the interaction with the counterpart is much more direct. With that, the impact
of arousal on behavior might be even more effective, be it harmful or beneficial.
Friends & strangers in other experiments. The same thought holds for the type
of the relationship between decision makers. Since this approach is rather novel to the
literature, it would be highly interesting to explore this aspect using a set of economic
standard experiments with a similar friends/ strangers treatment structure. This would
establish an empirical baseline for subsequent experiments and theories to build on. The
charming characteristic of this approach is that, rather than hypothesizing and projecting
laboratory results onto real people with real relationships, it builds on actual, existing
relationships.
All experiments would potentially benefit from raising additional data about the partic-
ipants. The aspects of emotion regulation (cf. Gross and John, 2003), competitiveness
(cf. Griffin-Pierson, 1990), cognitive reflection (cf. Frederick, 2005), and the Big Five
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personality traits (openness, conscientiousness, extraversion, agreeableness, and neuroti-
cism, cf., for instance, McCrae and John (1992)) are particularly noteworthy in this
regard.
Realistic field experiments Another way to approach social facets of decision mak-
ing under risk is to think of situations that naturally provide such a context. The
following example of a Karlsruhe based cocktail bar2 may illustrate that thought. Every
Monday between 5 pm and 8 pm this particular cocktail bar makes the following offer to
groups of customers, assuming that all members of the group order a cocktail. This offer
concerns the ordering and pricing scheme, which is arranged a little different than usu-
ally. The customers’ choices comprise two aspects. First, a cocktail is picked, yielding a
particular price. Second, the consumers individually choose to either pay the fixed price
according to the menu (in this case ranging from e 2.80 to e 5.80), or to alternatively
roll a six-sided die and pay whatever the die shows (e 1.00, e 2.00, ..., or e 6.00). The
choices are made sequentially, i.e., the ith customer is aware of the choices and outcomes
of all i − 1 antecessors. In particular, the role of group conformity together with the
economic and risky aspects of the choice merits further investigation.
Degree of Anonymity. A set of complementary questions between the poles of the
presence of humans/ computers and friends/ strangers is related to their appearance.
Specifically in e-commerce environments, platform operators set the boundaries for the
level of anonymity/ identity, in which users can decide on their profile and appearance.
This concerns a variety of relevant questions, regarding the economics of peer-to-peer and
other online-based market places. For instance, the trade-off between trustworthiness
(much information about your counterpart might be favorable), privacy issues, and effort
barriers (less information might be favorable) is of interest for any platform operator
reasoning on how much information to demand from its users. In this context, profile
pictures might play a particular important role. Where no picture or a meaningless
comic might be considered rather untrustworthy but conserves a high level of privacy,
a real photo (and maybe also the real name) yields the opposite in both regards. The
question is whether, e.g., trusted avatar pictures have the potential to create trust and
preserve privacy at the same time (cf. Teubner et al., 2013).
NeuroIS Applications. A way to develop the thought of using physiological measures
and feedback in economic decision making scenarios further is described by Gimpel et al.

















Emotion Regulation Capabilities 





















Intra-organizational social context 
External social context 
Figure 6.1.: NeuroIS Framework for Emotion Regulation in Management as presented
by Gimpel et al. (2013)
may affect decision making, and especially social interactions are able to cause such
emotions, economic decisions might benefit from the incorporation of these emotions.
Thus, in addition to using physiological measures as explanatory variables ex post, they
might be fed into the decision process right away, for instance in the form of real time
bio-feedback. For means of supporting management decisions with NeuroIS technology,
Gimpel et al. (2013) identifiedMonitoring/ Recording, Live feedback, Warning/ Interven-
tion, and Training as particular relevant. Proxies like heart rate and skin conductance
appear feasible since for these measures, “state-of-the-art sensor technology enables IS
researchers to conduct continuous physiological measurements in an unobtrusive and
unnoticeable way” (Gimpel et al., 2013, p. 4). Overall, this work must be seen as a
limited attempt at bringing together the “hard” facets of economic decision making and




This work attempted to demonstrate that the consideration of risk and social facets is
relevant to economic decision making, particularly so in online based e-commerce and
peer-to-peer applications. Thereby, the aspects of identity versus anonymity, trust, risk
attitude, and existing relationships may be regarded as crucial for the success of a partic-
ular service. Given that peer-to-peer relations now play an important role in e-commerce,
be this a good or bad thing, some findings can punctuated. From anecdotal evidence,
it occurs plausible that risk preferences and social preferences may interact. A decision
maker that fears to end up with less than his peer may be tempted to bear a greater
economic risk than inherently preferred in order to be catching or keeping up “with the
Joneses.” The interaction of social context and risk attitude may thereby affect decision
making in variable ways. Online market contexts appear to be an ideal playing field for
this, since they quantify and lay emphasis on otherwise intangible aspects such as the
perception of peers and relationships. This notion is confirmed by experimental evidence
both from a quite considerable body of literature and the experiments conducted in this
work. Additionally, it could be illustrated from a theoretical point of view. From a
behavioral market engineering perspective, there may be drawn 3 major conclusions.
First, the actual and perceived type of the actors should be considered carefully by market
designers, platform operators, and users. Whether one deals with other human users,
or rather with or against a script or algorithm may make a difference of how a service
is perceived and used. In the context of online auctions, computer opponents appear to
induce less arousal and with that less risk seeking behavior. In some sense, computers
seem to take emotionality out of the market. Given that many important markets
contain both human and computerized agents, understanding the interaction and the
impact of this interaction on behavior and efficiency may provide valuable insights for
the design and operation of such markets. The actual and perceived type of a platform’s
actors can, in this sense, be employed as a design factor by market engineering.
This work considered particularly first-price sealed-bid auctions for that matter, but it
can be assumed that the general principle applies to other contexts as well, potentially
even more so. In regard of technological progress, there is reason to believe that inter-
action between humans and computerized agents will become increasingly important in
business processes and also in daily life. E-commerce naturally “hides” the transaction
partner, both timely and spatially. It might thus be desirable to either create or reduce
ambiguity about the nature of players on the platform. Repeatedly being outperformed
by trading scripts is naturally not a pleasant experience. Competing against deliberately
“flawed” algorithms may be simply more fun, making the user believe to encounter a
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(human) competitor on eye-level, and eventually create higher revenues for the opera-
tor. The factor hedonic value is subject to IS research and highly relevant to e-commerce
practitioners.
Second, the relationships among human decision makers should be considered for market
and mechanism design. They blatantly affect economic decisions. Platform operators
may want to take the existing relationships among their users into account since the
underlying data is available from social networks today. In the context of team compo-
sition, this may help principals at staffing (who to assign to a team, in light of personal
risk profiles and personality traits), incentivizing, determining the sequence of actions,
and also at answering the question of how much information to provide among the
workers (anonymity vs. identity).
The shift towards economic peer-to-peer interactions may be seen as the opposite of, but
very well as the exact same thing as the economization of civic life. Political philosopher
and professor at Harvard University, Michael Sandel3 stated that many economist believe
that markets and commerce were “inert,” i.e. not changing the meaning of the good
being exchanged. He doubts that this holds for social goods and practices. Peer-to-peer
market places may be seen as the marketization of the social sphere to some extent.
Where friends in an online social network serve as a certification of credibility to potential
interaction partners, they inevitably become also a commodity, very much in the sense
of the notion of “social capital.” This is actually not a new phenomenon, limited to the
world of e-commerce. But one wonders, if market thinking and values are not supposed
to be applied to civic life, what does it mean if applied vice versa? Applications like social
trading, peer-to-peer lending, and other services of the peer economy will prospectively
urge this question.
Third, NeuroIS may contribute to a better understanding of the underlying visceral
processes and to supporting human decision making. In particular, the proponents of
the “quantified self”4 movement use technology to gather data about aspects of their
personal daily life. They show a distinct willingness to use such tools to gain knowl-
edge about and improve their routines, physique, reactions, stress levels, etc. Since the
tools for measurement and processing are becoming cheaper and less obtrusive, think
of Apple’s iWatch, the acceptance and use of such applications can certainly be ex-
pected to grow in the future. Once the physiological data has passed the barrier into
the IT system, the possibilities are virtually infinite. Only one application one could
think of, for instance, are employed are private retail traders that get access to their
psychophysiological data using a live bio-feedback device. This device might alarm or





even deter them from trading if—based on heart rate, skin perspiration, pupil dilation,
respiration frequency, or whatever measure is available—their judgment is recognized to
be potentially impaired.
In conclusion, e-commerce cannot be considered as the mere transfer of economic pro-
cesses to the online world. Virtuality, as it was shown, affects several aspects of human
interaction considerably. Activity on future market places will presumably shift towards
online platforms, incorporate rather more than less computerized agents, maybe involve
physiological data, and also the role of peer-to-peer exchange will presumably gain in
importance. With that, notions of risk, trust, identity, reciprocity, human/ computer
sense, relations, and other social facets become vital. In regard of this trend, market
engineering should understand and incorporate the aforementioned aspects into the pro-
cess of designing mechanisms and market places, where economic reasoning may interfere





























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































B.1. Instructions for the Risk Aversion Tasks
This section lists the participants instructions of the short version of the Holt & Laury
Risk Task presented in Chapter 3. The instructions were translated to English from the
original German version.
Welcome and thank you very much for taking the time to participate in this experiment.
Ten percent of all participants, who take the entire task completely, will receive a real
payoff, cash in Euro. How much money this is, depends on the decisions you take during
the experiment.
The payoff session will be held during an entire day at our Institute. You can, if neces-
sary, arrange an individual appointment for the payoff process. You will receive further
information on this after completing the experiment. All your data is treated confiden-
tially, i.e. it is securely stored, not forwarded to any third party and processes only for
scientific purposes.
Note on the chances to be selected for the real payoff and the payoff amounts: Ten percent
of all participants of this experiment will be randomly selected for a real monetary payoff.
For the following decision making, please assume that you were selected and receive a
real payoff.
In each of the following parts of the experiment, you will fill out a questionnaire-like
decision task. For your payoff determination, only one of these questionnaires will be
relevant. Which one it is, is determined randomly, both alternatives are equally likely
(50% each). Here you see an exemplary questionnaire. How the payoff is determined is
now explained in three steps.
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1. Every questionnaire-like decision task entails a number of rows, in each of which
you have to choose one out of two alternatives (A or B). If in one alternative (of a
given row) there is no probability listed next to a payoff amount, this means that
this payoff is certain (100%). If there is displayed only one probability next to the
payoff amount, the alternative probability will result in a payoff of e 0.-.
2. After having completed the task, one of the rows will be selected randomly and
your decision for A or B is looked up. At that, every row is equally likely to be
selected. Thus eventually, only one row will be relevant for payoff!
3. The lottery (A or B) you have chosen in the randomly selected row will be played.
For this, a ten-sided die is used (more details are provided in the examples below).
B.2. Instructions for the Auction Study
This section lists the participants instructions of the study presented in Chapter 4.
The instructions were translated to English from the original German version. The
instructions were almost identical for both treatments, with exception of the references
to the other bidders (either other human participants or computerized bidding agents).
The alternative text snippets for the “computerized opponents” treatment are provided
in square brackets.
You are about to participate in an experiment of economic decision making. During
the experiment, your skin conductance, pulse, and heart rate are recorded. You can
earn real money in this experiment. How much money you earn depends on both your
decisions and the decisions of the other participants in this room [the computerized
bidding agents]. The experiment consists of 30 consecutive auctions. The experimental
software manages a cash account for you that balances gains and losses out of the 30
auctions. A positive cash balance is paid to you at the end of the experiment, a negative
one is claimed. During the experiment, gains and losses are calculated in monetary
units (MU). 16 MU equal a real amount of e 1.-. 1 MU therefore equals 6.25 Euro cents.
Communication between participants is not allowed.
Design of an Auction. In each auction you bid for a fictitious asset. Information
about your personal resale value of the asset is given to you prior to an auction. This
value is known only to you. Within each auction you and two other participants [com-
puterized bidding agents] compete in an auction. [The computerized bidding agents
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follow a strategy that you do not know.] The two other bidders also receive their per-
sonal resale value prior to the auction and it is known only to them. As soon as the
auction starts, you have the possibility to place your bid via a number pad. If you make
a mistake you can correct your bid through clicking on the Correct button. It deletes
the last digit you entered. You finally place your bid by clicking on Submit Bid. [The
computerized bidding agents bid simultaneously and do not know about other bids.]
If all bidders made their bid, the one with the highest bid is determined. This bidder
wins the auction and pays the price he or she bid for the asset. If two or more bidders
place the same highest bid, the experimental software selects one of them by equal
chances. If you are not the highest bidder you receive a payoff of zero. If you are the
highest bidder your payoff is calculated in the following way: Payoff = Personal Resale
Value – Price
The Personal Resale Value. Prior to every auction you and the other participants
[computerized bidding agents] receive information about your personal resale value but
not about the resale value of the others. In each auction, you exactly know the height
of your personal resale value for this particular auction.
The personal resale value is drawn independently out of the integer values between 11
and 110 for each bidder. Every value is equally likely to be chosen. This corresponds to
an urn with 100 balls, which are labeled with numbers from 11 to 110. A random draw
from the urn determines the resale value of the bidder’s asset. After the draw the ball
is put back into the urn and the resale value for the next bidder is drawn. The winner
of an auction obtains her personal resale value minus her bid. This connection should
be explained through an example. Assume that you have a personal resale value of 65
MU and you have been the bidder with the highest bid. Then there are the following
cases:
1. Bid lies above resale value, e.g. 67 MU → Loss of 65 MU − 67 MU = −2 MU,
2. Bid equals resale value, i.e. 65 MU → Zero payoff: 65 MU − 65 MU = 0 MU,
3. Bid lies below resale value, e.g. 61 MU → Gain of 65 MU − 61 MU = 4 MU.
If one of the other participants (computerized bidding agents) is the highest bidder, the
auction ends and you receive a payoff of zero.
Course of the Experiment. After the instruction phase there are five practice pe-
riods to gain a better understanding of the experiment. Gains and losses out of these
practice periods are not considered for the later payoff. After the practice periods there
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is a five-minute resting period where a fixation cross appears on the computer screen.
The resting period is essential for the physiological measurement and later data analysis.
Stay calm during this phase and try to move as little as possible. The main course of the
experiment consists of 30 consecutive periods where each of the six participants plays
against two other participants (computerized bidding agents). In every period you and
the other participants [computerized bidding agents] of your group participate in one
auction as described above. After every period you are randomly re-matched to a new
group of three bidders. Thus, you will play against frequently changing participants
[computerized bidding agents]. The result of one auction does not affect following auc-
tions. [Please note that the other five participants in this room do not have any influence
on your auction outcome including gains and losses. Six participants are present because
this laboratory has six places.]
Payment. At the end of the 30 periods a positive cash balance is paid to you and a
negative one is claimed. The cash balance in MU is multiplied with a factor of 1/16 to
get the payoff in Euro. I.e. if you have a cash balance of 400 MU you obtain a payment
of 25 EUR. 1 MU equals 6.25 Euro cents.
... and finally, some comments. If you have any questions regarding the experi-
ment, please remain seated, raise your hand and wait until the experimenter approaches
you. Then, ask your question as quiet as possible. Only use your free hand to interact
with the experiment system. The hand linked to the physiological measurement system
must remain as calm as possible during the whole experiment. Try to avoid every move-
ment as this can distort the measurement. Upon the end of the experiment, remain
seated and wait until the experimenter has removed the electrodes from your arm and
wrist. The participant instructions remain at your place. Before the experiment starts,
you are going to answer some questions of general understanding about the rules of
the experiment on your computer screen. Then, five practice periods are performed as
described above. Gains and losses are not considered here. Then the five-minute resting
period starts and therewith the actual experiment. Important note: Please click your
mouse as quiet as possible and with little effort. You will now be equipped with earmuffs
to reduce the influence of background noise.
B.3. Instructions for the 2-Person Risk Game
This section lists the participants instructions of the 2-person risk game experiment
presented in Chapter 5. The instructions were translated to English from the original
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German version. These instructions presented in form of an audio track and were part
of a 3 minute slide show video, which participants watched together on a computer
screen.
Welcome. You and the other participant are engaging in an economic experiment, in
which you can earn real money in cash. This tutorial video explains the game you will
play and the procedure of the experiment.
At the beginning of the experiment you will see this game board in front of you on your
tablet computer. You will choose one of the four boxes by touching it on the screen.
Each of the boxes represents one of the numbers 1 through 4 of a four-sided die. At that,
each of the numbers is equally likely (25 percent). You earn e 4.- if the dice actually
shows your number. Furthermore, you can select an entire row, that is, two numbers at
once. In this case you win, if either the one, or the other number in shown by the die.
The amount you earn then is e 2.-.
Before the winning number is actually determined, you and the other participant ex-
change your tablet computers.
You now play the game, as described above, and again select a number or row of your
choice. However, now, it is visible to you, which box or row was selected by the other
player in the first stage of the game. The other participant’s choice does not limit your
possibilities of choice and does neither impair your chances of winning, nor your payoffs.
You can, similar to the first stage, select any of the four boxes, as well as one of the two
rows.
After that, one of the two tablet computers is selected at random and the winning
number is determined using the four-sided die. Depending on the choices of you and the
other participant, both then receive an independent payoff of either e 2.-, e 4.-, or e 0.-.
Please note: only one of your two decision will actually be relevant for payoff, either
from the first or from the second stage of the game. Which one it will be, is determined
randomly.
An example: Player “black” has selected the box number 4, player “green” has selected
the lower row, that is, the numbers 3 and 4. Now, the die actually shows a four. Player
“black” then receives e 4.-, player “green” accordingly receives e 2.-.
After the experiment, we ask you to fill out a short questionnaire and a receipt for
you cash payoff, provided that you win. We are happy to ask any remaining questions
regarding the game or the procedure of the experiment, if you have.
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Thank you very much for your participation. You can now take off the head phones.
After the 2-person risk game experiment, subjects conducted the short version of the
Holt and Laury (2002) risk aversion task. The graphical representation of the task, as
presented to subjects (in German language originally) is depicted in Figure B.1. The
instructions for this task were as follows:
Figure B.1.: Graphical representation of the HL5 risk aversion task.
You now choose five times between a safe payoff (on the left hand side) and a lottery
(right hand side). Please indicate for each instance, which alternative you prefer. One of
the five instances will afterward be selected randomly (equal probabilities of 20 percent
each). If you have chosen the safe payoff in the selected instance, this amount of money
will be payed out to you right away. If you have chosen the lottery, a die will decide
whether you win, or not.
Please note: You can earn real money in this task. Please note also: Only one of your
five decisions will actually be relevant for payoff.
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Appendix C. Correlation Tables and Logit Regressions
Table C.3.: Logit regression coefficients and significance levels for the friends treatment.
Dependent variables are (i) level of risk (1st stage), (ii) level of risk (2nd
stage), (iii) duplication, and (iv) risk change from first to second stage.
Method: enter. ε = 0.001.
(i) risk (1) (ii) risk (2) (iii) duplicate (iv) risk change
coef. sig. coef. sig. coef. sig. coef. sig.
high-risk (1) — — 2.374 < ε .561 .202 1.956 < ε
high-risk (2) — — — — -.464 .282 -1.719 < ε
duplicate — — -.273 .408 — — -.721 .041
risk change — — -1.730 < ε -.946 .028 — —
envy -.597 < ε -.293 .018 -.021 .853 .170 .155
gloating .681 < ε .254 .034 .083 .449 .191 .102
constant .076 .708 -1.166 < ε -1.080 < ε -1.819 < ε
Observations 314 314 314 314
Nagelkerke R2 .246 .410 .033 .257
0-hitrate .532 .592 .752 .723
hitrate .653 .911 .752 .901
Table C.4.: Logit regression coefficients and significance levels for the strangers treat-
ment. Dependent variables are (i) level of risk (1st stage), (ii) level of risk
(2nd stage), (iii) duplication, and (iv) risk change from first to second stage.
Method: enter. ε = 0.001.
(i) risk (1) (ii) risk (2) (iii) duplicate (iv) risk change
coef. sig. coef. sig. coef. sig. coef. sig.
high-risk (1) — — 1.106 .003 .559 .191 .069 .852
high-risk (2) — — — — -1.424 .001 -.067 .860
duplicate — — -1.317 .001 — — -.352 .353
risk change — — -.060 .873 -.510 .224 — —
envy -.621 < ε -.479 .004 -.092 .555 .321 .033
gloating .479 .001 .311 .046 -.054 .705 .129 .344
constant .287 .284 .216 .571 .044 .907 -1.195 .007
Observations 166 166 166 166
Nagelkerke R2 .185 .290 .120 .069
0-hitrate .518 .518 .663 .663




































































(c) λ, friends treatment.































































(c) λ, strangers treatment.































































(c) λ, friends treatment.
































































(c) λ, strangers treatment.































































(c) λ, friends treatment.































































(c) λ, strangers treatment.
Figure D.6.: Tan and Bolle (2006) model, strangers treatment.
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(c) λ, friends treatment.



































































(c) λ, strangers treatment.
Figure D.8.: Cox et al. (2007) model, strangers treatment.
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Appendix E.
Formal Representation of Best
Response Indifference Curves
Table E.1.: Response to high-risk, 1− r = 0.5 (risk averse)
α < 1 α ≥ 1
HHdup = HHdiv β = α+ 2
√
α β = α+ 2
√
α
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√
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√
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Appendix E. Formal Representation of Best Response Indifference Curves
Table E.2.: Response to high-risk, 1− r = 2.0 (risk seeking)
α < 1 α ≥ 1
HHdup = HHdiv β =
√
α2 + 1− 1 β =
√
α2 + 1− 1
HHdup = HLdup β =
√
−α2 + 2α+ 3− 1 β =
√
α2 − 2α+ 5− 1








α2 + 1− 1








3α2 + 2α− 1− 3)
HHdiv = HLdiv β = −1 β = −1
HLdup = HLdiv β =
√
5α2 − 2α+ 1− 1 β =
√
3α2 + 2α− 1− 1
Table E.3.: Response to low-risk, 1− r = 0.5 (risk averse)




α2 + α+ 3α
LHdup = LLdup β = α+ 4
√
α+ 2
LHdup = LLdiv β = 19(−4
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α2 + 3α+ 5α− 6)
LHdiv = LLdup β = 2α+ 4
√
α+ 1
LHdiv = LLdiv β = −1
LLdup = LLdiv β = α+ 2
√
α
Table E.4.: Response to low-risk, 1− r = 2.0 (risk seeking)
LHdup = LHdiv β = 13(
√
3α2 + 4− 2)
LHdup = LLdup β =
√
α2 + 2− 2
LHdup = LLdiv β =
√
α2 + 2




α2 + 1− 2)
LHdiv = LLdiv β = −1
LLdup = LLdiv β =
√
α2 + 1− 1
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